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Preface 
Weak governance has been identified as one of the obstacles for develop-
ment, particularly in African states. Western development partners, but in-
creasingly also African institutions, are searching for ways to support positive 
governance practice and aspire to highlight good practice in governance in 
Africa. Ghana is usually regarded as a ‘good performer’ both in economic 
and – not less so – in political terms. The country cultivates a self-perception 
of being “the frontrunner” in Africa: the first to have won independence, the 
first to have re-emerged from prolonged authoritarian and military rule with a 
successful transition to democratic rule. And, since January 2009, the first to 
have seen two peaceful and democratic changes in government in a row. In 
brief, Ghana appears to be amongst the first to look at when one wants to see 
‘good news’ from Africa. The country also seized an opportunity to be the 
first with the NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development) initiative 
of an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). This study looks into 
Ghana’s experience with the process and its follow-up in the West African 
country.  
This study is the result of research carried out in the framework of the Ger-
man Development Institute’s Training Programme for young professionals. 
Research was conducted in 2006 and 2007, with empirical research in Ghana 
undertaken between February and April 2007. The project was carried out in 
close cooperation with the Center for Democratic Development (CDD-
Ghana) in Accra and with the South African Institute for Security Studies 
(ISS). The authors’ colleagues Daniel Armah-Attoh of CDD-Ghana and 
Prince Mashele of ISS both had in-depth knowledge about the APRM. They 
were of invaluable help in conceptual discussions and logistical matters as 
well as great fun to work with. The team expresses its particular gratitude to 
both these counterparts. 
Our thanks also goes to our interviewees in Ghana, who took their valuable 
time to share their opinions and experiences with us, not least so to the mem-
bers of Ghana’s National Governing Council and their always busy yet ap-
proachable Secretary-General, Francis Appiah. Furthermore, the Accra office 
of the Hanns-Seidel-Foundation provided invaluable logistical support as 
well as the willingness to share insight into the APRM process from the per-
spective of a political foundation. Therefore, we are thankful to Elmar Frank 
and his team, Katharina Patzelt and Esther Kouassi! 
We very much appreciate that some of our Ghanaian interviewees took addi-
tional time and effort to participate in our validation workshop in Accra in 
April 2007. For some, this meant cumbersome travels from the North and the 
Centre of Ghana to the coastal capital. We are grateful for their insights and 
comments. Our colleague Michael Brüntrup at the DIE in Bonn was particu-
larly helpful during research design and when pulling everything together for 
our conclusions. Jörn Grävingholt and Susanne Neubert also contributed with 
their expertise to finalising this study. Last, but not least, Fatia Elsermann 
undertook the technical realisation.  
Many thanks to everyone for their contributions! 
 
Bonn, April 2009 Sven Grimm 
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Executive Summary 
Governance has been an important issue in international development discus-
sion since the end of the Cold War. African governments have come on board 
this discussion only relatively late. One key issue being discussed in Africa is 
NEPAD, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, which has preceded 
the African Union (AU) and was later announced as an AU programme. The 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was declared a key tool for the 
improvement of governance in Africa, being ‘at the heart of NEPAD’. It is a 
voluntary mechanism, to be acceded by signing a Memorandum of Under-
standing on the conduct of the process. The idea of the APRM is to mutually 
evaluate the quality of governance on a voluntary, but standardised basis in 
four areas: (i) democratic and political governance, (ii) economic governance 
and management, (iii) corporate governance, and (iv) socio-economic devel-
opment. For each area, there are guiding objectives, standards, criteria and 
indicators for the assessment which link back to AU norms.  
Basic guidelines for the process were formulated and (continental) institu-
tions established. These institutions are  
— the APR Forum (of Heads of State and Government),  
— a Panel of Eminent Persons (in order to increase credibility),  
— a supporting APR Secretariat (based in Midrand, South Africa),  
— a Country Review Mission per country under scrutiny (lead by one of 
the Eminent Persons per country, and assembled only for this purpose),  
— and APRM partner institutions, such as the UN Economic Commission 
for Africa (UNECA) and the African Development Bank.  
The process of a peer review is done with the involvement of the above men-
tioned institutions and undergoes five phases. (I) In a preparatory phase, 
national institutions are established for the conduct of the self-assessment in-
country. The self-assessment in Ghana was supervised by an independent, 
small and efficient governing council with support by expert groups in so-
called technical teams. The latter collected and presented evidence on gov-
ernance situation in all four areas under scrutiny. (II) The report coming from 
this self-assessment is used as the basis for a country review mission, consist-
ing of continental reviewers and headed by one of the ‘eminent persons’ at 
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the continental level. The country mission was relatively short (around two 
weeks), but could indeed alter some emphasis in the report. In Ghana, this 
control-function in some cases has indeed worked and issues like chieftaincy, 
for instance, were attributed some more attention. The third phase is the com-
pilation of the APR (African Peer Review) country report proper (III), includ-
ing recommendations by the panel of eminent persons and a draft programme 
of action to suggest necessary reforms in areas under scrutiny. Only then, in 
phase four, do we see a peer review proper (IV), i. e. the discussion of the 
country report amongst heads of state at the fringes of an African Union 
summit. This peer review is conducted behind closed doors and no report was 
published before. Only after the peer review – latest 6 months after it – the 
APR county report is published, which represents the fifth and final stage of 
the APRM (V). While the self-assessment in Ghana involved civil society to 
a high degree and in an exemplary manner, the subsequent phases happen 
without participation of civil society. This long delay between concluding the 
self-assessment and having the final report published is unfortunate, as it 
contributes to rumours about the content of the report and to a feeling of lack 
of transparency in the process. It also leads to a severe bottleneck in numbers 
of reports that can be published, as only four ordinary peer reviews were 
scheduled by year. By the end 2008, six reports were published (Ghana, 
Rwanda, Kenya, South Africa, Algeria, Benin) and a few others (Nigeria, 
Burkina Faso, Uganda) await their actual peer review or the publication of 
their APRM report. The cycle of a peer review is expected start again after 
three to four years, in order to scrutinize areas of progress and provide for 
peer learning of well-functioning structures and policies.  
The process and its incentive structure is predominantly based on the peer 
element, where a “club mentality” prevails and pressure is preferably exer-
cised behind closed doors. Yet, in all cases thus far, the continental structures 
have taken influence to varying degree. In the case of Ghana, innovations in 
institutions were established at the country level. Both a small and civil soci-
ety driven national Governing Council were established and professional 
expertise by so-called technical teams were sought (from outside govern-
ment; double-checked by anonymous academic reviewers). The process in 
Ghana was thus organised in an open and credible way, offering opportunities 
for civil society and keeping a very low profile for government in the process.  
The review aspires to be a comprehensive exercise regarding the content, yet 
The African Peer Review Mechanism as a tool to improve governance?  
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some topics are not sufficiently covered, such as agriculture or the informal 
sector, despite their importance for large parts of the populace. This appears 
to be a structural negligence, due to the template questionnaire established at 
continental level. Issues concerning politically sensitive areas or minority 
groups have, indeed, been put on the agenda by (a) advocacy institutions in 
Ghana, and (b) by the continental structures, e. g. after the country review 
mission headed by the South African Chris Stals in the case of Ghana. 
Ghana’s report is indeed comprehensive (with some caveats) and it addresses 
critical issues on a range of political levels, not shying away from criticising 
important pillars of the political system and also addressing issues of rele-
vance in the area of human rights. The politically sensitive issue of corruption 
is given adequate attention at various levels, including detailed recommenda-
tions.  
However, implementing the recommendations of the APRM remains a criti-
cal point. The experience in Ghana illustrates that civil society groups are 
limited in their watchdog function lacking both information and capacity. 
Even though stakeholders acknowledge the positive role of the Ghanaian peer 
review for the country, little evidence was found in early 2007 that the report 
was actually used as a tool for advocacy by civil society or a reference for 
government. In July 2008 parliament had just decided that it would regularly 
present APRM progress reports for general debates in its plenary sessions. 
Thus, there are some encouraging signs, but – generally speaking – few and 
those have come quite late.  
When regarding the roles of stakeholders in the process and in its follow up, a 
key question is how external actors should engage with it. A crucial element 
in the APRM and its appeal to political actors in Africa is its African nature. 
The APRM therefore – if made use of strategically – can be a vehicle to fur-
ther foster African ownership of the governance agenda. However, potential 
free-riders on the reputation of APRM participants continue to be a problem 
and require pertinent political will not to water down the process and content 
of the Peer Review. External actors can only support the process carefully. 
Direct funding to APRM institutions, for instance, could potentially under-
mine the political ownership and have unintended effects on the peer re-
view’s legitimacy. A possible level of external engagement would be funding 
for the implementation of APRM action plans. This would support the idea of 
the process as a credit rating exercise, and thereby increase the incentives for 
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African states to participate. However, it also raises questions. First, the qual-
ity of these plans will vary from country to country, depending on the na-
tional capacity. Secondly, the relation of APRM programmes of action to 
other existing documents (in particular Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers - 
PRSPs) is not clear and would have to be looked into. And thirdly, imple-
mentation plans should not be regarded as technocratic routes to develop-
ment. Yet, support to meaningful plans would create incentives to conduct 
the process properly and might support political discussions within partner 
countries. For weaker countries, less elaborate or less ambitious plans might 
have to be supported by donors in order to enable capacity building and 
maintain incentives for participation.  
From a donor perspective, more importantly, the documents can – and should 
– feed into the high-level political dialogue and sector-policy dialogues with 
developing countries. The APRM can already be politically supported with-
out fundamentally readjusting support. Donors, while supporting government 
and civil society, can indirectly support the APRM by making reference to 
them when engaging with countries that have conducted a peer review.  
This report sees the APRM as a contribution to improving governance in 
Ghana. Yet, it was not – and was probably not meant to be – the ‘silver bul-
let’ to solve all problems. The report formulated recommendations to various 
levels of stakeholders as lessons learnt from the process in Ghana: 
1. What the continental level should do: 
— Insist on the commitment of participating states in order to tackle the 
problem of free-riders. One cure could be providing a minimum time 
limit after which a country has to conduct its review once it has acceded 
the ARPM. Another issue to consider might be different levels of par-
ticipation, e. g. who has full voice at the table of heads of states and who 
listens in?  
— Include national APR Commissions in the basic guidelines: Ghana has 
introduced a national APR Governing Council. This institution has been 
included by the APRM Headquarters (Midrand) in some charts and 
presentations. They should be included in the base document for the 
APRM.  
— Think about basic principles for the setup of the APR Commission at the 
country level: The composition and size of the governing council ap-
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pears to be crucial for the effectiveness and efficiency of the process. It 
might be useful to define an absolute maximum number and probably 
some fundamental guidelines for the composition of that body, i. e. a 
minimum representation of civil society.  
— Have civil society organisation lead the self-assessment: it will be cru-
cial to stick to African expertise beyond government so as (a) maintain 
credibility and (b) not to undermine the ownership, while (c) building up 
capacity in Africa. Furthermore, with regard to the methodology, the 
double-checking of information provided by the technical teams was 
successful in Ghana and should be retained as standard in other assess-
ments.  
— Strengthen the Country Review Missions: There is a specific respon-
sibility of the Panel of Eminent Persons (and the Country Review Mis-
sion – CRM) in safeguarding the standards. The CRM was a crucial ex-
ternal check for legitimacy even in the good practice case of Ghana; it is 
of high importance to marginalised groups in society, as it can act as an 
external advocate. A strengthening could take the form of extending the 
period of time envisaged for this stage of the external investigation.  
— Revise the timeline for the peer review: Several observers felt that there 
was not enough time for the country self-assessment; we would also ar-
gue that the CRM was too short. Time can and should be saved, how-
ever, at the end of the peer discussion: the APR Forum only meets every 
six months and thus creates a bottleneck.  
— Improve the continental questionnaire: Topics such as agriculture and 
the informal sector need further elaboration; they are very important to 
large parts of the Ghanaian population – and more broadly, Africa – and 
their coverage in the APRM to date is too weak. Furthermore, the 
APRM is currently a stocktaking exercise, which could also look at pro-
spective challenges.  
2. What the national level in Ghana should do: 
— Start preparing the second, regular peer review in Ghana: four years 
after completing the base survey, the next peer review would be due ac-
cording to the declared intentions of the APRM.  
— Consider staffing and funding of the APRM: structures need to be 
strengthened if the exercise is meant seriously.   
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— Focus on core tasks: Prioritising is a key issue for the national APRM 
Secretariat. Don’t stretch capacity too far, i. e. apply the right level of 
subsidiarity. It might be more crucial for the national APRM Secretariat 
to actually monitor (and lobby) national government and to train / sensi-
tise staff in the regions than to conduct regional workshops itself.  
— Build on existing structures for dissemination: And do not stretch them 
too far. Linked to the plans to engage National Commission for Civic 
Education (NCCE) more in dissemination, it seems to be advisable to 
concentrate on pilot districts, in order to learn from experiences made 
there rather than spreading resources thin across the country.  
— Focus on the value-added of the APRM to key groups: It is hard to im-
age that a majority of the (literate) population would read the compre-
hensive and technical APR report from A to Z. It might better to provide 
more comprehensible information by providing shorter versions with a 
sector-focus rather than a 20-page report on overall governance in 
Ghana. This concise document could also enhance monitoring the im-
plementation, as civil society organisations would be better informed to 
fulfil their watchdog role. 
— Print more copies of the report in English: The strategy sketched above 
would also make translations of the overall report into local languages a 
secondary task, as the target audience of the entire report is the literate 
elite throughout the country that was trained in English.  
— For the next recruitment, treat a media officer as priority: Recruiting a 
permanent media officer could improve communication within APR 
structures.  
3. What civil society should do 
— Use the APRM documents as reference in advocacy work: Government 
has committed itself to implementing recommendations. This com-
prehensive report offers a lot of information and recommendations.  
— Consider shadow implementation reports: This would meet the watch-
dog function civil society also has in its respective areas of work. This 
requires funding of activities, of course. If development partners are se-
rious about their interest in the APRM, they should be one potential 
source of funding for Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) monitor-
ing exercises.  
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4. What development partners should do 
Development partners in a context of high donor-dependency like in many 
African countries have a particular interest in and responsibility for govern-
ance in African states.  
— Consider greater flexibility of the respective structures in-country: This 
concerns particularly engaging with parastatal actors like the national 
APRM structure. It needs to be applied carefully, though, as direct fund-
ing of the APR structures could potentially undermine the process. The 
APRM could appear as a ‘donor-driven’ project. 
— Use the APRM report and its programme of action: Reference to the 
APRM in work in the partner country would strengthen the soft-law 
process in the country. A strategy of supporting the APRM could also be 
applied in cases where special technical engagement (capacity building 
or the like) is necessary.  
— Develop a dialogue with African governments on sequencing: Key issue 
for this dialogue should be possibly better sequencing exercises like the 
elaboration of PRSPs and APRM. Both ultimately remain a task for Af-
rican governments. Both exercises might complement each other. Their 
elaboration, however, involves much energy, capacity and funds from a 
range of local actors and thus the respective focus should be clear. 
Capacity constraints appear to be dominant in Ghana, despite overall leader-
ship in the APRM process. This can expected to be the case in other African 
countries – to the same degree or even more so. It is via processes that actors 
can develop capacities. In its non-conflictual form, it might actually be suit-
able to engage in a constructive discussion if the national policy framework is 
not fundamentally averse to engaging with civil society. In this regard, the 
APRM – though not the panacea to Africa’s development – can contribute to 
improve governance in Africa.  
 
 
 
 

The African Peer Review Mechanism as a tool to improve governance?  
German Development Institute 9 
1 Introduction 
A good record in governance is broadly regarded as key to economic success 
and sustainable development. Both African and international actors from civil 
society highlight governance as key to social, political, and economic suc-
cess. And also African governments have started to come on board of this 
consensus. Yet, governance is often seen as critically weak in African states. 
In the past, African governments have recalled the strict Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) principle of non-interference in order not to be held 
accountable for bad governance by their peers. Bad governance was thus not 
addressed and was allowed to stifle the continents’ economic prospects. In 
2001, some ‘like-minded’ heads of state joined forces and launched the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). NEPAD is based on com-
mon norms for good governance and democracy. After the foundation of the 
African Union (AU) in 2002, NEPAD became its socio-economic programme 
and thus expanding from the group of ‘like-minded’ to the entire continent. 
NEPAD is admittedly not the first development initiative elaborated by Afri-
can leaders, but it is the first that – in its basic documents – shares widespread 
Northern perceptions of Africa’s own responsibility for its development and 
the hereby concerned role of governance. Consequently, it attracts much 
attention and creates high expectations of the international community. 
NEPAD’s key objective is to support the continent’s development by foster-
ing good governance. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is a 
programme within NEPAD, often claimed to be ‘at the heart of it’. The 
APRM is a voluntary process with 29 country members at present. This was a 
noticeable ‘first’ in Africa, which had previously been prone to consensus 
moves.  
The founding idea of the APRM is to mutually evaluate the quality of gov-
ernance on a voluntary, but standardised basis in four areas: (i) democratic 
and political governance, (ii) economic governance and management, (iii) 
corporate governance, and (iv) socio-economic development. The aspirations 
of the APRM are thus broad – much broader than, for instance, specific peer 
reviews conducted in the framework of the Organisation for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD) in areas like education or development 
cooperation. The African peer review mechanism – like any peer mechanism 
– is intended to foster peer learning and, if necessary, create political peer 
pressure between African heads of state and government. Beyond this, how-
ever, it also – and possibly more so – provides an opportunity for civil society 
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to make its voice heard. By early 2009 six countries have completed the 
APRM: Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, South Africa, Algeria, and Benin, with an 
additional three almost finished at the time of writing, namely: Burkina Faso, 
Nigeria and Uganda (see Diagram 1 below). 
Diagram 1: APRM participating states and status of their respective review 
 
Source: http://www.uneca.org/aprm/CountriesStatus.asp (downloaded 16 Jan.
 2009) 
This study examines the case of Ghana, the pioneer in the process. Ghana 
was the first country to undergone the process and to publish the findings. 
The country declared its willingness to accede to the APRM in October 2002, 
at a time, when the framework for the review had not yet been established. In 
February 2004, the Heads of State and Government Forum in Kigali an-
nounced that Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda and Mauritius would be the first four 
countries to be reviewed (UNECA 2005a, 9).1 Indeed, Ghana welcomed the 
country review mission in April 2005 and was the first country to be re-
                                                          
1  The process in Mauritius derailed and the APRM process in the country was stalled. It has 
been overtaken by others in the process, as Diagram 1 illustrates.  
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viewed at the Forum of Heads of State and Government in January 2006. 
Ghana is often perceived as not only chronologically leading in the process 
but also in terms of quality (cf. Busia 2006; Weyel 2006). With this example, 
Ghana has also had an impact on the shaping and refining of core documents, 
national institutions and gained first experiences with the process in Africa. 
The aim is to provide information about the APR process and its impact on 
the national level in Ghana and its potential beyond this West African state. 
The APR process – and thus the period covered by this study – formally 
started in 2003 by the Ghanaian government’s adoption of the relevant 
documents and was officially finalised in 2006 by the presentation given by 
Ghana’s then President Kufuor to his peer and the subsequent publication of 
the country report and programme of action (PoA).  
The conduct of the peer review process itself is one dimension for its success. 
Process, however important, is yet only one dimension. The APRM cannot be 
assessed without its outcome. This study thus examines the process dimen-
sion, the specific policy recommendations of the report, and first steps to 
implementation. Even if the empirical research in country took place at a 
relatively early stage – between February and May 2007 – indications were 
sought on how stakeholders engage with implementation. What happened 
during and after the compilation of the Ghana peer review report? By answer-
ing the question of how meaningful the review was, we can make a qualified 
statement about the value of the APRM as a tool to improve governance in 
Ghana.  
1.1 Why is the APRM relevant to development 
 cooperation? 
The term governance embraces different aspects and can be subdivided at 
least into political, economic, and administrative governance. The importance 
of governance concerning development relies on the formation of insti 
tutional structures (cf. North 1993). These structures offer a framework for 
interaction of stakeholders; they define the rules of the game (cf. Giddens 
1984). The basic assumption is that if these structures are designed for pro-
viding accountability, transparency and responsiveness, the potential for 
economic and social development will be enhanced.  
With the end of the Cold War, the context for development cooperation 
changed profoundly. Cooperation policies adapted to the changing context 
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among other things by highlighting the significance of governance as key to 
economic success and sustainable development. This frame of reference – 
governance regarded as key element – was taken over by the international 
development agenda and found its specification in a range of new instruments 
like the Poverty Reduction Strategic Papers (PRSPs) or the Millennium De-
velopment Goals (MDGs). A World Bank study of 1989 on Sub-Sahara Af-
rica (From Crisis to Sustainable Growth) became the starting point of an 
international discussion about the role of institutions, transparency and ac-
countability (World Bank 1989); the latter have become accepted as princi-
ples of good governance (see below, section 2.1.1). Since these impulses, 
concepts have evolved from an exclusive orientation on economic or techni-
cal constraints of development to a broader concept that includes the political 
aspects related to economic and social development (cf. Adam 2000; Mkan-
dawire 2004; UNECA / OECD / DAC 2005). Discussion about the impor-
tance of governance in development has further gained momentum with the 
adoption of the Millennium Development Declaration of the United Nations 
in the year 2000. Based on this declaration, signed by 189 member states, 
eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were established. The Millen-
nium Declaration included a commitment to good governance, development 
and poverty reduction from both donor countries and developing countries. 
This consensual international development agenda emphasises the key ideas 
of responsibility of the developed as well as the developing countries, the 
need for national ownership and accountability between all stakeholders. 
These principles are regarded as essential to reach the agreed MDGs (cf. 
BMZ 2006; Loewe 2005; UNDP 2003). 
Moreover, in cooperation policies, the orientation towards national develop-
ment strategies and budget support is seen as an important way to enhance 
aid effectiveness, as formulated by the Paris Declaration in 2005 and reaf-
firmed in Accra in September 2008. This is explained by the fact that it builds 
up responsibility of the development partners (in aligning to and supporting 
national strategies) as well as of the partner countries, which are responsible 
for their own national strategies. Budget support and other forms of pro-
gramme-based approaches became central in the discussion about develop-
ment cooperation; these new modes of development cooperation came with 
implications (and conditions) for the governance of partner countries: The 
programmes as well as the coordination and alignment of development part-
ners’ engagement within the programmes are planed, managed and run by the 
partner countries (cf. Klingebiel / Leiderer / Schmidt 2005, 73 ff.). In general, 
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good governance or concrete measures to strengthen governance on the part-
ner side are seen as a basic requirement for budget support. There are still 
some important issues and challenges that need to be further debated in inter-
national discussion such as conditionality or weaknesses in public manage-
ment in a number of partner countries.  
In reaction to NEPAD, the G8 adopted an Africa Action Plan in June 2002 in 
which they expressed their political intention to support NEPAD’s implemen-
tation. Much hope was put on the APRM, which, it was hoped, would lead to 
a revitalisation of African policy-making with a view to reforms in order to 
improve the socio-economic performance. Within the Africa Action Plan, the 
G8 states also declared support for the African Peer Review Process (cf. G8 
2002). To underline the importance of the APRM, the G8 stated that acceding 
to the peer review process was a pre-condition for preferred partnerships. 
Preferred partners, it was promised, would benefit from enhanced develop-
ment support, intense political exchange, additional debt relief, etc.  
The APR process has attracted much international awareness, but the ques-
tion remains if it is a meaningful approach to improve governance. In contrast 
to the great international attention and support, evidence on practice and the 
situation on-site has not been examined. Can the process fulfil the interna-
tional expectations and can it shoulder the mentioned advance in trust? Do 
international actors engage adequately with it? 
1.2 Research question and structure of the report  
The aim of this study is to examine the APRM in Ghana in the light of its 
aspirations to serve as a tool to improve governance. The study applies quali-
tative research. The central aim of qualitative social research in general is to 
document, to reconstruct analytically, and to comprehend the process of con-
stitution of reality (cf. Lamnek 1993). Thus, in addition to literature, this 
study is mainly based on semi-structured interviews conducted in Ghana from 
February to April 2007.2 
Fundamental precondition for the improvement of governance performance − 
respect for key democratic principles such as freedom of expression and 
regular elections − can be regarded as given in Ghana. The study aims to 
                                                          
2  More details on methodology can be found in the annex to this study.  
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identify good practice in the conduct of the peer review in Ghana, aspiring to 
find good practice that could be a point of reference for other APRM proc-
esses. This research will provide an analysis of different stakeholders’ role in 
the process with a focus on the extent to which stakeholders were able to play 
a meaningful part. Moreover, it analyses the coverage of critical issues identi-
fied by the APRM and to what extent stakeholders were able to bring forward 
their respective issues of interest. Furthermore, this study aims at deriving 
conclusions about stakeholders’ role in the follow-up and about the institu-
tionalisation of the process.  
To investigate the potential and significance of the APRM concerning the 
improvement of governance, some general conditions have to be met. Conse-
quently, the Ghanaian process has to be tested against the fulfilment of these 
conditions. First, the APR reference documents need to be meaningful. The 
APR process needs to ensure minimum standards and be soundly value-
based, but still needs to be open enough to allow for assessing largely varying 
realities in Africa and thus enable mutual learning. Second, the process must 
be open to all key actors. The mostly non-adversary peer component of the 
review mechanism (across country) is important to build ownership. Yet, the 
opportunity for vertical accountability (within country) is apparently also 
pronounced and crucial for the entire endeavour. Third, the right issues need 
to be covered. In order to be meaningful, the APR report will have to address 
the right and urgent issues of society. Only then can it expected to be useful 
for and used by stakeholders for the discussion on governance. And fourth, a 
strong focus needs to be given to implementation. The APRM is meant to be 
a tool for initiating and supporting reform endeavours, as is argued. It there-
fore would not live up to all its potential if it stopped at the level of discus-
sions about governance without further actions.  
These conditions have formed the structure of this report and are examined 
for the case of Ghana. The study begins with outlining a conceptual frame-
work (Chapter 2), which explains the basic principles of good governance. 
Furthermore, it gives an overview of the international governance discussion 
and the African debate on governance. Additionally, Chapter 2 will explore 
the concept of peer reviews and explain the basics of the African Peer Re-
view Mechanism as can be found in fundamental African documents, thereby 
assessing the meaningfulness of the framework documents. Chapter 3 exam-
ines how the Ghanaian APRM unfolded. It explores the role of different 
stakeholders such as state actors, civil society and the media and their ability 
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to get involved. This allows assessing the value of the process to fostering 
good governance. Has it provided an open procedure with opportunities to 
engage for civil society, i. e. offered an occasion to improve vertical account-
ability? A second echelon of accountability – horizontal accountability – 
should have happened at the international level of continental APRM struc-
tures. The role of development partners is also considered. The study turns to 
the content of the report in Chapter 4. It is looked into the coverage of topics 
in Ghana’s APRM, drawing some conclusion on whether the process ad-
dressed the right issues. It analyses how the report approached certain issues, 
both in the main body of the APR report and in the subsequent programme of 
action (PoA). It puts the identified issues in the context of evidence and 
stakeholders’ perceptions (as provided for by interviews). Chapter 5 concen-
trates on the impact of the APRM. It regards the follow-up of the process and 
the role of stakeholders in implementing development measures to improve 
critical findings. In this context it also takes into consideration the capacity of 
stakeholders to participate in implementation. The study concludes with pol-
icy recommendations to various groups of stakeholders in the Ghana APRM 
and at the continental level.  
2 The conceptual framework – can the APRM be 
meaningful? 
The APRM is an embedded, but voluntary feature of NEPAD. One year after 
NEPAD’s official launch, the newly established AU officially adopted the 
initiative as its development programme in 2002. In July 2002, the AU Sum-
mit agreed on a protocol establishing the APRM. The aim of the peer review 
is to mutually assess the quality of governance in each participating country 
in order to accelerate the progress of member countries in implementing the 
priorities and programmes of NEPAD. The exercise is based upon a continen-
tal framework of several reference documents that were printed in March 
2003. Among the core documents are protocols, guidelines by the continental 
APRM Secretariat and a template questionnaire for the country self-
assessment. 
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The analysis of the APRM’s framework is conducted under the main assump-
tion that reference documents need to be sufficiently value-based to allow for 
basic common standards. Otherwise, it is hardly imaginable that it can both 
offer enough flexibility to allow for variety of starting points and, at the same 
time, foster mutual learning across the continent, without becoming a hap-
hazard exercise in window-dressing. In other words: key topics in national, 
academic and international discussion need to be targeted by the assessment. 
And the governance of the APR process itself has to be sufficiently institu-
tionalised and could be adapted to national experiences according to stan-
dardised procedures. Looking especially at the APR continental standard 
questionnaire, the major assumption is that it needs to strike a balance be-
tween norms and practice in order to be meaningful. The corresponding indi-
cators would be: First, values are stated in a clear and general form and link-
age is made explicit between questions and underlying norms. Second, ques-
tions are always asked about adhering to standards (not just signing them), 
i. e. norms and practice, and third, the internal organisation of the topics is 
pertinent and transparent.  
At first this chapter explores the concept and the elements of good govern-
ance and shortly explains how the APRM could potentially be linked to the 
improvement of the quality of governance. Secondly, it gives background 
information about the African debate on governance. Thirdly, the chapter 
analysis the core principles and objectives of the APRM as well as the scope 
and meaning of the peer element in the APRM. Furthermore, it describes the 
exact guidelines for the process are described by presenting the relevant APR 
institutions, stages and roles of major stakeholders within the process. Fi-
nally, the chapter concludes by examining if the APR conceptual framework 
is meaningful.  
2.1 The APRM in context: NEPAD and good governance  
Assessments of governance are a critical issue on the African continent. The 
concept of good governance does not have a universally agreed definition, 
but key aspects can be identified that reoccur across various definitions (see 
Box 1). According to numerous surveys and studies, many African countries 
are captured in a vicious circle of bad political and economic performance 
due to insufficient institutional setups; the bad performance in return is a 
constraint to the improvement of institutional capacity. The result of this 
vicious circle often is social crises, conflict and long term under-development 
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(cf. Gelb 2001). The situation was shaped and sustained by many different 
factors such as the colonial legacy and Africa’s strategic position in the Cold 
War. Bad and corrupt governance, however, are also – and arguably first and 
foremost – the African political elites’ responsibility. 
Box 1: In want of a definition – key elements of good governance 
Governance in general refers to the exercise of power through public institu-
tions like rules and routines, formal laws, and informal norms. According to 
the World Bank researcher Girishankar, governance comprises three key 
dimensions:  
“(a) the process by which governments are selected, held accountable, moni-
tored, and replaced; (b) the capacity of governments to manage resources 
efficiently and to formulate, implement, and enforce sound policies and regu-
lations; and (c) respect for institutions that govern economic and social inter-
actions” (Girishankar et al. 2002, 271).  
Good governance, therefore, is the positive practice of governance. Even 
thoughgood governance has become acknowledged as a prerequisite for sus-
tainable development and economic prosperity, the concept lacks a universally 
agreed definition. Different organisations developed their own interpretation 
according to their analytical or practical background. Yet, most authors oper-
ate with some basic principles that characterise good governance, like, for 
instance, UNDP’s eight principles (cf. UNDP 1997; UNESCAP 2006; Torres 
2001): 
 Sven Grimm et al. 
18 German Development Institute 
 
Source: UNESCAP (2006) 
— Good governance requires government, civil society and the private sector to 
be accountable to the public and relevant stakeholders;  
— It requires transparent decision-making as well as enforcement of decisions 
according to rules and regulations. This includes access to sufficient and un-
derstandable information for all affected stakeholders. 
— It means that institutions and processes seek to be responsive to all stake-
holders within a reasonable timeframe.  
— The principle of equity and inclusiveness requires that every individual is 
given the opportunity to improve its well-being. 
— The principle of effectiveness and efficiency requires that institutions and 
processes aim at meeting the needs of society while using resources best.  
— Good governance requires the rule of law, which encompasses the protection 
of human rights, an effective judicial system as well as the fight against cor-
ruption.  
— It seeks participation of the people through either direct or representative 
structures. This includes vulnerable groups and minorities.  
— It requires mediation of the different viewpoints of stakeholders within a 
society in order to build a broad consensus on policies and procedures. 
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It is obvious that the described concept of good governance is normative in nature 
and that its ideal is hard to achieve in its totality. The eight principles are intercon-
nected and often reinforce each other. For example, putting into practise the idea of 
accountability is directly linked to transparency, responsiveness or the rule of law. 
However, trade-offs between the realisation of some principles can occur and also 
need to be considered. For example, an excessive level of participation or account-
ability could have an impact on effectiveness or efficiency. Thus, a balance has thus 
to be struck when applying the principles in practice – and the difficult debate is 
that no absolute measures exist. Practice was and is often contested. 
African leaders have traditionally been reluctant to discuss their respective 
country’s governance with each other or even with actors beyond Africa (cf. 
Herbert / Gruzd 2008; Grimm / Mashele 2006). NEPAD and its foundation in 
2001 marked a change in political debate as it is based on the analysis that 
home-grown governance deficits hinder Africa from developing. NEPAD 
therefore focuses not only on socio-economic issues, but also on political 
governance. In general, NEPAD aims at political stability, poverty reduction, 
sustainable development and an increasing capacity to defend and advance 
Africa’s interest in the global arena. These objectives shall be reached by  
a holistic and integrated strategy, which includes economic, social, political 
and ecological dimensions. After the foundation of the AU, the new organisa-
tion embraced NEPAD as its socio-economic programme. Since  
the turn of the century, therefore, the AU and its member states have politi-
cally committed themselves to respecting and fostering the objectives and 
principles of good governance. Considering the evolution of the AU from the 
OAU and the latter’s core principle of non-interference, it becomes clear that 
the step to accept a mutual assessment with other states constitutes  
a fundamental change in the politics of Africa (cf. Asante 2006, 49; 
Grimm / Mashele 2006). 
NEPAD is based on the vision of an African renaissance, rested on the ideas 
of South African President Mbeki, and discussed with the presidents of Alge-
ria, Nigeria, and Senegal. The programme was originally called the Millen-
nium Partnership for African Recovery Programme (MAP) and was pre-
sented at the G8 summit in 2001. MAP merged with the so-called Plan 
Omega of Senegalese President Wade after his election in 2002. The NEPAD 
Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance 
underlines the importance of the concept: “We believe in just, honest, trans-
parent, accountable and participatory government and probity in public life” 
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(AU / NEPAD 2005, 4). Moreover, in July 2002 at the AU summit in South 
Africa the member states supported good governance by agreeing to 
– “adopt clear codes, standards and indicators of good governance at the 
national, sub-regional and continental levels;  
– accountable, efficient and effective civil service; 
– ensure the effective functioning of parliaments and other accountability 
institutions […]; and  
– ensure the independence of the judicial system that will be able to  
prevent abuse of power and corruption” (AU / NEPAD 2003a, 5). 
Within this NEPAD framework, the APRM is a key feature. The APRM aims 
to accelerate the progress of member countries in adopting and implementing 
the priorities and programmes of NEPAD and the values, codes and standards 
defined in the corresponding Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic 
and Corporate Governance (cf. Asante 2006, 49). Member states of the AU 
can voluntarily join the mechanism by signing a Memorandum of Under-
standing (MoU); joining the APRM, is thus not an explicit requirement of 
NEPAD.  
By acceding to the APRM the country is obliged to improve its governance in 
line with the objectives and to move towards the agreed standards. It must 
open itself up for internal policy dialogue as well as with other participating 
states (cf. Cilliers 2002; AU / NEPAD 2003b). Accession entails periodic 
reviews including a country self-assessment and country review visit, full 
funding of the APRM, development of a national PoA and involvement of all 
stakeholders in the process (cf. AU / NEPAD 2003c, 9 f.). Thus far, 27 mem-
bers of the AU have signed the MoU and joined the APRM.3 
While the APRM is usually described as one peer review, actually the proc-
ess provides for four different types of reviews, in which internal and external 
reviews interact (UNECA 2005a, 5).  
                                                          
3  Cf. http://www.nepad.org/aprm (accessed 21 May 2007). The countries are: Cameroon, 
Gabon, Republic of Angola, Republic of Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Mauritius, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Algeria, Egypt, Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone. For the individual stages of implementation cf. Annex A2.  
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— The most prominent is the base review, which is supposed to be carried 
out within eighteen months after the country became a member of the 
APRM process. This review produces a national country report, which 
discusses the problems faced in the reviewed state.  
— In addition to this base review, it is intended that participating countries 
undergo periodic reviews every two to four years.  
— Besides these scheduled reviews, each member country may request an 
additional review, which is referred to as review on demand.  
— The fourth type of review - the impending crises review - could be car-
ried out if the Heads of State and Government call for it, because of 
signs of impending political or economic crisis in the member country. 
Thus far, only the base review has taken place in some of the member coun-
tries of the AU. Consequently, this study focuses on this base review.  
2.2 Why a peer review? – Scope and meaning of the peer 
 element  
The APRM is one example within a multitude of peer reviews in international 
and regional organisations. For example, peer reviews exist within the EU, 
UNEP, IMF or the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). 
Probably the best-known example of state peer reviews is the country review 
mechanism of the OECD, particularly its development assistance committee 
(DAC). Within the OECD the idea of peer review is very prominent as “dia-
logue, consensus, peer review and pressure, are at the heart of OECD” 
(Kanbur 2004, 6). Reviews within the OECD are theme-based focussing on 
economic and social issues from macroeconomics, to trade, education, devel-
opment and science and innovation (cf. OECD 2003).4 In contrast to this, the 
APRM is a very comprehensive exercise; it aims at scrutinizing the overall 
performance of an entire country. 
Peer reviews are mechanisms of mutual assessment. Peers are defined as 
different actors considered being equals, i. e. interacting at a horizontal level 
of power. In the context of state peer reviews, they are generally understood 
as the  
                                                          
4  Cf. http://www.oecd.org (accessed 29 Jan. 2007). For a comparison between the APRM 
and the OECD Aid Review cf. Annex A5.  
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“systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a state by 
other states, with the ultimate goal of helping the reviewed state improve 
its policy making, adopt best practices, and comply with established stan-
dards and principles” (Pagani 2002a, 15).5  
The mutual assessment on a non-adversarial basis thus aspires to reach an 
agreed standard and to test the performance of the peer in terms of this goal. 
Four main aspects could be strengthened through the mechanism of peer 
reviews (cf. Pagani 2002a; Pagani 2002b, 11 f.):  
— Transparency: As the review addresses national rules, practices and 
procedures, these features are often not only shared with the peers but 
are also made public in reports. This enhanced transparency contributes 
to the effectiveness of the peer review. 
— Policy dialogue: Dialogue between the peers – participating states – is 
an integral component of the mechanism. 
— Capacity building: As the goal is to help the states in improving their 
policy making, one result of a peer review is the exchange of best prac-
tices, i. e. occasions of mutual learning. By doing this, the peer review 
serves as an important capacity building instrument. 
— Compliance: By monitoring the policy making of the member state in 
respect to agreed standards and principles the compliance by the coun-
tries with these agreed goals is enhanced. According to the logic that 
talking the talk requires to eventually walk the walk, the soft law nature 
of the peer review can prove better suited to enhance compliance than 
the appliance of hard law sanctions (cf. Risse / Sikkink 1999; OECD 
2003, 5).6  
                                                          
5  The concept of peer review could therefore be distinguished from other forms of monitor-
ing as judicial proceedings, fact-finding missions or general data collection.  
6  With regard to the possibility of applying sanctions on member states, the APRM empha-
sises political dialogue but remains vague about possibilities in cases where dialogue does 
not lead to success or does not even takes place: “If dialogue proves unavailing, the par-
ticipating Heads of State and Government may wish to put the Government on notice of 
their collective intention to proceed with appropriate measures by a given date. The inter-
val should concentrate the mind of the Government and provide a further opportunity for 
addressing the identified shortcomings under a process of constructive dialogue. All con-
sidered, such measures should always be utilized as a last resort” (AU / NEPAD 2003e, 
paragraph 24). 
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In sum, these four effects of the reciprocal evaluation tend to create a “system 
of mutual accountability” (Pagani 2002a, 16), which is one of the eight prin-
ciples of good governance (cf. Box 1 above). In order to make the mechanism 
of peer review possible and effective, reciprocal trust among the peers, shared 
confidence, and combined engagement are prerequisites. The success and 
effectiveness of peer reviews rely on the influence and power of peers exer-
cised during the process of peer review. Such peer pressure, which is impor-
tant as there are usually neither arrangements of decision-making power nor 
any possibilities to impose sanctions, usually comes to play after the partici-
pating country was reviewed by others and the findings are discussed in the 
group of peers either behind closed doors or in public. Depending on the 
individual peer review system, the pressure can occur as formal recommenda-
tions or informal dialogues between the peers as well as in the shape of com-
parisons or rankings of the findings in the review (cf. Heubaum 2005, 1).  
The findings of state-to-state peer reviews are often debated in public. If 
findings of peer reviews are discussed in public, these formal and informal 
reactions of peers can strengthen or even initiate pressure at another level. 
Consequently, pressure unfolds not only between the peers − the govern-
ments of participating states − but is also used as an opportunity for discus-
sions within the reviewed state between stakeholders and government (at 
vertical level). Findings of the review and possible commitments of the state 
in reaction to these can be used by different stakeholders in the participating 
country in order to put pressure on the government. By using the findings of 
the review, different stakeholders can serve as engines or multiplier of the 
various forms of peer pressure. Public scrutiny and the usage of comparisons 
and rankings can have a great impact on the public opinion within and out-
side the reviewed state. Since the media and civil society serve as sources of 
information, they do have significant influence on the public opinion. The 
effects of international reviews on public opinion in general as well as on 
specific stakeholders can thus also be of great interest for enhancing vertical 
accountability and improving governance. Consequently, the main idea is that 
due to the pressure of peers in the form of recommendations or dialogues 
(horizontal accountability) and due to the internal pressure of stakeholder 
within the state (vertical accountability), peer pressure “can become an im-
portant driving force to stimulate the State to change, [as well as set and] 
achieve goals and meet standards” (Pagani 2002b, 6). 
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Peer reviews are thus one way to target improvements in the quality of gov-
ernance. For instance, enhanced transparency and information to different 
stakeholders within the participating states can reinforce good governance. 
Particularly the requirement of the APRM process to be open and participa-
tory can also have a positive impact on the quality of governance. The as-
sumption is that effective stakeholder involvement in the country assessment 
and in the implementation of reforms enhances the participatory dimension of 
good governance as well as socio-economic development. In addition, other 
governance dimensions like consensus-orientation, responsiveness or ac-
countability of the decision-making process can also be strengthened by the 
APRM, e. g. through the sole compilation and publication of existent govern-
ance problems (cf. AU / NEPAD 2003c, 12 f.; Opoku 2006, 7 f.). 
The APRM aspires to be an evaluating system of governance that encourages 
the political dialogue between governments of other participating states – the 
peers - but also among the various stakeholders at the national level. In the 
context of the APRM, observers emphasise that the purpose is mutual learn-
ing and not blaming a government for possible nonconformities. As the Gha-
naian scholar Asante stated the objectives of the APRM should be reached 
through sharing of experiences, the reinforcement of best practices and the 
identifying of deficiencies (cf. Asante 2006, 50 f.). According to the above 
mentioned concept of peer pressure, the rationale and the leading principles 
of the APRM are thus intended to be rather peer learning than peer pressure 
(cf. Appiah 2004). This emphasis of the common goal of peer learning is so 
important since it is assumed to increase the acceptance of the mechanism by 
the Heads of State and Government. It is this design that enables countries at 
different levels of development to join since they are not “judged against a 
hard pass-fail system” (Herbert 2006, 3). Nevertheless, the instruments of 
peer pressure are also envisaged in the APRM as will be seen especially in 
the form of Heads of the State summits. 
2.3 Principles and objectives of the APRM 
The APRM was adopted in July 2002 and further fleshed out in March 2003 
at the sixth summit of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Imple-
mentation Committee (HSGIC) held in Abuja. At this meeting, a Memoran-
dum of Understanding (MoU) on the APRM was endorsed, alongside the 
before mentioned Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corpo-
rate Governance (cf. AU / NEPAD 2003a, f). The NEPAD leaders also 
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adopted four more documents that outline the main provisions of the peer 
review as a self-monitoring instrument: (i) The APRM base document, (ii) 
the organisation and processes document, (iii) the document on objectives, 
standards, criteria and indicators for the APRM, and (iv) the outline on tech-
nical assessments and the country review (cf. AU / NEPAD 2003b/d/e/g). 
Later, in November 2003, guidelines for countries to prepare and participate 
in the APRM were issued giving more details about the process in general; 
also a standard questionnaire for the assessment was developed (cf. 
AU / NEPAD 2003c; AU / NEPAD 2005). Guideline documents were not 
always dated or published; they were often clarifying, but at times also con-
tradicting previous documents (cf. Herbert / Gruzd 2008, 23–30). 
The APRM evaluates the quality of governance on a voluntary basis in four 
areas: (i) democratic and political governance, (ii) economic governance and 
management, (iii) corporate governance and (iv) socio-economic devel-
opment. The primary purpose of the APRM is  
“to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to po-
litical stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and ac-
celerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through 
sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practice, 
including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity 
building” (AU / NEPAD 2003e, paragraph 3).  
The process is voluntary, but once they sign, participants commit to common 
standards; the APRM is explicitly normative. For each area, there are guiding 
objectives, standards, criteria and indicators for the assessment (cf. 
AU / NEPAD 2003b). For example, the sphere of democratic and political 
governance is guided by the overall objective to 
“consolidate a constitutional political order in which democracy, respect 
for human rights, the rule of law, the separation of powers and effective, 
responsive public service are realised to ensure sustainable development 
and a peaceful stable society” (AU / NEPAD 2003b, 5).  
More specifically, nine key objectives are drawn from this: Conflict-
prevention; constitutional democracy including periodic political competition 
and rule of law; human rights; separation of powers; accountable civil ser-
vice; fighting corruption; protection of womens’ rights; children’s rights and 
of the rights of vulnerable groups.  
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Accordingly, the assessment in the area of economic governance and man-
agement is guided by refined objectives. In this area, there are five objectives: 
promotion of macroeconomic policies that support sustainable development; 
implementation of transparent, predictable and credible government eco-
nomic policies; promotion of sound public finance management; fighting 
corruption and money laundering; and acceleration of regional integration. 
The area of corporate governance sets the aim “to align as nearly as possible 
the interests of individuals, corporations and society within a framework of 
sound governance and common good” (AU / NEPAD 2003b, 20) by setting 
five specific objectives like corporate citizenship or codes of good business 
ethics. The area of socio-economic development specifies six objectives like 
affordable access to water or gender equality. 
The APRM is thus more than a stock-taking and should have a fundamentally 
political role. Aspirations are aiming high: the process should provide a plat-
form for reform policies or rather become a rallying point for governance 
improvements in a broad range of topics.  
2.4 Institutions of the APRM  
The general outline of the APRM defines different institutions and activities 
at the continental or multilateral level, described in the APR organisation and 
processes document (cf. AU / NEPAD 2003d).  
2.4.1 Institutions at the continental level 
At the continental level, the following institutions are foreseen (for the fol-
lowing, cf. AU / NEPAD 2003d; UNECA 2005a; Zimen 2006; Opoku 2006, 
14 ff.; Herbert / Gruzd 2008, 11 f.):  
Committee of Heads of State and Government (APR Forum)7  
The Committee of Heads of State and Government is the ultimate authority 
and oversight body of the APRM. It is at this level that peer learning shall 
take place. The APR Forum’s mandate includes the selection of personalities 
for and the appointment of the APR Panel. Ultimately, the APR Forum takes 
                                                          
7  The Committee of Heads of State and Government is also referred to as Heads of State 
Forum. 
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the responsibility of country review reports and makes recommendations, 
which are made public and foster peer dialogue. It is only after the final revi-
sion at the APR Forum that country reports may be published. Dialogue with 
development partners is also part of the APR Forum’s mandate.  
Panel of Eminent Persons (APR Panel) 
The Panel of Eminent Persons consists of seven members who are nominated 
by the member states and are appointed by the APR Forum. Guidelines de-
mand that the members must be Africans with high moral stature, that they 
need to be familiar with the APRM and that they should be strongly commit-
ted to the ideals of Pan-Africanism. The composition of the APR Panel is 
selected according to aspects of regional balance, gender equity and cultural 
diversity (see box 2 below). The overall mission of the Panel is to oversee the 
process and to guarantee its integrity, independence and professionalism. It is 
the panel’s task to develop tools, instruments, codes of conduct and guide-
lines to govern the country review process. It thus plays a crucial role in the 
national processes. This panel oversees support missions that may become 
necessary before the review takes place. For each country review there is one 
responsible coordinator; for Ghana it was Chris Stals. Furthermore, the panel 
is responsible for the selection of the country review teams (described be-
low). It makes assessments of and gives recommendations on country review 
reports and delivers recommendations to the APR Forum. As such the APR 
Panel serves as a credibility buffer between the country review and the APR 
Forum (cf. Grimm / Mashele 2006, 3). 
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APR Secretariat in Midrand / South Africa 
The secretariat serves as support to the APR Panel as well as to country re-
view teams (see below). It is meant to collide background information and 
extensive database information on political as well as economic develop-
ments in all participating countries. It is responsible for the technical and 
administrative coordination of the review processes in participating countries. 
In this context, the secretariat, in cooperation with the APR Panel, develops 
guiding tools like the template questionnaire (see below) spelling out detailed 
criteria and indicators for the country assessment. It was often criticised for 
providing too little practical guidance to national processes, mostly due to 
severe capacity constraints (cf. Herbert / Gruzd 2008, 24).   
Box 2: Members of the Panel of Eminent Persons 
The Panel of Eminent Persons consist out of seven members: 
Ms. Marie-Angeligue Savané, Senegal: Ms. Marie-Angeligue Savané is sociologist 
and international consultant and Chair of the Foundation in Support of Basis Initia-
tives. Ms. Savané served as minister in several Senegalese governments. 
Prof. Adebayo Adedeji, Nigeria: Professor Adebayo Adedeji is Chief Executive of 
the Africa Centre for Development and Strategic Studies (ACDESS) in Nigeria.  
Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, Kenya: Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat is independ-
ent consultant on peace and conflict resolution, Executive Director of the Africa 
Peace Forum and Director of Universal Bank in Kenya. 
Dr. Graça Machel, Mozambique: Ms. Graça Machel is President of the Foundation 
for Community Development of Mozambique and Chancellor of the University of 
Cape Town. She is the an eminent person in Mozambican politics, widow of former 
Mozambican president Samora Machel and wife of Nelson Mandela.  
Mr. Mohamed-Seghir Babes, Algeria: Mr. Mohamed-Seghir Babes is Lecturer and 
Research Associate at the Quebec Institute for Advanced International Studies of 
the Laval University of Quebec.  
Dr. Dorothy Njeuma, Cameroon: Ms. Dorothy Njeuma is President of the Confer-
ence of Rectors of Cameroon State Universities, President of the Federation of 
University Sports and Vice-President of the Association of African Universities.  
Dr. Chris Stals, South Africa: Dr. Chris Stals is the current Chancellor of the Uni-
versity of Pretoria and Director of the Standard Bank Group Limited. He was for-
merly head of South Africa’s Central Bank.  
Source: http://www.saiia.org.za (accessed 17 May 2007) 
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The Country Review Team (APR Team)  
The country review teams are responsible for inspecting the proceedings of 
the countries during the reviews as well as to complete the APR reports. The 
teams are constituted for the period of the country review visit – usually two 
to three weeks – and they are assembled specifically for one country. The 
APR Panel arranges the teams. Members usually are selected from partner 
institutions described below. With regard to the composition, the base do-
cuments state that they should “enable an integrated, balanced, technically 
competent and professional assessment” of the reviewed country 
(AU / NEPAD 2003d, 7).  
The APR Partner Institutions 
The APRM works with a number of partner institutions that have an expertise 
in various fields touched upon in the process.8 These strategic partners carry 
out technical assessment in supporting the planning and later implementing 
the national programme of action (PoA) on countries to be reviewed. African 
staff from these institutions also participate in the country review teams. APR 
Partner Institutions might also participate in sessions of the APR Panel or the 
APR Forum when discussing the country report. The relationship between 
APR Partner Institutions and the APR Secretariat is based on a memorandum 
of understanding between both. The potential role of partner institutions is 
important, given the often low levels of capacities in African states. The gen-
eral issue of lack of capacity could have serious repercussions on the actual 
conduct of the APRM in some countries; success of the undertaking would 
thus to some extent rely on partners’ support.   
                                                          
8  With regard to the different subject areas a number of institutions are chosen: the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in order to conduct the technical as-
sessment in economic governance and management; the African Development Bank 
(AfDB) in banking and financial standards as well as several AU organs for matters relating 
to human rights, democracy and political governance. These institutions will get support 
from “appropriate African institutions” (AU / NEPAD 2003d, 8). In the areas of corporate 
governance and socio-economic development, “the APR Panel will also advise the APR 
Forum as to which African institutions will be invited to conduct the technical assess-
ments” (AU / NEPAD 2003d, 9). Later, in 2006, the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP) was officially added to the list of strategic partners by the APR Secre-
tariat (cf. UNDP 2006, 13).  
 
 Sven Grimm et al. 
30 German Development Institute 
2.4.2 Institutions foreseen at the country level 
Beyond the continental structure, each participating country needs to build a 
coordinating structure at the country level in order to participate in the 
APRM. At the national level, however, there is no exact roadmap for the 
creation of institutions. The official APR base documents of March 2003 do 
not mention any provisions for this level, so participating states are largely 
left to their own devices in defining the national setup of the APRM (cf. 
AU / NEPAD 2003c; Herbert 2006, 13).  
Focal Point  
The Focal Point plays a crucial part within the APRM at the country level as 
a coordinator and interface between various stakeholders. The guidelines for 
countries to prepare for the APRM (established in November 2003) foresee a 
focal point as the one national institution and speaks of an individual. It 
should be at a ministerial level, or a person that reports directly to the Head of 
State or Government, with technical committees supporting the focal point. It 
is responsible for coordiating the process on the national level and serves as a 
link between the APR Forum and the secretariat on the one hand, and the 
national institutions on the other. The following statement considers the im-
portant role of the focal point: 
“it is critical that the work of the APR Focal Point is inclusive, integrated 
and coordinated with existing policy-decision and medium-term planning 
processes” (AU / NEPAD 2003c, 11).  
Thus far, the practice of nominating persons for one focal point differed from 
country to country. Mostly, government bodies such as ministries or presi-
dential offices were chosen. Apparently, the understanding of the role and 
independence of the focal point remained a debated issue (cf. Herbert / Gruzd 
2008, 28).    
National Governing Councils 
When the first countries like Ghana, Rwanda or Kenya started to undertake 
the APRM, they had no template for the establishment of national institu-
tions. Apart from ministers as focal points, they decided to create governing 
councils or national commissions as principal bodies to manage the peer 
review. This provided a buffer from the political process, which, in Ghana for 
instance, was taking place during a time when national elections were con-
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ducted. Members of civil society were nominated to serve as members on 
these councils.9 These templates were later picked up by the APR Secretariat, 
which subsequently suggested a separation of the role of Focal Points and 
potential national governing councils. The latter institutions were then offi-
cially included in a chart on relevant national institutions by the APR Secre-
tariat at the African Governance Forum held in Kigali in May 2006 (cf.  
Herbert 2006, 14 f.; UNDP 2006, 13 f., 28 f.). Today, these bodies are also 
presented as part of the national structures of the APRM on the official 
website.10 Yet, this issue up to now attracts considerable discussion, because 
is touches the question of the autonomy of national APR structures from 
government:  
“The acceptable level of APRM structures’ autonomy from governments 
was seen as a challenge that is yet to be resolved in some countries. On the 
one hand, there was a strong argument for internalising the APRM proc-
esses within the government system as a way of securing its legitimacy and 
access to public resources. On the other hand, some countries argued for 
the exact opposite: the independence of the governing Councils so as to 
secure freedom to effectively undertake the APRM reviews” (UNDP 2006, 
18).  
Other critical issues concerning the governing council concern the option of 
having a small body of eminent persons vs. the representation of groups in 
the council. And remuneration of the council members was a much debated 
point (cf. Herbert / Gruzd 2008, 27–28).  
With regard to national structures, it has to be kept in mind that the APRM is 
an evolving process. In any event, to enhance dynamism and to take into 
account experiences made with the process in due course, it is foreseen in the 
base documents that “the Conference of the participating countries will re-
view the APRM once every five years” (AU / NEPAD 2003e, paragraph 28). 
In this regard, Ghana’s experience already had a crucial influence on the 
further development of some provisions. This will be elaborated more in 
chapter 3.    
                                                          
9  These bodies consist of different numbers of people, e. g. Benin has 94 members whereas 
the Governing Council in Ghana only counts of seven members.  
10  Cf. http://www.nepad.org/aprm (accessed 10 May 2007).  
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2.5 Guidelines for the process  
The APRM is shaped by several provisions that are determined in the base 
documents. The continental standard questionnaire, the prescribed institu-
tional setup, the general process and timelines in the process provide basic 
orientation and core principles to actors in participating states. The continen-
tal templates, however, are “considered a guide rather than a gospel” (Her-
bert / Gruzd 2008, 37).    
One of the key tools that makes the methodology for the APR process opera-
tional is the continental standard questionnaire. It is prepared at the continen-
tal level by the APR Panel and APR Secretariat (two institutions described 
below). The questionnaire is used by all participating countries as a basis for 
the national self-assessment, i. e. adaptations to national peculiarities are 
acknowledged. The questionnaire, however, determines the general course of 
assessment of each review. Such standardisation is crucial, since the APRM   
“needs to be grounded in valid information, the imperative of creating 
credible data bases is paramount so as to avoid conclusions or review 
judgments that may be wrongly premised” (UNDP 2006, 48).  
According to the NEPAD framework, the questionnaire is organised in four 
sections spelling out detailed criteria for assessment in the respective four 
governance areas (cf. AU / NEPAD 2005). The internal logic of the question-
naire is organised along the following broad items: (i) definitions and (ii) 
objectives, followed by components against which country action is assessed: 
(iii) Standards and codes, (iv) questions and (v) indicators.  
The whole document starts first with some definitions of what is considered 
as good political, economic and corporate governance in light of the NEPAD 
Declaration, including a definition of socio-economic development. For in-
stance, good governance is normatively defined as  
“creating well-functioning and accountable institutions − political, judi-
cial and administrative − which citizens regard as legitimate, in which 
they can participate in decisions that affect their daily lives and by which 
they are empowered” (AU / NEPAD 2005, 17). 
Second, objectives define the essential elements of the overall goal that must 
be achieved by a country in each focus area. Third, a list of relevant standards 
and codes that refer to the objective follows. A country dealing with the ques-
tionnaire is hence supposed to give an overview of standards and codes cur-
rently in force; and it is subsequently measured against these. Fourth, ques-
The African Peer Review Mechanism as a tool to improve governance?  
German Development Institute 33 
tions focus on the actual practise and compliance within a country with re-
gard to the objectives and the codes, how is it done and with what results. 
Fifth, indicators are named as the type of evidence that is expected in the 
replies of countries. The indicators serve to highlight certain aspects of the 
objective, standard or code that are generally recognised as measures of per-
formance (cf. AU / NEPAD 2005).  
The questionnaire is thus asking about norms and practise. For example, in 
area one under the objective to uphold the separation of powers, the question 
“how would you rate the independence of the legislative body in your coun-
try?” (AU / NEPAD 2005, 34). It is then further broken down to provide 
evidence of legal provisions and resource allocation establishing the inde-
pendence of the legislature, and continues to go beyond this by also asking 
for the description of measures taken to sustain progress towards independ-
ence, e. g. training (cf. AU / NEPAD 2005, 34 f.). Other questions in the area 
of good political governance, target the objective to ensure accountable and 
efficient civil service and also ask for practise in recent years. One indicator 
explicitly demands to   
“provide evidence of cases of disciplinary sanctions, including dismissal 
and prosecution of civil servants related to the shortcomings of service de-
livery“ (AU / NEPAD 2005, 36).  
The questionnaire states that even though the four governance areas are 
treated as separate in the self-assessment, they are closely interconnected. 
Thus, eight cross-cutting issues are identified to encourage holistic and main-
streamed responses by participating countries – which would be a substantial 
task to developed countries and poses even more of a challenge to developing 
countries with limited resources. The cross-cutting issues are (cf. AU / 
NEPAD 2005, 11 f.): 
— Poverty eradication, 
— gender balance,  
— decentralisation,  
— country capacities to participate in the APRM,  
— access to and dissemination of information,  
— corruption,  
— broad-based participation, and 
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— sustainability in both financial, social and environmental issues.  
The complete questionnaire has been criticised as too long and repetitive. 
Separation into four areas make research on the cross-cutting issues particu-
larly difficult (cf. Herbert / Gruzd 2008, 39). Definitely, some topics can be 
grouped in a different way to avoid duplications or questions about similar 
issues can be merged to shorten the whole exercise. Critics pointed out that 
there are tendencies in some questions to ask for too much detail without 
policy relevance, thus straining scarce resources. As the APRM is a tool aim-
ing to improve governance and is inspired by the sharing of best practises, the 
questionnaire should also provide space for suggestions for solutions, e. g. 
particular strengths of institutions in coping with challenges. Structuring it 
around institutions would be an alternative way of taking research on the 
issues at the country level forward (Herbert / Gruzd 2008, 40–41). Critics 
also mentioned that some verbalisations in the questionnaire are value-laden 
and should have been phrased more neutrally. As an example for the latter 
approach they cite the question “how has decentralisation contributed to the 
quality of governance?” (AU / NEPAD 2005, 31), which is ignoring that 
decentralisation could also have negative effects on governance; respondents 
should be left with a choice to make up their mind about the concept. Like-
wise, suggestive wording on free trade or regional integration is criticised (cf. 
Herbert / Gruzd 2008, 42; SAIIA 2006; Team Consultancy 2005). Further-
more, according to South African Institute of International Affairs’ s (SAIIA) 
analysis, important topics like international humanitarian law, child soldiers 
or press freedom are missing in the questionnaire and the role of civil society 
as an important aspect of good governance is not touched upon. It is therefore 
reasonable to suggested that the questionnaire  
“should be reviewed and subsequently revised, taking into account the 
missing issues that are generic to the governance question in Africa. The 
APR Secretariat should assume leadership in the provision of guidance on 
the adoption of country specificities […]. Civil society should also be as-
sessed. Thus, indicators and benchmarks targeted at this category of ac-
tors should be included in the Questionnaire” (UNDP 2006, 24 f.).  
This study turns to the content of the country report – determined largely by 
the questionnaire – in more detail in Chapter 4.   
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2.6 How to conduct an African peer review? – Stages of 
 the APRM  
How is the APRM actually conducted at the country level? According to the 
base documents, the APR cycle goes through five stages: (i) the preparation 
of the country self-assessment, (ii) the country review, (iii) the review report 
preparation, followed by (iv) the actual peer review, which takes place by 
presenting and discussing the finding of the reviews at summits of the APR 
Forum and (v) finally the publication of the APR reports. These stages are 
further described in box 3 below and in the annex A3. The estimated duration 
of stages one to four is between six and nine months.11 An often neglected 
quasi-sixth stage is the implementation and follow-up of the process, con-
densed in the national programme of action (PoA). The PoA, together with 
the country self-assessment report are the two main documents that the gov-
ernment and civil society in each participating country are requested to de-
liver. Within these documents problems discovered during the review as well 
as a guideline of the government towards its priorities and actions with regard 
to those problems are addressed (cf. AU / NEPAD 2003d). 
Box 3:  Stages of the APRM 
The APRM – in the form of the initial base review looked into here – follows five 
stages, as outlined in the base documents: 
Stage one: Preparatory and Country Self-assessment 
Stage one involves the preparatory process at the continental level (APR Secre-
tariat) as well as at the country level. Preparing for the APR process, the country 
might receive help from partner institutions and other technical experts. The main 
output of the country review is the preparation of a preliminary PoA. This is done 
by an extensive, participatory country self-assessment, based on a template ques-
tionnaire (provided by the APR Secretariat in Midrand). In some cases, a country 
support mission visits the country to help it follow the APR guidelines. Thus far, at 
the first stage all countries were visited by a country support mission (cf. 
Grimm/Mashele 2006). After self-assessment, the first draft of the national PoA 
                                                          
11  At first, six months were planned. This time period proved to be too short and therefore it 
was extended to very ambitious six to nine months. Only South Africa was able to keep up 
the time schedule – with the result that the process was criticised considerably from civil 
society as being not participatory enough. 
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includes the main challenges and development issues is presented. This draft and 
the self-assessment are then submitted to the APR Secretariat at the continental 
level. Meanwhile the APR Secretariat prepares a background document about the 
four sectors being reviewed. This is done through desk research and information 
that is provided by the country in question. On the basis of the preliminary PoA, 
the self-assessment and the background paper, the APR Secretariat prepares a so-
called issues paper. This paper guides the country review process. If the secretariat 
decides that further investigations are necessary; this is done by partner institutions 
that conduct technical assessment. After the technical assessment these institutions 
provide findings and recommendations. The APR Secretariat - under the guidance 
of the APR Panel - includes these findings and recommendations in this issues 
paper. Parallel, the country updates its PoA. Finally, the secretariat plans the visit 
of the APR Team.  
Stage two: Country Review Mission (CRM)  
Stage two is the country visit by the APR Team. This visit takes place under the 
leadership of the APR Panel. The aim is to interact with and to consult a great 
number of stakeholders from the state as well as the non-governmental sector in the 
country. These consultations serve three purposes: First, to provide information 
about the APR process, second, to discuss the draft PoA prepared in stage one, and 
third, to discuss with stakeholders remaining issues and steps that need to be taken. 
Stage two ends by recommending changes to the PoA draft if held necessary. 
Stage three: Review Report 
Based on the visit and the prepared documents, the country team prepares a country 
report focussing on the adaptation of the national PoA. As stated in the APR base 
document, this report “must be measured against the applicable political, eco-
nomic and corporate governance commitments made” (AU / NEPAD 2003e, 
paragraph 20). This report as well as recommendations are discussed with the 
government of the country. This discussion gives the government the possibility to 
react to the findings of the APR Team. The responses of the government are in-
cluded in the team’s country report as an annex. The country itself includes the 
recommendations as well as estimated capacity and resource requirements in the 
PoA. Stage three ends with the final PoA and the country review report. 
Stage four: Peer Review 
Both the country report as well as the PoA are sent to the APR Secretariat. The 
APR Secretariat submits both documents to the APR Panel. At this point, the panel 
takes over the process, reviews the report and makes recommendations for policy 
reforms. The report as well as recommendations are then handed on to the APR 
Forum. The forum discusses the report and then communicates actions deemed 
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necessary to the institutions at the national level in the reviewed country. If the 
government is willing to address the identified shortcomings, other participating 
governments are required to provide support and assistance; a requirement that is 
not further specified. At the same time development partners are urged to assist the 
country under review in rectifying remaining problems. If the government is not 
willing to address challenging issues, peer pressure is meant to be applied.  
Stage five: Publication of reports 
During the final stage, the APR Country Report as well as the national PoA are 
publicised and presented to the AU, the Pan-African Parliament, the Regional 
Economic Commission of the country, the African Commission on Human and 
People’s Rights and other relevant bodies. This publication is envisaged six months 
after the APR Forum considered the report; it can thus take up to one year after 
completion of the self-assessment until the final APR report is published. With this 
publication the first cycle of the APR process is officially completed and imple-
mentation of reforms are to start. 
Source: AU / NEPAD (2003c); AU / NEPAD (2003d) 
Within each stage of the base review, the guidance given is comprehensive 
but rather general in nature. Chapter 3 examines how the general rules for 
institutions were fulfilled at the country level in Ghana. Before that, a closer 
look is taken at the base documents’ provision of how to involve stake-
holders.  
2.7 Roles and responsibilities of major stakeholders  
The APRM base documents also assign specific roles to three major stake-
holders: (i) the government of the participating country, (ii) civil society and 
non-state actors within the national society as well as to (iii) development 
partners.  
Government  
Government is the main actor responsible for the functioning of the national 
review exercise as “technically competent, credible and free of political ma-
nipulation” (AU / NEPAD 2003c, 3). It is also reports its process results vis-
à-vis to the other Heads of State and Government on the peer level; in other 
words, the major task of accountability is attributed to it. The undertaking can 
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only function appropriately if there is an adequate political commitment to 
the process at high levels of government, including personal engagement and 
funding. The core responsibilities of the participating countries’ governments 
are further defined in the base documents as follows:  
– “Define, in collaboration with key stakeholders, a roadmap on par-
ticipation in the APRM, which should be widely publicized and pro-
vide information about the national coordinating structures, the stages 
of the APRM and the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders from 
government, nongovernmental organizations, private sector and inter-
national development partners. 
– Establish and publicize feedback mechanism between different levels 
of government and with non-governmental stakeholders.  
– Ensure participation by relevant stakeholders in the implementation of 
the programme of action.  
– Make annual progress reports to the APR Secretariat on the imple-
mentation of the programme of action” (AU / NEPAD 2003c, 12).  
When examining the different process stages, the third stage plans that the 
draft report written by the APR Team is discussed with government officials. 
As the base documents states, this procedure is implemented to improve the 
ownership of the outcome and to  
“ensure the accuracy of the information and to provide the Government 
with an opportunity both to react to the Team’s findings and to put for-
ward its own views on how the identified shortcomings may be addressed 
(AU / NEPAD 2003e, paragraph 21). 
After the discussions, the responses of the government are published in the 
annex of the final country report. When the final country report and PoA are 
ready, it is within the government’s realm to address and rectify the identified 
shortcomings and to seek assistance from development partners if necessary.  
Civil society and non-state actors  
The driving principle in implementing the APR process is the active partici-
pation of stakeholders. In the base APR documents it is clearly stated that the 
overarching goals of NEPAD can only be reached through the involvement of 
all stakeholders and that participating countries must organize a participatory 
and transparent national APR process (cf. AU / NEPAD 2003b, 2; 
AU / NEPAD 2003c, 11). In this context trade unions, women, youth, civil 
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society, private sector, parliamentarians, representatives of political parties, 
rural communities and professional associations are explicitly mentioned as 
important groups (cf. AU / NEPAD 2003 f., 5). These stakeholders are also to 
be consulted by the APR Team during the CRM (cf. AU / NEPAD 2003e, 
paragraph 19).  
There are five possible ways of engagement identified in the guidelines (cf. 
AU / NEPAD 2003c, 12). Stakeholders could take part in the (i) assessment 
of country compliance with APR standards, codes and indicators, (ii) identifi-
cation of national priorities, (iii) drafting of the national PoA, (iv) implemen-
tation, and (v) monitoring and evaluation. How this was done in Ghana is 
further elaborated upon in Chapter 3.  
Development partners  
Within the APRM, international development partners are not meant to be in 
the driving seat. Nevertheless, they are assigned a certain role. Whereas par-
ticipating governments have to guarantee the finances of the national process, 
development partners, according to the base documents, are welcome to step 
in on the continental as well as the national level:    
“It is […] foreseen that the participating countries will actively engage in-
ternational partners in support of their involvement in the peer review 
process. This may include technical assistance and capacity building. In 
addition, the NEPAD Secretariat will set up a mechanism to mobilise re-
sources from external partners, if necessary, to help the country improve 
its performance and achieve the objectives of its National Programme of 
Action“ (AU / NEPAD 2003c, 16).  
It is the role of the national governments of participating countries as well as 
the APR Forum to interact with development partners if necessary. Chapters 
3 and 5 continue to examine the actual scope and character of the in-
volvement of development partners with the APR process in Ghana.  
2.8 Conclusion  
With regard to the APRM’s conceptual framework and the initial question 
about the meaningfulness of the framework, six conclusions can be drawn 
from the above analysis:   
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First, it has to be stated that the APRM is a truly comprehensive exercise. 
Key topics surrounding governance appear to be covered in the assessment. 
The assessment might not explicitly refer to all keywords of the international 
academic discussion – such as the contested term neopatrimonialism – but it 
addresses major topics. Herein included are also issues previously neglected 
in international political dialogue within Africa, such as corruption. For in-
stance, one can regard the demand for asset declaration of office holders (as 
included in the APRM) as a key indicator for the acknowledgement of a dis-
tinction between public and private funds. The standard questionnaire explic-
itly asks about the national practise of assets declaration.  
Second, this very comprehensiveness is one of the criticisms towards the 
assessment; it is criticised for being too broad. Despite the considerable ad-
ministrative and financial burdens this implies, one can also argue that the 
comprehensiveness is one of the key strengths of the APRM as it provides for 
one authoritative reference document and there is no excuse to not cover an 
issue. Politically unpopular topics thus cannot be excluded for the pretext of 
limited scope of the assessment.  
Third, the continental questionnaire asks about the conventions and declara-
tions signed by the country under scrutiny, i. e. it has an inductive approach 
to norms for each country. Even collating the international norms a country 
agreed to in one document might be useful and already provides a minimum 
urge for accountability. The questionnaire, however, commendably also asks 
about practice of the norms a country has committed itself to.  
Fourth, there are no sanctions against countries not fully recognising their gap 
between norms and applications. There is only speculation possible about the 
level of peer pressure and based on past experience, doubts remain about a 
high commitment to all norms by all participating countries. However, the 
very process of the APRM provides for an opportunity to discuss shortcom-
ings in specific countries. The set-up as a peer review has soft law implica-
tions: Good practice within the APRM will be the measuring stick for future 
national APR processes – and that sense of ownership cannot be underesti-
mated. The more people refer to the APRM, the stronger the institution be-
comes. 
Fifth, concerning the question whether governance of the APR process itself 
is sufficiently institutionalised, it has to be mentioned, that there is a trade-off 
between objectivity and national flexibility. The base documents of the 
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APRM are broad and do provide little standards for the national processes, 
e. g. the official core documents do not prescribe the composition of govern-
ing councils as key institution of the APRM at the country level. Another 
bottleneck appears to be – presumably even more so in the future – the APR 
Forum. Beyond pertinent questions on capacity of the APR Secretariat in 
Midrand, questions persist on the workload of the Heads of State and Gov-
ernment in the review process. With 27 countries participating and each of 
them either being in a peer review or delivering progress reports on imple-
mentation, the time constraint at the APR Forum – even if the secretariat in 
Midrand were to be substantially stocked up in number of staff – appears to 
be overwhelming.  
Sixth, the timeline for the whole process is a tricky issue: The given nine 
months for the completion of stages one to four may not be enough time to 
reasonably integrate stakeholders, which, as shown above, is crucial to the 
whole process. The bottleneck at continental level is even more severe as the 
APR base documents provide for a delay of six months before the final report 
is published once the country report was discussed by the members of the 
APR Forum. As the Heads of State and Government in practise meet at the 
six-monthly AU summits, there is a further delay, because a country report 
could be handed in at one meeting, and then discussed at the next. The time 
delays might negatively impact on trust in the process, if the country self-
assessment is indeed done – as required – with great involvement of civil 
society. A year of official silence over a country report is a long time and can 
be expected to lead to speculations. Much of the drive of the process – public 
interest within the reviewed country – will be lost over this time.  
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3 Ghana’s journey through the APRM – an open 
process 
The Ghanaian government politically committed to the APRM initiative, 
even before the process had a proper timetable or fixed structures (cf. Gruzd 
2006c; UNECA 2005b, 9). As a first mover, government had the chance to 
set standards in designing the APR institutions and proceedings in its coun-
try.12 The Panel of Eminent Persons, for instance, had not yet been estab-
lished when Ghana claimed to be ready for a peer review in October 2002. A 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) kicked off government’s responsibil-
ity for the conduct of a peer review in March 2003. As broad participation in 
the self-assessment is provided for in the base documents, the national APR 
process holds an opportunity for vertical accountability of government to 
society. Therefore, both the structures and the process of the APRM in Ghana 
are looked into in this chapter. At both levels, in fact, some changes to the 
original common African standard set have occurred in the Ghana case. The 
key aspect to be explored in this chapter is whether the interpretation and 
practice of the APRM in Ghana had a positive impact on the governance 
structure of the country. By being open to all key stakeholders, the process 
has a potential to foster good political governance.  
To explore these issues, this chapter first looks into the national APR institu-
tions, namely the Governing Council, its secretariat and the technical teams 
(TTs). Their respective composition, specific role, and their approach e. g. in 
dissemination and to methods applied in the process, as well as their degree 
of independence from government are subject to this part of the study. In this 
context, it is important to also look into the methodology of the TTs, in order 
to assess whether they met academic standards, as referring to external ex-
perts also contains the risk of receiving crucial input on a partisan or preju-
diced basis.  
Secondly, a central interest of this chapter is the commitment of all stake-
holders to the process, ranging from government to specialised interest 
groups. There are concerns that the APRM could be a predominantly a gov-
ernment-driven process. In order to provide for an open process, it would be 
necessary that all parts of society had the possibility to participate, not least 
through organised groups that represented their interests. Apart from the 
                                                          
12  For a detailed outline of the Ghanaian process cf. Annex A4.  
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government and public institutions, such organised groups – and relevant 
stakeholders – were civil society organisations (CSOs), the parliament, and 
the media. Views of development partners were also sought. When it comes 
to fostering good political governance beyond checks and balances within the 
political system itself, particularly CSOs and the media were identified as the 
key institutions of vertical accountability in a political system (cf. Schacter 
2001, 135; Diamond 1999, 3 f.). It is also important to have a look at the level 
of participation beyond the metropolitan area of the capital city.  
The Ghanaian APR structures and process are outlined below with special 
attention on changes from or variations of the original framework set at the 
continental level and explained in Chapter 2.  
3.1 The Ghanaian APR institutions  
The Ghanaian institutions are at the backbone of the national APR process. 
The institutional structure was designed to provide for a large degree of 
autonomy and thereby credibility. Their design, however, was not fully de-
tached from the political process in order to guarantee a certain legitimacy: 
“One of Ghana’s innovations was to consult with all political parties about 
the proposed APR structure and the list of eminent persons proposed to lead 
it” (Herbert 2006, 23). This consultation was even more important as national 
elections were upcoming and likely to overlap with the review period in De-
cember 2004. Apparently, Ghana’s President Kufuor wanted to avoid the 
APRM to become “a political football” (Herbert / Gruzd 2008, 158). Con-
ducting an independent peer review was seen as “a vehicle for demonstrating 
greater transparency and candour in public policy to various audiences”, as 
Gruzd notes (2008, 157), including to international donors. The key question 
is whether the practise matches the claimed aspiration. Which adaptations 
have been made to the continental framework (see previous chapter), and 
which consequences did they have?  
Ghana’s national APR institutions embrace the Governing Council of the 
APRM (GC)13, the APR Secretariat, and the technical teams. The institutional 
setup can be depicted as below (see Diagram 2). The individual elements are 
explained in the course of this chapter.  
                                                          
13  The official abbreviation is NAPRM-GC, it was shortened to GC for text clarity.  
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3.1.1 The Governing Council  
The Governing Council (GC) is at the centre of APR institutions in Ghana, as 
depicted above. Key issues regarding the effectiveness and the independence 
of the Ghanaian process are thus the GC’s mandate, its composition, its func-
tioning, and its autonomy.  
The GC in Ghana acts as the focal point, i. e. the linkage between all stake-
holders. At the start of the APRM activities in Ghana, it was envisaged to 
have the national focal point within the government, as the official wording 
in the APR basis documents suggests. Also for this purpose, a Ministry of 
Regional Cooperation and NEPAD was established, which has been extracted 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Due to persistent complaints of civil 
society, the role of the focal point was separated from government and trans-
ferred to the GC, and, in terms of administrative actions, to its newly estab-
lished APR Secretariat (cf. 3.1.2). In 2006, the Ministry for Regional Coop-
eration and NEPAD relocated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where it 
Diagram 2: Ghanaian APR structures at the national level 
 
Source: own illustration, cf. UNECA (2005a, 8) 
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then constituted a NEPAD Bureau, which currently is a government contact 
for the APRM (interview with a government official on 12 March 07). 
The GC was a crucial Ghanaian innovation. It was apparently modelled along 
the lines of the continental structure of eminent persons in the APR Panel. 
The people selected by the President in March 2003 were all respected, non-
partisan individuals; yet the selection process itself had been criticised in 
Ghana (cf. Herbert / Gruzd 2008, 161). Early Criticism apparently was taken 
seriously: Government – in cooperation with civil society – had laid out crite-
ria for persons to be eligible for the GC. These criteria define requirements: 
appointees have to be non-state officials, must have professional competence, 
integrity as well as fulfil the principles of objectivity, impartiality and inde-
pendence. Further considerations were ethnic and regional balance, religious 
representation, academic representation, gender balance, review experience, 
etc. (cf. Opoku 2006, 21). These criteria were largely matched by the current 
setup (cf. box below). It is difficult to measure characteristics such as integ-
rity or objectivity and independence. Yet, if perception is taken as an indica-
tor, the opinions expressed by stakeholders in interviews by the authors in 
three Ghanaian cities (Accra, Kumasi and Tamale) were positive about the 
GC.14 The work of the GC was appreciated almost unequivocally, despite 
some criticism of individual members of the opposition parties (Interview, 29 
March 2007). Some of the more balanced voices from civil society hinted 
about an underlying reason for this reproach of partisanship:  
“They are men of integrity. No one can question that. [But] one thing in 
Ghana and Africa is that the selection of people into institutions is always 
partisan. Unfortunately! Because of over-politization of issues in this 
country. You cannot be non-partisan in Ghana.” (interview, 26 March 
2007).  
This statement shows that it was a wise decision to set up an autonomous 
body and refrain from working on the peer review during the election period. 
                                                          
14  The lack of religious diversity was not mentioned as a critical point, as might have been 
expected though they were critical at times. The GC-member Bemile, a Catholic bishop, 
represents the northern parts of Ghana, where the majority is Muslim. This issue was not 
raised in any of the interviews conducted with a number of non-Christians and Muslims on 
14 and 18 March 2007. 
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Positively noted was also that the GC in Ghana is comparatively small (inter-
view, 3 march 2007).15 The small number in Ghana makes it much easier to 
work jointly and to interact with each other, and it facilitates establishing a 
common understanding of the task. Ghana therefore opted for eminent per-
sons and against representation of various organisations, apparently appoint-
ing people with stronger management skills (cf. Herbert / Gruzd 2008, 30). 
Ghanaian GC members claimed that the non-constituency based selection 
was not necessarily a disadvantage as long as the body remained accessible to 
all parts of society; a small structure can also rely on experts for each issue 
area (e. g. gender) (see Box 4). If the GC were too big, there would be the 
danger of individual strong members capturing the process with their own 
agenda (interview, 7 March 2007). Especially worth mentioning is that the 
GC criticised not meeting the target in regard to the criterion of gender bal-
ance, as only two out of the seven members are female.16 
 
                                                          
15  As a comparison: South Africa’s respective body has 29 members, representing 11 organi-
sations, while Benin’s APR body has 94, and Burkina Faso’s structure has 97 members. 
16  This, furthermore, is much in line with general findings about female representation in 
decision-making in Ghana elsewhere (as ironically also stated by the APR report). 
Box 4: Members of the Ghanaian APR Governing Council 
Prof. Rev. Samuel Kwasi Adjepong (chairman): Professor in Physics; Vice-
Chancellor of Cape Coast University (1991–2001); Principal of the Methodist 
University 
Ambassador Alex Ntim Abankwa: Former Ambassador to the EU and Canada; 
Consultant of the Ministry of Finance 
Prof. Samuel K. Botwe Asante: Former Head of Political Science Department at 
University of Ghana (Legon); served several years for the United Nations; Con-
sultant to UNECA 
Rev. Dr. Bishop Paul Bemile: Catholic Bishop of Wa (Upper East Region) 
Prof. Miranda Greenstreet: Leading Educationist and former Director of the 
Institute of Adult Education at University of Ghana (Legon) 
Gloria Ofori-Boadu: Former Executive Director of the International Federation 
of Women Lawyers in Ghana; President of the Women’s Assistance and Business 
Association 
Nutifafa Kuenyehia: Lawyer and former President of the Ghana Bar Association 
and Media Commission 
 
Source:  www.naprm-gc.org (accessed 18 May 2007)  
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That GC members were appointed by the President, but – symbolically being 
independent – without taking a customary oath of allegiance to the President 
or the government. The GC, however, depends on public funding. It had to 
struggle for financial autonomy from government policy; at the time of re-
search, the GC had its own bank account, and received funding through a 
separate budget line. An independent bank account is important for potential 
external funding: the development partners can only support the GC’s work 
directly only with a separate account. (interview, 3 March 2007). According 
to GC members, only around five percent of the council’s budget is derived 
from development partners. This predominant national funding underlines the 
ownership of the APR. Overall, the Ghanaian GC appears to be more inde-
pendent than respective national focal point bodies in other participating 
states (cf. Herbert 2006, 30).  
Essentially, the GC has two main roles. It serves as the national focal point 
and has an oversight function for the Ghanaian peer review. As focal point, it 
is the main place of contact for all stakeholders of the APRM. Its tasks com-
prise to technically steer the Ghanaian self-assessment within the APRM. 
Consequently, it is responsible for collecting and spreading of information, 
and for organising consultations for the four focal areas. Furthermore, as the 
oversight body, it compiles the final country report, and hands it over to the 
President. The GC describes itself as a “buffer” between the APR Secretariat 
in Midrand, and the Ghanaian government (cf. GC, interview, 3 March 2007). 
The GC, for instance, was responsible for managing that stakeholders partici-
pated. Groups that had been initially left out – e. g. youth organisations and 
the disabled – were later integrated into the process.  
3.1.2 The national APR Secretariat  
Similar to the GC, the secretariat was created based on the example of the 
continental APR framework but not required by the APRM guidelines.  
The APR Secretariat was developed to provide administrative and technical 
support to the GC. It is an autonomous unit, not attached to any ministry or 
governmental department and hires its own professional staff from the private 
sector. The APR Secretariat is headed by an Executive Secretary (Francis 
Appiah), who is supported by six employees. Temporarily, UNDP Ghana had 
supported the secretariat by adding two members to the staff (cf. Appiah 
2004). Francis Appiah had previously been an advisor to the NEPAD-
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Minister, which lead to the suspicion by some that he was representing gov-
ernment “at arms length” (Gruzd 2006a, 6). Nevertheless, this access to 
government can be seen as rather positive; taking into consideration the non-
state composition of the GC, a link to government at the administrative level 
seems to be an obvious advantage. 
The APR Secretariat implements decisions taken by the GC, coordinates the 
their programmes and activities, conducts public relations such as the under-
taking of public education and sensitisation programmes and the coordinates 
with stakeholders in the process (cf. GC 2005b). De facto, the secretariat is 
first point of contact for all stakeholders of the APR process. Their task was 
more specifically comprised of preparing the selection of support research 
and organising a technical review of their work (see below on technical 
teams) or, together with the support researchers, organising workshops such 
as the three days validation workshop before the drafting of the PoA. Fur-
thermore, the secretariat supported by the researchers cross-checked the 
changes made to the standard (i. e. technical teams).  
One more concrete example for its technical work is the integration of addi-
tional quality checks on the independent technical teams by – again – inde-
pendent technical experts, instead of government officials. This happened 
without previous notification of the TTs, as one interviewee noted (interview, 
27 March 2007), and thus indicates a high degree of rigor. However, several 
interviewees criticised that the selection of TTs had not been transparent 
(interview, 16 March 2007). Apparently, there was no open tendering process 
to select the TTs (cf. 3.1.3).  
Much of the task of dissemination of the APRM in Ghana rest on the shoul-
ders of the Secretariat. Staff capacity constraint its work and also affect the 
work of the Executive Secretary. Even though there appear to be attempts 
within the secretariat to improve the attributions of tasks and to delegate 
responsibilities, the secretariat still appeared to be mainly driven by one per-
son. The Executive Secretary, as a number of interviewees expressed, has 
shown a very high personal engagement. Yet, questions about the devolution 
of work can be asked: It does not seem to be a sustainable approach that the 
Executive Secretary (as well as GC members) were present at every APR 
workshop in the country. Some research institutions (technical teams) also 
raised issues that could be related to capacity problems in the secretariat: 
“It would have been useful to have had greater consultation and informa-
tion sharing with the GC, for instance we often found out about sensitisa-
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tion and awareness workshops and other events only by reading about 
them in the press” (interview, 27 March 2007). 
However, the vast majority of interviewees appreciated the work of the secre-
tariat, despite some described capacity constraints. Similar to the GC itself, 
only a small number of interviewees – individuals from the opposition parties 
– reproached the secretariat of being partisan (interview, 7 March 2007).  
3.1.3 Technical teams  
It was quite clear that the conduct of the peer review itself was beyond the 
capacities of the GC or the secretariat themselves. Consequently, external 
support was sought. Ghana thus conducted its first stage of the APRM by 
choosing a so-called “survey and think-tank model” (Gruzd 2006b, 6). This 
model was an innovation for the APRM that has subsequently been used by 
other countries, e. g. South Africa. Ghana’s GC appointed four policy think-
tanks as technical review teams (TTs) for the task of working through the 
questionnaire and drafting the programme of action, thereby fostering credi-
bility of the APR process in Ghana (cf. Herbert / Gruzd 2008).17 The assign-
ment of four independent TTs presumably played an important part in secur-
ing the independence of the overall process, as the four teams helped keep 
government at a distance (Gruzd 2006b) and were given autonomy to write 
the Country Self-Assessment Reports (CSARs) for their respective areas (cf. 
Herbert 2006, 37 f.).  
The mandate of the TTs comprised the operationalisation of the standard 
continental questionnaire, analysis of the four governance areas (attributed to 
one institution each), and advice to the GC on how to draft the PoA.18 The 
specific terms of reference for the four TTs include the essential methodo-
logical requirements: how to achieve broad participation, expected deliver-
ables, advise on policies that consider country specific issues, and to main-
stream gender issues (cf. Appiah 2004). It was then up to each TT to develop 
its own approach in conducting the country self-assessment (interview, 27 
                                                          
17  he Ghana Centre for Democratic Governance (CDD) was chosen for the area of democracy 
and good political governance; the Centre for Policy Analysis (CEPA) for the area of eco-
nomic governance and management; the Private Enterprise Foundation (PEF) for the area 
corporate governance; the Institute for Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER) 
for the area of socio-economic development (cf. APR Secretariat 2005a, 7).  
18 For details, see below, Section 3.2.1. Methodology of technical teams in Ghana.  
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March 2007). The fact that the APR process should take place periodically, it 
might be problematic that the scope of the TTs contract (funding, duration, 
etc.) was apparently not clearly defined by the secretariat.  
A positive aspect is that the participants described a vibrant exchange among 
the TTs. For instance, they had been working together to harmonise the modi-
fication of the questionnaire: 
“Given the cross-cutting nature of the questionnaire and to avoid overlap-
ping and conflicting reports, the Technical Review Teams worked first to 
establish linkages, shared best practices and learning. To reinforce this, 
they meet routinely to discuss and compare notes” (Appiah 2004)  
Additionally, the tight timeframe was handed down to the TTs: 
“Time issues are the biggest challenge. […] The time bound deadlines 
made it more difficult. Some things you cannot control. For this case, no 
spare time was available. We should have had much more time to prepare 
everything” (interview, 27 March 2007).   
Since the TTs received funding from the secretariat, which had to deal with 
significant financial bottlenecks itself, capacity constraints affected interac-
tion with the TTs. The level of funding for technical work – criticised as not 
sufficient for some of the more extensive methods described below – were an 
issue.  
External criticism address the selection of technical teams without a proper 
(and thus transparent) tendering process. Apart from this procedural critique, 
most stakeholders appear to have been convinced that the selected TTs were 
competent (interview, 27. Feb. 2007). There are admittedly few organisations 
capable of carrying out such a demanding exercise. However, particularly in 
the case of the think tank working on political governance (CDD) there was a 
perception with some interviewees that they were somehow close to govern-
mental positions. Nevertheless, according to the vast majority of interviewees 
this link between the government and the CDD had no effect on their work 
for the APRM: 
“CDD was seen as pro-government in the beginning, but it works very in-
dependently. They just have the same liberal philosophy like the govern-
ment. They have been able to show their independence. Even if you are 
appointed by somebody, you can work independently and be critical like 
CDD.” (civil society stakeholder, interview, 27 March 2007).  
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One illustration of how the roles of the technical teams as external research 
support was perceived is that they did not have any direct contact to the 
Country Review Mission (interview, 27 March 2007).  
3.2 The conduct of a national political process – vertical 
 accountability? 
The APRM is clearly a political process and aims at providing an opportunity 
for interaction between government and civil society at the national level. 
The APRM explicitly aspires to “facilitate exchange of information and 
national dialogue” (APRM guidelines, November 2003). As a political inter-
action, it lives from the engagement of and input provided by a wide range of 
stakeholders (cf. Herbert / Gruzd 2008). The key question is to assess validity 
of the process in this context. And therefore, asking whether the process had 
been open to all key stakeholders and if the procedures as well as results were 
disseminated to the broad public during and after the review. Furthermore, 
the study turns to several stakeholder groups to review their specific engage-
ment with the APRM.  
3.2.1 Methodology of the technical teams in Ghana 
According to the APR Secretariat, the methodology of the country self-
assessment along the continental questionnaire has been designed as a bot-
tom-up process, aspiring to make the process inclusive and transparent, as 
required by the continental standards. Numerous feedback-loops and valida-
tion workshops were introduced during the country self-assessment. In prac-
tice, the applied methodological approach can be subdivided into four major 
steps: pre-field methodology, field-methodology, in-house methodology, and 
post-field methodology (cf. Appiah 2004).  
The first stage of implementing the APR was the pre-field methodology, 
which largely consisted of the preparation stage of the country self-
assessment, including preparing for the participation of stakeholders. The 
very first measures that have been undertaken during this stage were aware-
ness-raising about the APRM in Ghana, i. e. education, sensitisation and the 
creation of ownership. Creation of ownership among the Ghanaian civil soci-
ety arguably was key in that phase, as further steps aimed at building on it 
(APR Secretariat 2005a). Awareness raising consisted of activities like 
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monthly newsletters, meetings across the country or media training, etc., were 
undertaken (cf. Gruzd 2006b, 5).  
“Stals [Member of the Panel of Eminent Persons and Chair of the Country 
Review Mission] singles out Ghana’s effective sensitisation efforts, and 
notes that every time he landed in the country, he was besieged by print 
and electronic media for interviews about APR.” (Gruzd 2006b, 5). 
As indicated above, each TT was responsible for the methodological design 
of its respective section. Consequently, responsibility lies with the GC to 
harmonise and coordinate the methodological approaches among the TTs, in 
order to avoid unnecessary doubling of questions. Furthermore it was neces-
sary to identify key stakeholders, adapt the questionnaire, and gather informa-
tion and data for the APR Panel (cf. Appiah 2004).  
The most critical step within the pre-field methodology was the selection of 
stakeholders. The selection appears to have built on TTs experiences: in some 
areas it was clear, which organisations to select (interview, 27 March 2007). 
Yet, ex ante criteria were not specifically defined. The GC cross-checked the 
selection. Each TT produced a list, which the GC compiled. As a result of 
this cross-check youth associations and organisations of the disabled were 
included. These groups had not been added from the start, but pro-actively 
approached the GC (interview, 3 March 2007). Altogether, more than 5000 
stakeholders were identified and participated in the process (Appiah 2004). 
Different groups of stakeholders, such as government agencies, CSOs, or 
ordinary citizens, were involved in different ways, such as panel interviews, 
focus groups, or syndicate discussions. The findings of this participative self-
assessment were tested through a validation workshop, which brought differ-
ent stakeholders together (Appiah 2004). Opposition parties once again 
claimed to have not been involved appropriately in their role as parliamentar-
ian opposition. According to them, they had not been (systematically) invited 
to seminars, nor did they receive targeted information (interview, 23 March 
2007). This stands in stark contrast to the findings of SAIIA, as Herbert 
writes, “one of Ghana’s innovations was to consult with all political parties 
about the proposed APR structure” (Herbert 2006, 23). 
The subsequent field methodology was organised with three major instru-
ments: elite survey, household survey, and focus group discussions. Only one 
TT – CDD-Ghana – undertook household, having had experiences with this 
methodology in previous work on political governance. During the household 
survey the researchers interviewed 1,200 people face-to-face to seek the opin-
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ions of the general public.19 In comparison to that, an elite survey was carried 
out with 250 respondents. This methodology was costly, but considered to 
produce better results than just sending questionnaires, particularly in a con-
text like Ghana’s, with high levels of illiteracy (cf. CDD 2005, 3 f.).20 In 
order to facilitate the task for respondents, the think-tank ISSER (responsible 
for the section on socio-economic development), for example, paraphrased its 
research questions for the mass survey. In contrast, CDD reproduced the 
questions in the exact way the continental secretariat formulated them, in 
order to avoid misinterpretations of their meaning (cf. Opoku 2006, 26). The 
methodology of conducting expert and household surveys appear to have met 
academic standards. Critical voices, however, asked about their weighting: it 
was not clear how it was dealt with potentially conflicting results from both 
survey models (Interview with an academic, 19 Apr. 2007).  
In line with the continental questionnaire, the nationally adopted question-
naire on political governance developed by CDD asked about political norm 
and their implementation. For example, respondents were asked whether they 
knew relevant programmes, or policies, which are set up to help vulnerable 
(minority) groups, children, or women. The next question then asked 
whether, or to what extent, these policies were making a difference in prac-
tice (cf. CDD, Mass Survey Instrument). In addition, values were stated in a 
clear and general form and linkage was made explicit between questions and 
underlying norms. CDD organised the questionnaire for the household survey 
clearly along the given nine objectives for its area of democracy and political 
governance, and always named the specific objective to make it more trans-
parent for the respondent (cf. CDD, Mass Survey Instrument). The general 
acceptance of the questionnaire was claimed to have been good, also in rural 
areas, which were included in the process. This approval might also came 
from that the questionnaires were translated into the local languages, with 
support of local non-governmental organisations, such as the Northern Civic 
Union (NCU) (as stated during a workshop in Wa, 26 Feb. 2007).21 Further-
                                                          
19  The center is partner of the Afrobarometer opinion survey and thus an expert in the field 
and a member of the quantitative social research network.  
20  Contrary to this methodology, South Africa made questionnaires of the country self-
assessment available to all individual citizens. Yet, only a handful of South Africans made 
use of the opportunity (cf. Herbert / Gruzd 2008, 281). 
21  Translations were available at least in all major national languages, namely Ga, Akan, Ewe, 
Haussa, and Dagbani, while the recording was done in English.  
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more, the national acceptance of the questionnaire was apparently enhanced 
by including the national cultural specificities (e. g. chieftaincy; more on the 
questionnaire in Chapter 4 below).  
However, doubts raised among the interviewees questioning the ability of the 
average Ghanaian citizen to answer the complex (legal) issues addressed in 
the questionnaire (interview, 12 March 2007). Stakeholders in the process 
must be technically competent enough to bring in their issues into the country 
self-assessment. Consequently, questions will have to be divided into sections 
for experts and non-experts. Overall, the selection of stakeholders appears to 
have been reasonable and expert surveys provided for the inclusion of spe-
cific expertise.  
In a third step – parallel to other endeavours to collect evidence – desk re-
search, as well as in-house peer reviews were integral parts of the in-house 
methodology. Basis for the in-house method was a literature review. Further-
more, major sources for data were the ministries, government departments 
and agencies, development partners, etc. CDD also subcontracted external 
consultants to conduct this research (cf. CDD 2005, 3). The in-house peer 
review provided for a feedback-loop, in line with international good practice 
(cf. Appiah 2004). 
Central instrument of the post-field methodology were validation workshops 
in order to cross-check the draft reports with stakeholders in the country. This 
post-field methodology is possibly the most crucial aspect to ensure a well 
governed process and will be looked into in the following section on dissemi-
nation. 
3.2.2 Dissemination – efforts and shortcomings  
A challenging task of the GC was the dissemination process of the APRM 
(cf. Gruzd 2006b, 10). In a context of generally weak institutions, conducting 
a meaningful peer review with wide range participation is a major logistical 
challenge. First of all, citizens and interest groups as well as organisational 
units need to be sensitised about the exercise, its scope, its aim and its inher-
ent limitations.   
One of the obstacle was a lack of sensitisation and information in the early 
stage (interviews, 26 March 2007 and 27 March 2007). Apparently, getting 
information about the APRM to broad parts of the population was a chal-
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lenge, even though many interviewees claimed to have heard about the 
APRM mainly through the media. The media was targeted by and involved in 
the APR process early on.22 However, a positive start might not suffice to 
keep the media continuously informed, as civil society actors highlighted 
(Interviews, 20 March 2007 and 21 Feb. 2007). A free and independent me-
dia is crucial for the functioning of a democratic state as freedom of expres-
sion lies at the very heart of it (cf. Louw 2006). Consequently, the Ghanaian 
constitution stresses that mass media “shall uphold the responsibility and 
accountability of the Government to the people of Ghana” (Article 162, 5; 
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (CoG)). Concerning the APRM, the 
media is a key player in the sensitisation, consultation and monitoring of the 
process (cf. UNECA 2005b, 14 ff.). In Africa it is very important to have 
radio broadcasts due to high rates of illiteracy. It is crucial to highlight that 
most of the interviewees – including regional state representatives – said that 
nearly all of their knowledge about the APRM came from media reports (in-
terviews, 21 March 2007 and 23 March 2007). As a parliamentarian stated:  
“When the report was published, radios informed the people. Before the 
media informed about the APRM, people thought that this initiative takes 
only place on the highest level. Radio promoted the ordinary man to play a 
role in the APRM” (Interview, 1 March 2007). 
Curiously – and critically – some media were being paid by the GC to cover 
APR-related workshops, which might have contributed to the tame coverage 
of the process (see box 5).23 The APR report was nationally disseminated via 
national media: the GC selected the widely circulating daily newspaper The 
Daily Graphic to publish the whole country report in a series. This raised 
questions about the space for critical coverage: 
“Some reporters are advocates. For example, the APRM gives advertise-
ment to The Daily Graphic. So they are reluctant to criticise, since other-
                                                          
22  A media workshop was held in Accra on 12 December 2002, which was organised by the 
GC to inform the media about the objectives of the APRM (cf. Appiah 2004).  
23  The media in Ghana are perceived as politically free, as acknowledged by indices of Free-
dom House. Yet, some media organisations in Ghana are state-run or parastatal, and some 
are private enterprises (cf. Hasty 2007; Ghana Journalist Association / FES 2005, 178 ff.). 
Parts of the media are thus perceived as strongly pro-government (interview, 27 Feb. 2007). 
In this context, individuals complained that the media did not live up to their possibilities as 
watchdog of the APR process (interview, 19 Feb. 2007). Even though these perceptions are 
admittedly political coloured, they cannot be completely dismissed. 
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wise they are not given the advertisement” (interview with media repre-
sentative, 26 March 2007). 
A crucial institution in dissemination was the National Commission for Civic 
Education (NCCE). This public institution is mentioned in Ghana’s constitu-
tion as being in charge of education of its citizens; it has 10 regional offices 
and represented in all 138 Ghanaian districts.24 Ideally, the NCCE would act 
as a mediator between the government, the APR institutions and the people. 
Since 2004, the NCCE was chosen as partner of the GC for the sensitisation 
about the APRM, especially in resorting to the district offices’ network (in-
terview, 27 March 2007). The tasks ranged from handling the questionnaires 
by inviting stakeholders to workshops and distributing the final reports (in-
terview, 16 March 2007). However, dissemination of the APRM was an 
enormous task. Yet this task was not in line with its schedule, as workshops 
on dissemination (explaining what the APRM was about) were still being 
held in early 2007 – a phase in which meetings and workshops should have 
been predominantly focusing on implementation issues.25  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24  According to the Ghanaian constitution, NCCE is responsible for the education of the 
Ghanaian citizens especially with regard to the principles of the constitution and thereby 
encouraging the public to defend constitutional rights against abuses (cf. article 233, CoG). 
For this task, NCCE agreed on an activity-based budget from the GC; the latter made sug-
gestions how to spread information. Thus, for example workshops were organised. For ref-
erences to the 1992 Constitution cf. http://www.parliament.gh/const_constitution.php (ac-
cessed 2 Feb. 2007). 
25  One such example was a workshop in Wa in February 2007, attended by authors of this 
study. 
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26  The press archives of the Ghanaian APR Secretariat covers national print media from 
2004–2006. It includes newspapers such as The Daily Graphic, The Accra Daily Mail, The 
Box 5:  The Ghanaian APRM in the media 
How was the APRM covered in Ghana’s press? For European readers, Ghanaian 
newspapers generally leave the impression of varying between the extremes of 
either official or polemic style. The national newspapers provided basic coverage 
of the Ghanaian APRM throughout the years 2004-200626, even if reports were 
rather event-driven and little analytical.  
In 2004, information was mainly about the fundamental ideas of NEPAD and the 
APRM, often in connection with the ongoing electoral debate in Ghana at that 
time. Articles on the APRM published in the run-up to the elections in December 
2004 were rather educative and tried to steer clear of party political lines: GC 
members were cited that the APRM should not be understood as a party mani-
festo; ownership of the process should be by all Ghanaians and civil society. 
Furthermore, articles covered sensitisation workshops held in Accra, e. g. with 
staff from the security services or members of an association for the disabled. A 
regional workshop in Ashanti was also prominently covered, yet not in an analyti-
cal manner (where are the critical issues? What to expect from the process?). 
Background information was given about the external reactions to the Ghanaian 
process, for example, referring to Canadian financial support within the frameset 
of the G8. Also covered by the press was the support mission to Ghana led by the 
APR Panel, covering the team’s visit to the President. 
In 2005, media coverage on workshops continued. That year, the press turned to 
Ghana’s governance performance. According to the self-assessment process, 
articles reported on the findings of the TTs that where presented at several stake-
holders’ forums. In addition, articles covered events like the meetings of the GC 
with the President, e. g. for the handing over of the self-assessment report, or the 
presidential audience for the members of the APR Team during the country re-
view mission that year. The CRM – like other continental events – featured quite 
prominently in the press; main activities and statements of the APR Team were 
covered. The same holds true for the presentation of the Ghanaian and the Rwan-
dan report to the APR Panel in Abuja in June 2005, which was extensively cov-
ered. Though the performance of Ghana was judged as largely satisfactory, some 
of the media picked-up on the governance weaknesses presented at the meeting 
and blamed the current government for failures. This prompted a reaction of the 
Ghanaian GC. The GC’s members emphasised that the APRM is not a scoring 
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exercise for the current New Patriotic Party (NPP) government but a non-partisan 
report of Ghana’s collective achievements. The continental APR Secretariat was 
concerned about the large number of articles on the APR Forum have  
“focused only on the shortcomings identified in the review reports and 
have failed to recognise any positive contributions of the APRM process 
to good governance in Africa. The APRM Secretariat believes this may 
be due to a lack of proper understanding of the process and is con-
cerned because it regards the role of the press as critical in supporting 
the APR process and disseminating accurate information to the general 
public” (APR Secretariat 2005b).  
Though it seemed important to clarify the nature of the APRM time and again, this 
concern appears to be rather exaggerated. While shortcomings should not provide 
for the only focus, a critical assessment of what government could and should do – 
i. e. a political dialogue – was one aspect of the APRM (vertical accountability). 
Other, non-controversial issues covered by the press were compliments by the 
international community for Ghana’s successful APR exercise as well as an exten-
sive discussion about the money needed for the implementation of the programme 
of action.  
In January of 2006, President Kufuor’s presentation at the APR Forum and sharing 
the experience Ghana had with other African countries were at the centre of inter-
est. It was the first country being discussed at the APR Forum. The praise from 
other African statesmen was hyped by the media in Ghana as a very positive step. 
Later, articles reported on Benin’s quest for Ghanaian advice towards their own 
APR process and the public launch of the Ghanaian country report as well as im-
plications for further action. Articles critically dealing with the issue of chieftaincy 
drew the connection to findings of the Ghanaian APRM. At least this issue led to 
an analytical and balanced, yet critical coverage. 
A number of materials, such as leaflets etc. had been written to reach the 
public. The APR Secretariat in Ghana also produced a radio jingle of the 
APRM and it was broadcast at national and regional radio stations, also in 
different local languages. The overall number of these, however, seemed to 
have been too small, as an interviewee from the administration in the region 
complained: 
“We have to do more. It is one thing to put the things on paper, but it is 
another thing to bring it down to the people. We even do not know where 
                                                                                                                         
Evening News, The Crusading Guide, The Ghanaian Times, The Statesman, The Heritage, 
The Business Times, and The Business Chronicle. 
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the reports are and do not know where to order them. I have not read the 
whole report. I only read it in the Daily Graphic.” (interview, 7 March 
2007). 
Dissemination efforts did not stop by the end of the peer review process it-
self. The results need to be, too dispersed, as the above quotation indicates. A 
small number of the country reports were distributed across the nation, which 
contributed to the lack of detailed information about the content and recom-
mendations of the APRM. Nearly two thirds of the interviewees27 reported 
not having received a copy, even though some of them claimed to have pro-
actively tried to get one. As one might expect, the distribution of country 
reports is even smaller in the districts and regions. For instance, from 20,000 
copies of the APRM report an estimate of slightly more than one percent 
reached Tamale in the Northern Region, as interviewees among development 
partners and the Ghanaian administration stated (interviews, 16 March 2007 
and 27 March 2007). 
The secretariat coordinated other activities measures such as translation of the 
country report into local languages (co-financed by Danisch International 
Development Agency – DANIDA). Though interviewees stated that having 
country reports in local languages would definitely improve sensitisation 
about the APRM (e. g. interview, 15 March 2007), especially in rural areas, 
the authors of this study would question whether this step should have had 
priority. The report is technically detailed and serves mostly CSO representa-
tives rather than a broad readership. Nearly all the CSO representatives read 
and write English; local languages are used predominately by word of mouth. 
In order to reach more illiterate citizens with overall information about the 
process and its results, it would arguably be more useful to increase the num-
ber of dissemination workshops as well as sensitisation measures in the radio.  
Capacity problems prevail, mainly with regard to staffing and funding. Espe-
cially in the context of dissemination the secretariat needs more personal 
resources. For instance, the Secretariat claimed that a permanent media offi-
cer on staff could help coordinate the APR dissemination and ensure that 
enough follow-up work is done with the media (interview, 21 Feb. 2007). 
This view was shared by media representatives in the interviews, e. g.: 
                                                          
27  The interview sample is not representative. However, it targeted mostly key stakeholders, 
i. e. people that had contact with the peer review process. More striking is that a high per-
centage of this group had not received copies of the report.  
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“The APRM Secretariat has to realign the information and communication 
policy. They have information about 10 pages long. That is too long! They 
have to bring it down to make ordinary people understand it.” (interview, 
23 March 2007).  
The question is, however, whether it is sensible to shorten an already con-
densed and very comprehensive report or whether specifically targeted sum-
maries would not be more successful, such as “Agricultural issues in the 
APRM” or “Anti-corruption measures in the APRM” or “Ghana’s youth and 
the APRM” or the like. 
3.2.3 Assessment of national stakeholders’ engagement in 
the process  
As illustrated above, stakeholders of the APRM should come from all parts of 
Ghanaian society, since it is an assessment of the country, not just govern-
ment. Domination of few stakeholders could have negative implications for 
the acceptance of the APRM. The following looks at stakeholders from gov-
ernment, public institutions, parliament, civil society organisations, and de-
velopment partners.  
Government  
The role of government within the process is ambivalent. On the one hand, it 
plays a crucial role, as it has initiated the whole APR process by signing the 
MoU to accede to the APRM through the President and will need to act on 
most of the recommendations. On the other hand, it is regarded as one stake-
holder among others during the country self-assessment; a powerful stake-
holder that potentially fights for its own interests and its own agenda. No 
stakeholder beyond government has the opportunity to comment on the final 
recommendations of the peer review report. Furthermore, government has to 
assess the costing (as only administration can estimate certain costs). This, 
however, gives the government opportunity to substantially influence the 
direction of the programme of action.28  
The much lauded commitment of the Ghanaian government, which was often 
cited as a critical success factor for the APRM (cf. Appiah 2004), leads to the 
question about the reason for this government behaviour. First of all, the 
                                                          
28  On the institutional setup of the Ghanaian APRM and its political implications, see above. 
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strong commitment towards the APRM can partly be explained by the self-
perception of the NPP, the governmental party of President Kufuor, which 
claims to stand for liberal thought and mainstreaming of democratic rule (cf. 
Appiah 2004). Even though the majority of interviewees appreciated the step 
of the Ghanaian government to undergo the APRM, there have been a few 
critical voices from parliament and Civil Society individuals that claimed 
government had conducted the APRM for their self-interest, in order to raise 
more external funds. Other observers saw little political risk for the incum-
bent government as many of the faults could have been attributed to the pre-
vious administration of Jerry Rawlings. This safeguard option of finding a 
political scapegoat could minimise potential risks, while undergoing the 
APRM would illustrate openness and the will to reform (without delivering 
before the elections) and thereby fostering electoral chances (e. g. interviews, 
21 March 2007 and 30 March 2007). Whichever version holds true, govern-
ment was apparently committed to the process for a number of reasons and 
duly followed continental guidelines where available or the spirit of an open 
APRM where no framework was given.  
Public Institutions  
Public institutions provide public services – and thus are subject to govern-
ance assessment as well as stakeholders. They are, however, not part of the 
government and are not under direct supervision of a ministry. The Commis-
sion on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) or the Serious 
Fraud Office (SFO) are examples of public institutions in Ghana.  
CHRAJ is explicitly mentioned in the Constitution of Ghana (CoG) as an 
independent state organ.29 The functions of CHRAJ include: to educate the 
public about human rights, to report to parliament on related issues as well as 
to take appropriate action to remedy instances of violation of fundamental 
rights. This commission has a nationwide network of 10 regional offices and 
99 district offices.30 The SFO has a different legal position as both NCCE and 
CHRAJ. It was created by an act of parliament in 1993 and is under supervi-
                                                          
29  CHRAJ was founded after Ghana’s return to constitutional rule in 1992, with a mandate to 
foster a culture of respect for human rights, as well as administrative justice and fairness in 
Ghanaian society. It is supposed to address all aspects of human rights and administrative 
justice, which includes investigating instances of corruption. Similarly, the NCCE men-
tioned above is also a constitutionally protected institution. 
30 Cf. www.chrajghana.org (accessed 14 May 2007). 
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sion of the Ministry of Justice (the minister is also attorney-general of 
Ghana). The mandate of the SFO is to prevent any suspected offence against 
the law, which appears to involve serious financial or economic loss to the 
state. In order to do so, its core tasks include monitoring, investigating and 
prosecuting corruption and serious frauds. The SFO has a nationwide net-
work of five offices, with their headquarter based in Accra.   
Both bodies are active in anti-corruption activities and were to some extent 
involved in Ghana’s self-assessment and during the country review mission. 
CHRAJ’s head office in Accra, for instance, was closely involved from the 
beginning of the self-assessment: it was engaged in the conceptualisation of 
the country report. By discussing draft reports drawn up by the technical 
teams, the institutions were able to comment on the reported human rights 
issues as one interviewee explained (interview, 29 March 2007). Moreover, 
the public institutions were invited to workshops and were able to submit 
ideas. Findings of the self-assessment were discussed during the country 
review mission (cf. GC / Stals 2005). Interviewees and literature reported that 
due to these discussions, CHRAJ and SFO were flagging their topics – like 
shortcomings in their respective mandate or capacity constraints (interview 7 
March 2007; APR Secretariat 2005a, 79). SFO, for example, tabled the issue 
of their only limited autonomy from the Ministry of Justice (interview, 20 
March 2007).  
In their activities, regional disparities seem to have prevailed. While some 
state institutions in regions – including beyond Accra – participated in several 
APRM related meetings at the local level and could place topics like their 
under-funding on the agenda. However, staff from other regions claimed that 
they had only learnt about the process through the media and were not di-
rectly involved. Others apparently had been involved in the process, but did 
not receive the final report (interviews, 19 March 2007, 20 March 2007 and 
21 March 2007). 
Parliament  
The Constitution of Ghana (CoG) provides for a hybrid system with elements 
of both a presidential and a parliamentary democracy.31 Parliament is the key 
                                                          
31  Executive authority is established by the Office of the President. The president appoints the 
ministers of state with the prior approval of parliament; ministers have to be members of 
parliament (MPs) or persons qualified to be elected as such. A constitutional provision re-
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institution, for both vertical as well as horizontal accountability (Schacter 
2001, 137); this is specifically recognized by the NEPAD Declaration (cf. 
AU / NEPAD 2003a, 5). Brief, in democratic Ghana, parliament is a key 
institution with regard to a number of principles of good governance and 
should take early interest in the APRM.32 
Being at the interface between CSOs and the government, the role of parlia-
ment in the APR process is multifaceted. In the first place, the role of parlia-
ment can be strengthened by the country self-assessment. Parliament could 
use the country report as a catalogue that summarises the weaknesses and 
strengths of the country – and hold government accountable for these. More-
over – with the APRM assessing a country, not just government – parliament 
as an institution could introduce its own issues and, for instance, point out 
weaknesses of its position in the political system, thereby attempting to im-
prove its role within the system.  
On the downside, the APRM might be uncomfortable for MPs, since it covers 
their precise role: assessing the governance of Ghana. In theory, the institu-
tion should be able to identify the country’s problems and needs without the 
help of a – potentially non-representative – civil society driven country self-
assessment. However, the gap between ambitions and realities in the political 
system were at the very core of the APRM’s creation (cf. Herbert / Gruzd 
2008, 103) and Ghana’s parliament in practice is a weak institution. Ghanaian 
MPs have apparently not been involved in the APRM process from the start 
(interview, 1 March 2007). After making some noise about being sidelined, 
                                                                                                                         
quires half of the appointed ministers to be MPs (cf. Article 78, CoG,). This element is a 
main characteristic for the mentioned mixture of political systems as it is a deviation from a 
pure presidential system e. g. as established in the USA (cf. SAIIA 2005, 3). 
32  The past parliamentary elections took place in December 2004; since then four parties have 
been represented in the legislative. The current majority party is the New Patriotic Party 
(NPP) holding 128 seats. The largest opposition party, with 94 seats, is the National De-
mocratic Congress (NDC). The People’s National Convention (PNC, 4 MPs), the Conven-
tion People’s Party (CPP, 3 MPs) and one non-partisan MP complete the picture. The share 
of female MPs is 10.87 %. Parliament currently holds 14 standing and 15 select committees 
(cf. http://www.parliament.gh; accessed 2 Feb. 2007). Since the return to democratic rule in 
Ghana in 1992, four elections have been held. These elections have been characterised by 
gradually improving quality measured against the free and fair criteria. For details concern-
ing the assessment of the electoral processes since 1992 cf. Crawford 2004, 4 ff.; Ayee 
1998, 6 f.; Aning 2001; BTI 2006, 4 f.; UNECA 2004b, 7 f.  
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MPs were subsequently addressed as specific stakeholders in the APRM.33 
The actual engagement of MPs, however, appears to have remained low, 
allegedly due to capacity constraints. Parliament apparently focuses on the 
Ghana poverty reduction strategy (GPRS).34 Nevertheless, the Country Re-
view Mission picked up on MPs dissatisfaction with insufficient independ-
ence and efficiency of parliament (APR Secretariat 2005a, 31 f.). The APR 
Panel, i. e. the continental level of heads of state and government, gave six 
specific recommendations concerning parliament (for details, see Chapter 4). 
Civil society organisations  
Concerted civil action can articulate and mobilize demands and pressure 
public actors for accountability. Accordingly, the role of CSOs can be de-
scribed as forming “coalitions to lobby constitutional changes to improve 
governance, while also working to monitor the conduct of public officials” 
(Diamond 1999, 4). Consequently, civil society organisations – including 
business associations – are key within the APR process; all interviewees 
named CSOs as the most important stakeholder. 
There are different motivations that can drive CSO participation in the proc-
ess: CSOs might want to (i) influence the political agenda, (ii) raise aware-
ness for their specific issues, e. g. increase funds for policy actions (e. g. by 
being covered in the PoA), (iii) increasing their national and international 
reputation, (iv) benefit from individual incentives, such as attendance of a 
workshop (i. e. gaining insight, also usually linked to daily allowances), etc. 
Consequently, the process needs to be modelled in a way to prevent individ-
ual stakeholders from high-jacking the agenda for its self-interests.  
The Ghanaian self-assessment – with the exception of few household surveys 
– built mostly on organised groups, as mentioned above. The rationale of the 
APRM explicitly includes an evaluation of the functioning of CSOs them-
selves. CSOs denounced capacity constraints as a major barrier for being 
engaged in the APRM more actively, with capacity problems more pro-
nounced in remote and non-urban areas. The APRM is one more issue to 
                                                          
33  The GC subsequently organised a workshop for MPs to inform them about the objectives of 
the APRM. 
34  Note, for instance, that parliament has a commission for the GPRS II, but none specialised 
on the APRM (interview, 2007-03-30). In 2008 it was suggested to discuss the APRM pro-
gress reports in the committee for foreign affairs, as it was responsible for NEPAD.  
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engage with for Ghanaian civil society, as there is no organisation to specifi-
cally monitor the implementation of all aspects of the APRM. Each partici-
pating CSO therefore followed their usual approaches and specific agenda. 
Yet, CSOs expressed respect for the APRM as such, as it was an opportunity 
to engage with the political system at an eye-to-eye level:  
“For the first time, government has put its neck on the ground and gave 
someone a knife to cut. This is a good thing. The fact that we went through 
the process is good” (interview, 16 March 2007). 
For state agents, the APRM offered opportunities to engage with CSOs, since 
it sought remedies for the identified shortcomings and gaps, as an interviewed 
state representative claimed (interview, 12 March 2007). A certain level of 
disillusion about civil society’s capacities prevails at the side of public 
agents, including a level of mistrust regarding actors’ agendas: 
“[the APRM] is a chance to involve the civil society into the process of po-
licy making, but since CSOs do not have enough capacities, there is also a 
big challenge to make them stronger. A major problem in this context is 
the dependency of the CSOs to the donor community. Another chance is 
that the APRM brings the government and CSOs together” (interview, 21 
Feb. 2007). 
As another governmental stakeholder in the region put it:  
“We need to train people and start from the lowest level […]. In our cul-
ture, the attitude of questioning leaders is not there, so we need to change 
and explain that it is important to ask questions and to check” (interview, 
21 March 2007). 
Initial complaints about little consultation with the GC were apparently acted 
upon. Civil society representatives were satisfied with a progressively more 
inclusive process (interview, 27 March 2007). Dissemination of the results, 
however, was patchy as illustrated above. This left some stakeholders uncer-
tain whether their submissions have been included in the report or not (inter-
view, 20 March 2007). 
3.3 The international dimension – horizontal 
 accountability? 
The international level of the APRM first and foremost embraces the peer 
level, which often confounds the Panel of Eminent Persons and the peer re-
view proper at the level of heads of state and government. The former pre-
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pares and informs discussions of heads of state and government. The actual 
peer review is conducted by the heads of state and government. Furthermore, 
the international level also, somewhat awkwardly, includes the international 
development partners that take an interest in the APRM.   
3.3.1 The peer experience for Ghana – The Panel of  
 Eminent Persons  
According to its mandate to oversee and steer national APR processes, the 
Panel of Eminent Persons sent a preparatory support mission to Ghana be-
tween 24 and 29 May 2004.35 Headed by the panel member Chris Stals 
(South Africa), eight experts from partner institutions took part in the mis-
sion. The main purpose of the mission was reaching an agreement on the 
technical issues of the APRM and the later Country Review Mission (CRM). 
For this purpose, a MoU was signed (cf. AU / NEPAD 2004).  
The panel came into play again in the Ghanaian process during the CRM, 
which took place 4–16 April 2005. In this context, the panel appointed 15 
members of the APR Team for Ghana, again under the lead of Chris Stals. 
Members of the team came from 12 different African countries and were staff 
of either the continental APRM and NEPAD secretariats as well as from 
partner institutions.36 It is within the APR Team’s mandate to cross-check the 
topics raised during the self-assessment and to give comments in its subse-
quent report.  
While in Ghana, the APR Team interacted with the stakeholders. During their 
stay in Accra, they met with the Governing Council, the four TTs involved in 
the self-assessment and several public institutions. Furthermore, a one day 
workshop was held with MPs, in addition to meetings with representatives of 
NGOs, trade unions, academia as well as with development partners. Meet-
ings took place across the country, in four regions.37 Besides meetings with 
state officials, the CRM also held workshops with various civil society stake-
holders in order to assess their participation in the process and to get their 
views on the APRM. At the end of the visit, the APR Team validated the 
                                                          
35  So far all APR countries have had support missions managed by the continental APR 
structures in advance of the actual national proceedings. 
36  For the full list of members and their affiliations cf. Herbert / Gruzd (2008, 175).  
37  These regions were Volta, Central, Upper West and Ashanti. 
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Ghanaian self-assessment in retrospect as technically competed and credible 
(cf. GC / Stals 2005). Some critics, however, were less positive about the first 
CRM experience: The visit was criticised by observers as too rushed, with 
some APR Team members not fully prepared and not familiar with the meth-
odology and modalities. This was expected to have had an influence on the 
report written by the team, which was reviewed by the Midrand Secretariat 
before presentation to the full APR Panel (cf. Herbert / Gruzd 2008, 174–177; 
Gruzd 2006c). According to the critics, the mission  
“had not interacted extensively with Ghanaians, particularly in the hinter-
land. Certain analysts claimed that the country team’s visit was carefully 
stage-managed by the local secretariat, with little contact beyond the offi-
cial itinerary. The reason for this may include the lack of preparation time 
before the team’s arrival, as well as its short visit” (Herbert / Gruzd 2008, 
175).   
The role of the Ghanaian APR Secretariat in the preparation of the visit was 
also questioned by a critical voice from academia in Ghana:  
“The [Ghanaian APRM] process was open and brought local groups to-
gether. Only at the point when foreigners came to control, like the Country 
Review Team meetings seemed to be arranged and controlled by the secre-
tariat” (interview, 21 Feb. 2007).  
In Ghana, the CRM apparently had an influence on the coverage of at least 
one key topic: the issue of chieftaincy appears to have changed weight also 
because of the CRM report. An observer at the CRM’s workshop in Kumasi 
claimed that it had come to a heated verbal exchange between the participat-
ing chiefs and other workshop participants.38 Throughout following dissemi-
nation exercises of the APRM, traditional rulers were targeted as a specific 
group of stakeholders, singled out from civil society groups, i. e. workshops 
were organised separately for these groups. In this case, the APR Team pro-
vided for a critical coverage of relevant issues in Ghana’s APRM, even if 
these issues are sensitive due to national traditions.  
                                                          
38  The discussion, he claimed, had obviously been dominated by the chiefs who claimed their 
role as leaders of their groups. This negative influence on the open atmosphere had been an 
eye-opener for the CRM, which subsequently put a stronger emphasis on the topic of chief-
taincy in their report (interview, 16 March 2007). 
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3.3.2 The climax of the peer review – The Heads of State 
Forum  
The debate at the APR Forum is meant to crown the entire process of an 
African peer review.39 The review of the Republic of Ghana took place 22 
January 2006 at the 4th summit of the APR Forum in Khartoum. Besides 
Ghana’s resident Kufuor, ten other Heads of State and Government partici-
pated in the four hours discussion; another 14 countries were represented at 
ministerial or ambassadorial level. Members of the APR Panel and represen-
tatives of various APR partner institutions also participated (cf. AU / NEPAD 
2006). Little is known about deliberations of the APR Forum, as it took place 
behind closed doors and only issued brief minutes of the meeting. This is 
understandable in order to enable an open peer discussion, but makes an 
assessment of the level of discussion difficult. Concerns exist that the lack of 
transparency in this key stage of the APRM could lead to some sort of horse 
trading or log-rolling (cf. Déme 2005, 22). One academic interviewee who 
was present in Khartoum felt that Kufuor took the peer review at the APR 
Forum quite serious:  
“It is embarrassing if others discuss your shortcomings. Before the meet-
ing in Abuja President Kufuor was quite tense. He was really concerned 
about the report and the reaction of peers” (interview, 28 Feb. 2007).  
The minutes note that President Kufuor underscored the high value of the 
country report and stressed that the government is working on the implemen-
tation. In this context, he pointed out to his peers that 19 of the 159 recom-
mendations had already been implemented. He also announced that the Gha-
naian GC would be converted into a permanent body. The minutes reported 
that the subsequent peer discussion covered three aspects: constitutional re-
form, problems with land tenure and funding for the PoA. Regarding the 
latter, Ghana’s government had estimated the overall costs at 5 billion US$ - 
                                                          
39  As not all states take part in the APRM, the ARP Forum is currently not identical with 
NEPAD’s HSGIC. In general, there are three different African structures in place that in-
volve Heads of State meetings as the highest decision making body: The AU Assembly (52 
countries), the HSGIC (20 countries) and the APR Forum (26 countries [cf. LDGL 2007; 
Ojienda 2005]; 29 countries since 2008). As the MoU of the APRM states that “all proce-
dures to be adopted under the APRM shall be consistent with the decision and procedures 
of the AU” (AU / NEPAD 2003 f., 6), future arrangements or institutional changes should 
be considered to foster coherence. Already being discussed in this context is the integration 
of the NEPAD Secretariat into the AU Commission (cf. Cilliers 2003).     
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an amount that had been at much lower levels before the meeting (cf. Gruzd 
2006c).  
In the discussion, according to an academic Ghanaian participant (a member 
of the Ghanaian Governing Council), some Ghanaian best practises have 
been identified, namely the practise of holding an annually peoples’ assem-
bly, a national governance forum as well as a national economic dialogue. 
Also the existence of public institutions beyond government, namely the 
NCCE) and CHRAJ had been positively noted (cf. Asante 2006, 67 f.). Other 
sources, however, express disappointment about the quality of the peer meet-
ing: 
“there was little discussion of best practises in Ghana; some heads of state 
seemed not to grasp the ethos of the peer review, and spent time castigat-
ing Ghana for following (and the APR panel for supposedly endorsing) 
Western-inspired neo-liberal policies. Ghana’s report was candid, so there 
was little for the peers to add. […] no media conference was arranged for 
Kufuor” (Herbert / Gruzd 2008, 180).  
The minutes of the meeting state that Nigeria’s President Obasanjo, as then 
Chairperson of the APR Forum, defended the role of the APRM as more than 
window-dressing:  
“[The APRM] is not being conducted because African countries expect to 
receive additional external assistance, but rather because they are ready 
to comprehensively address and improve all areas of governance. External 
assistance from development partners would, nevertheless, be useful to-
wards implementing the Programme of Action” (AU / NEPAD 2006). 
Criticism of the peer review in general is widespread in literature. First, it is 
critically noted that only 29 AU countries participate in the APRM; the lack 
of willingness of African leaders to open being scrutinized is criticised 
(cf. Mathoho 2003, 7; Arthur / Quartey 2006, 212 f.). This could be seen as 
an indication for the candidness of the process. However, curiously enough, 
the list of non-subscribers to the APRM also includes African states that  
are usually classified as good performers like Botswana or Namibia 
(cf. Gottschalk / Schmidt 2004, 149 f.), allegedly as they do not see the value 
in such an costly and exhaustive exercise.  
Often referred to is the ambivalence of African states on the situation in Zim-
babwe is often cited as proof of unwillingness of peer criticism and as  
an example for the toothlessness of the idea underlying the APRM (cf.  
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Arthur / Quartey 2006, 214). This is somewhat unfair criticism, as Zimbabwe 
has not signed up to the APRM and an organisation is thus criticised for the 
behaviour of a non-member. However, the issue is also symptomatic of a 
disbelieve that the end of African indifference (cf. Grimm / Nawrath 2007) 
has actually come. Their silence on Zimbabwe casts the shadow of doubts on 
the seriousness of African statesmen in to address critical situations and led 
some civil society actors to dismiss the APRM altogether:  
“The Peers? They will not criticize each other. Look at [Zimbabwe’s 
President] Mugabe, everybody knows what is going on, but nobody stops 
him. When [Ghanaian President] Kufuor was in Great Britain he was 
asked about the situation, but was too diplomatic” (interview, 20 March 
2007).  
Third, there are doubts about the membership of countries perceived as bad 
performers. In addition to the fear that this could undermine the reputation of 
the APRM, the value-added of authoritarian states, like Sudan as an APR 
participant is questioned. Just by joining the APRM, Heads of States and 
Government of dubious regimes participate in APR Forum discussions. Mere 
declaration of participation does not necessarily have to be followed by a peer 
review in the near future, if governments decide to put the national process on 
the backburner. The base documents do not permit expelling a country from 
the process if they have never implemented a review. Legitimacy can thus be 
bought cheaply, which risks undermining the credibility of the process further 
(cf. Herbert 2004, 18).  
Most Ghanaian interviewees were not expecting much from the peer level. 
Some CSOs appreciated the new opportunity the APRM is providing for 
interference between individual African governments (interview, 16 March 
2007). Others, however were rather sceptical about the quality of discussion 
at that stage. Ghanaian civil society actors emphasised that they considered 
the time not being ripe “for one king to criticise the other” (interview, 14 
March 2007). Some openly shrugged off the possibility of an open discussion 
about critical points at all. The potential impact of the APRM on Ghana thus 
apparently unfolded rather at the national level, i. e. is more vertical than 
actually at the horizontal peer level, as an interviewee from a Ghanaian NGO 
bluntly stated: 
“The peers come and go! And every country is sovereign. So everybody 
can do what they want. Yes, peers can blame others, but it will not really 
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be serious. It is the people, the citizens who should hold the government 
accountable!” (interview, 1 March 2007).  
He was not alone with this view. One representative of a CSO even went as 
far as to suggest, “to scrap the word peer out, since it is the civil society 
organisations who are important players in the APRM” (interview, 20 March 
2007). 
The argument in Ghana in favour of the peer level discussion were raised by 
actors of the APRM. The point towards an additional representative function 
within the political system casts a doubtful light on the trust in representative 
democracy in Ghana:  
“The APRM is another road. Peoples´ views finally go to the APR Forum. 
Every half a year, the President has to report to the peers on progress in 
implementation. The APRM is an alternative road to express things inde-
pendent of parties. But the APRM is more critical than the parliament, be-
cause MPs have to take care whether they do not criticise the government 
too much because of their future career” (interview, 3 March 2007).  
Views on the performance of the peer element expressed by development 
partners rather emphasised positive aspects; hope in the process appeared to 
be a driving force for Western partners. Issues mentioned were rejecting 
Sudan as AU presidency in 2007, which was interpreted as peer pressure 
beginning to work (interview, 21 Feb. 2007). Another representative found 
the refusal of Heads of States and Government to discuss the Rwandan coun-
try report at the APR Forum as an illustration for unfolding peer pressure and 
the respect of fundamental guidelines:    
“[Rwanda] sent the foreign minister to the summit. But peers rejected to 
discuss since the minister is not the president and he was not considered a 
peer. The Rwandans said the APRM is a review about a country, not about 
the president. This is right, but it is not in line with the idea of the peer 
level as being defined as Heads of State” (interview, 30 March 2007).   
3.3.3 Development partners  
The APRM is an African initiative, which is much of its charm. Yet, this 
African ownership and management does not exclude the development part-
ners from being important stakeholders. After all, NEPAD was established 
with the aim to create a new partnership between African countries and the 
international community (cf. Asante 2006, 7). Ghana is one of the donor 
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darlings countries – all medium- to large-size development partners are pre-
sent. The community of development partners declared much interest in the 
APRM, its objectives, process and results, and regards it as the heart piece of 
NEPAD (cf. Council of the European Union 2005, 15). The positive reaction 
to the APRM among development partners was unanimous.  
As development partners in Ghana emphasised, there has been high level 
political, and intense moral support for implementing the APRM in Ghana 
from the very start (interview, 26 March 2007), while another highlighted it 
as a “process assigned with a lot of hope” (interview, 21 Feb. 2007). Particu-
larly the participatory aspect of the country self-assessment was appreciated 
univocally and identified as a very positive aspect for the Ghanaian public. 
The APRM, it was felt, enhanced ownership of the Ghanaian development 
process. At the same time, development partners also felt they benefited from 
the country report as they could use it as a reference document as it was a 
very good summary of the most relevant issues in Ghana (interview, 21 Feb. 
2007): 
“It is good to have the APRM as an African initiative to cater for the own-
ership issue which is difficult in the area of governance. Donors do not 
want to impose things on recipient countries. […] it is a [gift] for us, since 
donors do not need to make their own agenda. It is an internal thing, not a 
Western one. So we avoid something like ‘Africa vs. the West’. The topics 
are in line with the donors’ ideas” (interview, 29 March 2007).   
However, development partners have been much more reluctant to engage 
with the process beyond political and moral support (e. g. through technical 
and financial support). It is admittedly a difficult issue for development part-
ners: Credibility of the APR process among African stakeholders – arguably 
mostly so among African governments – depends very much on it being an 
African endeavour with strong African ownership. Crucial for any external 
engagement was thus not to undermine ownership. Yet, a broad majority of 
Ghanaian stakeholders interviewed in early 2007 claimed that further external 
financial support for the APR process was needed. As one civil society stake-
holder stated:  
“[W]e need external resources and support, but if there are indications 
that external forces also want to interfere, it is difficult! They can support 
financially, but it is an African initiative. We set the standards and devel-
oped the mechanism. We should use the support to develop structures and 
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capacity to do it ourselves and to reduce dependency to external support in 
the long run” (interview, 26 March 2007). 
The APRM is obviously an ambitious initiative and thus requires reliable 
financial and technical means. African countries acceding to the APRM have 
each granted a minimum of 100,000 US$ to the continental APR Secretariat 
to cover general functions. In Ghana, national APR structures soon had to 
approach development partners for financial support (cf. Apraku 2002). A 
number of development partners – inter alia, France and the UK – have pro-
vided some startup finance to the newly established GC as a political ges-
ture.40 Some development partners, amongst which are also German political 
foundations41, most prominently the Hanns-Seidel-Foundation, has engaged 
more substantially by funding dissemination activities. UNDP deployed sup-
portive staff to the secretary.42 For further details about the issues of engage-
ment of development partners in the implementation of the APRM cf. Chap-
ter 5. 
3.4 Conclusion  
The APR process in Ghana has apparently been open to all key stakeholders. 
Ghana has sensibly interpreted and exceeded the continental guidelines, e. g. 
by copying the model to staff the APR Panel with eminent persons for its 
own oversight institution (GC), and by adding expertise and staff to the proc-
ess (e. g. through the TTs), and thereby adding technical expertise to the 
assessment. This has improved the efficiency and effectiveness of the na-
tional process, without largely impacting on its credibility. The applied meth-
odology was designed to establish a sense of ownership among all stake-
holders. The APR institutions have been regarded as non-partisan by a major-
ity of interviewees and their applied methodologies were according to aca-
demic standards. Regarding the continental requirements, Ghana did not 
                                                          
40  In some cases, this financial support has been directly ordered and politically backed from 
their headquarters (interviews, 29 March 2007 and 26 March 2007). 
41  For example, the German political foundations Hanns Seidel Stiftung (HSS), Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung (FES) or Konrad-Adenauer- Stiftung (KAS).  
42  This contribution was regarded as a bit of a mixed blessing. UNDP selected staff from 
UNDP ranks and was consequently highly criticised for not respecting ownership. It would 
have been more in line with international good practice to fund employments selected by 
the APR Secretariat. 
 Sven Grimm et al. 
74 German Development Institute 
finish its report within the required time. However, this was understandable 
as – Ghana was the first country to be reviewed, and the timeline appears to 
be unrealistically ambitious as already flagged in Chapter 2. 
In general, all stakeholders in the process have been very positive about the 
APRM and recognised the inherent chances and challenges. The institutional 
setup was a successful innovation: the small and non-representative GC has 
been respected for its work. Likewise, a majority of the interviewees appreci-
ated the work done by the APR Secretariat. This may be due to the autono-
mous structures (including some financial autonomy), and the fact that the 
selection process of GC members was made transparent (even though initially 
criticized); government wisely refrained from trying to fully control the proc-
ess. Both, the secretariat, as well as the GC kept the required neutrality during 
the process. Judging from voices of stakeholders, the procedures for discus-
sion and dissemination have been relatively open; criticism during the proc-
ess has been taken on board. Yet, it has been difficult for non-organised 
groups to join the process and also APR institutions face capacity constraints. 
The technical teams can be regarded as mostly autonomous and independent 
– this was a key innovation by Ghana for the entire peer review, even if it 
raised worries by some development partners about the level of dependence 
on their work (interview, 27 March 2007). 
Shortcomings existed in the engagement with special stakeholder groups such 
as parliament in the initial phase. The key shortcoming, however, was in 
dissemination, despite serious efforts by APRM actors. Not enough copies 
were distributed – and it is not clear who received them, as noted by the re-
search team and also by Herbert / Gruzd (2008, 180). CSOs are at the core of 
the country self-assessment – and it must be concluded that despite the over-
all positive assessment, they did not fully live up to the potential of their role 
as watchdogs of the APR process. Generally, severe capacity constraints 
hinder CSOs in their advocacy work. CSOs face difficulties to actually pro-
actively engage. This is largely true even for urban groups that were inter-
viewed for this study in the three cities Accra, Kumasi, and Tamale. Even 
within these urban areas, regional disparities prevail: already in Kumasi and 
in even more so in Tamale, the research team found lower levels of involve-
ment than in Accra. One might ask the question of how broad a level of par-
ticipation is possible with an endeavour like the APRM. Indeed, the APRM in 
Ghana could be regarded as an elite process – which risks decreasing owner-
ship of civil society (cf. Opoku 2006, 28–29). Systematic engagement with 
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the media thus became even more important, even though it could only partly 
solve the problem. The media – anywhere in the world – reports on events, 
not processes, so achieving systematic coverage of issues is difficult, while 
key moments or events are covered more easily.  
The initial suspicion of the research team was that the continental level in-
volving the Panel and Heads of State Forum was rather weak. The value-
added of the APRM was seen in the provision for an opportunity for CSOs to 
engage and in a general impact at the internal country level. While this em-
phasis is still mostly on the national process, the study, however, found a 
stronger role than expected on the international level, particularly of the 
CRM. Scepticism, however, prevailed on the role of the peer level involving 
the Heads of State discussions: will they openly criticise each other – or, 
moreover, discuss national policies in depth? Some anecdotal hints were 
provided for a cautiously positive assessment, but peer debates happen be-
hind closed doors, so there is still little information.   
4 Issues in the Ghanaian report – is the APRM report 
useful? 
The coverage of critical issues is crucial for an honest and useful process. 
Issues addressed in the APRM reports will need to identify the most signifi-
cant bottlenecks of reviewed societies if they are to meet the objective of 
helping on the path or reforms for development. Covering the right issues is 
also important with regard to broad ownership. Only those civil society actors 
will develop an ownership for the APRM that regard its issues as appropri-
ately covered.43 To assess whether the “right” issues were covered, this study 
drew on evidence of data and international publications about Ghana. Fur-
thermore – as much depends on perceptions of stakeholders, too – it consid-
ered interview statements by stakeholders in the Ghanaian APRM. 
As stated above, the APRM process is internationally recognised as very 
ambitious if not overambitious, concerning both the process and the ad-
dressed range of issues (cf. Ziemen 2006; Herbert / Gruzd 2008). It might 
have been ambitious enough to start with single sectors of society as one 
interviewee involved in the process stated: “A problem with the APRM is that 
                                                          
43  Ownership is also crucial for future participation and eventual implementation, as it will be 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
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it is too broad! Dealing with all those areas is too difficult.” (interview, 29 
March 2007) Others argue that society has to be seen as one leading to the 
conclusion that it makes only sense to approach sectors with a view to their 
interdependence and as a part of the whole. This section gives a more impres-
sionistic overview about the range of topics and takes a closer look at the 
issues and how detailed they have been examined. Some important issues in 
the area of governance, this study argues, have not been given enough atten-
tion or they were not mentioned at all. 
4.1 The range of issues – according to the adapted 
 Ghanaian questionnaire 
Given the high ambition of the APRM, it seems that most issues are dis-
cussed. This leads Ghanaian actors in the APRM to observe that “the PoA 
was nothing new. The same shortcomings were already identified in [GPRS] 
plans of 1995 or 2003.” (interview, 21 Feb. 2007). In some areas, however, 
the country report came up with very critical and far-reaching political rec-
ommendations. For instance, the report stated that there was a tendency of the 
executive to monopolise power. A “fusion of the executive and legislature” 
(APR Secretariat 2005a, 30) was cited as a problem. The report saw problems 
in upholding the separation of powers if a majority of Ministers of State had 
to be sitting Members of Parliament (MPs). This point touches on constitu-
tional demands and thus aims at the core document for the political order of 
Ghana.  
Criticism thus is bold and highly political at times, and recommendations are 
detailed, as in the case of parliament’s role.44 Nevertheless, a closer look is 
needed to grasp whether the issues have been addressed adequately. 
The issues addressed in the APRM report are organised in four thematic ar-
eas, following the structure of the NEPAD principles (AU / NEPAD 2003b, 
4, cf. Chapter 2) (see Box 6). This was used as a scheme for the organisation 
of the standard questionnaire and, subsequently, the Ghanaian adapted  
                                                          
44  First, to give parliament the right to revise the law allowing the president to establish 
ministries. Second, to foster capacity building regarding the committees aiming at strength-
ening their oversight function. Third, to review the desirability of the Ministry of Parlia-
mentary Affairs. Fourth, concerning the general structure of parliament, to stipulate action 
concerning regional and women’s representation. Sixth, to review the remuneration system 
and to improve services to MPs (cf. APR Secretariat 2005a, 32).  
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version of the questionnaire. To provide a feeling of issues covered the fol-
lowing box covers some key critical findings for each of the four areas: 
Box 6: Overview of issues  
1  Democracy and political governance  
- Concerns exist about the inadequacy of resources, notably the human, finan-
cial and logistic capacity of the Electoral Commission;  
- The sustainability of the Electoral Commission's budget is questionable, as it 
is donor dependent;  
- Parties lack of internal democracy which might have a potential long-term 
effect in weakening democracy in the country;  
- Representation of women in politics is low.   
2  Economic governance and management  
- Performance of the economy is weak and goes in hand with a high vulnerabil-
ity towards external shocks in world economy and sub-regional political in-
stability;  
- Internal capacity in economic and fiscal management is low;  
- Ghana is highly indebted and depends on external resources for financing 
government development expenditure; and the level of export diversification 
is low. 
3  Corporate governance  
- Awareness of corporate governance in general is low and of corporate social 
responsibility in particular;  
- Corporate governance institutions in finance, human and institutional terms 
are underdeveloped;  
- The respective roles of the public and private sector are unclear; and  
- Difficulties remain for small and medium enterprises in accessing finances, 
domestic resource mobilisation and support that is offered. 
4  Socio-economic development  
- The level of decentralisation and governance capacity is still low;  
- The ability of parliament to perform its representative, legislative and over-
sight functions is limited;  
- Progress in the structural transformation of the economy to foster growth and 
stability is slow; 
- Cumbersome government requirements are serious obstacles to business 
development; 
- Quality and availability of health services is unsatisfying;  
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- School enrolment and retention is low, especially in the Northern regions of 
Ghana; and 
- Corruption in the public sphere, at both the national and regional levels re-
main a major governance problem in Ghana. 
Source: Cf. APR Secretariat (2005a) 
The identification of these findings by the APRM was the result of a meth-
odological mix consistent of a) the country self-assessment, b) its validation 
by the CRM and c) the recommendations of the Panel of eminent persons (cf. 
Chapter 3). The subsequent programme of action was predominately a gov-
ernmental reaction to the findings.45  
Ghana’s questionnaire was – according to the continental standards (cf. 
Chapter 2) – adapted to country specific conditions. Thus, some issues were 
taken out of the questionnaire and others highlighted. The questions concern-
ing intra- and inter-country conflicts in the thematic area democracy and 
political governance were modified and directed towards chieftaincy and 
land tenure issues. It must be mentioned critically that the questionnaire 
needs to provide a certain pre-selection of issues. This subsequently has an 
impact on the identification of issues in the Ghanaian APRM report as one 
interviewee stated: 
“First the standard questionnaire is very general in nature. So some topics 
will be missed. And it was a fresh thing! Also some topics were forgotten 
when we adapted the questionnaire since some topics were not so promi-
nent this time. But these topics will be in a second report when we have the 
next review in some years. For example environment, energy, of course, 
[and] also agriculture and the informal sector!” (interview, 29 March 
2007) 
This has to be taken into account when it analysing shortcomings of the re-
port below. 
                                                          
45  Concerning the number of objectives and issues within the four thematic areas, the areas 
were addressed in the report and the subsequent programme of action with equal weight. 
However, the costing for area three and four claims more than 90 percent of the overall 
costing of five billion US$. This can be partly justified by the nature of the four different 
areas. While most of the objectives in areas one and two concern policy measures, areas 
three and four comprise high cost measures concerning physical infrastructure. 
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4.2 Details on ‘democracy and political governance’ as an 
 example 
In order to explore the issue in more depth, the following focuses on one of 
the APRM’s thematic areas as an example: democracy and political govern-
ance. The coverage of issues varies between the country self-assessment, the 
recommendations by the APR panel and the programme of action, which 
should thus be looked at separately. All issues are structured according to the 
objectives of the APRM, i. e. a normative direction of the review is provided 
for.  
Issues covered by the APRM – concise recommendations at times 
The objectives and the critical issues mentioned in the APRM report in the 
area of democracy and political governance look into a large variety of as-
pects. The spectrum covers both constitutional provisions and practice of 
democracy, and ranges from institutional capacity, over the delivery of public 
services, and the electoral process, to the performance of governance institu-
tions at the various levels of the governance system. The main issues dealt 
with under these headings are chieftaincy, land tenure, political competition, 
efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector, corruption and women and 
children rights. The following box provides more details on two objectives of 
the APRM report, namely to prevent and reduce intra- and inter-country con-
flicts and to fight corruption in the public sphere. As seen in these two exam-
ple areas, issues of the self-assessment are not always followed by panel 
recommendations. The recommendations made by the panel, however, are 
very specific at time and might target specific legal acts (see Box 7).  
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Coverage of “right” issues – right to whom? 
Beyond the breadth of coverage and the level of details in recommendations, 
a critical question is whether key issues were covered in the first place. Are 
these topics the relevant ones and are they addressed adequately? To assess 
this question (at least in one or two areas), it is necessary to compare state-
ments by Ghanaian stakeholders concerning specific issues to the findings of 
the APRM report. Furthermore, it will be investigated whether evidence sup-
ports the selection of these issues. 
Indeed, as interviews with stakeholders have shown, issues in the APRM 
report reflect the interviewees’ perceptions about relevant issues and devel-
opment gaps. Besides over-arching issues, which are discussed below, inter-
viewees – not surprisingly – addressed their respective work area in more 
detail, but also included more general points. Good governance in general 
was mentioned in half of the interviews as a relevant issue. All of the inter-
viewees said that aspects of good governance are covered in the APRM. 
Many mentioned the weak role of parliament, the low level of education, 
deficiencies in the organisation of CHRAJ and SFO, (a lack of) accountabil-
ity between the state and society, violation of human rights and also low 
salaries. According to the interviewees most of these issues are covered by 
the APRM, the perception about the coverage and its relevance is heteroge-
neous. Accordingly, the analysis of the interviews alone did not provide a 
clear picture about missing issues, even though a few stakeholders that were 
interviewed mentioned agriculture, the informal sector, environment and 
electricity and water supply were not adequately covered by the APRM.  
It appears that the APRM report reflects most of Ghana’s internationally 
discussed development issues. The most significant governance gaps fre-
quently mentioned in expert studies or academia are issues organised around 
electoral and political processes, corporate governance, division of powers 
and the role of state institutions, administration and the civil service and anti-
corruption mechanisms and rule of law (cf. The Centre for Public Integrity 
2006; SAIIA 2005).  
Concerning electoral and political processes, one of the most urgent issues 
discussed in academic publications was the unregulated political party financ-
ing. The Political Parties Act, (2000, Act 574) did neither secure state fund-
ing for political parties nor did it limit donations to political parties or their 
campaign spending. The contested political independence of and capacity 
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constraints within the electoral commission were regarded as further bottle-
necks (Public Integrity 2006, 3). This point is vaguely mentioned in the 
APRM report, stating “that requirements for the disclosure of related party 
transactions are adequate, enforcement and oversight capacities for imple-
mentation of the same are weak” (APR Secretariat 2005a, 111). The APRM 
Programme of Action refers to the issue “Lack of adequate resources for 
governance institutions” with a “System of funding for non-executive gov-
ernance” as expected output in objective four of democracy and political 
governance. 
In the political realm (or rather: in Ghana’s practice of its constitution), the 
presidency has overwhelming and largely unchecked powers. The dominant 
power of the executive branch goes together with the weak role of parlia-
ment. It was criticised that the majority of the members of parliament is part 
of the executive branch at the same time. Additionally, the parliament pos-
sessed insufficient budgetary control. The judiciary suffers from financial 
dependence on the government and from a lack of resources (The Centre for 
Public Integrity 2004, 3). The role of parliament is excessively discussed in 
different parts of the APRM report. Area two concentrates on the “separation 
of powers, including the protection of […] an effective Parliament”(APR 
Secretariat 2005a, 29 ff.). Among other points it recommends to “provide 
appropriate capacity to Parliament Committees enabling them to perform 
their functions efficiently in overseeing and providing effective checks and 
balances against the Executive” (APR Secretariat 2005a, 32). Concerning the 
financial oversight role of parliament, the APR Panel recommended to “put 
in place institutional and organisational changes to facilitate an enhanced 
oversight role for Parliament in the public finance arena” (APR Secretariat 
2005a, 76) in area three.      
Human rights watchdog organisations in Ghana such as CHRAJ were re-
garded as under-funded. The effectiveness of CHRAJ additionally suffered 
from the lack of power to prosecute. Capital punishment in Ghana, observers 
denounced, was still existent. Women in Ghana – in all measurable areas – 
were living a harder life than men.46 Child labour was widely spread all over 
Ghana (SAIIA 2005, 31 ff.). The precarious situation of the two mentioned 
institutions was referred to in the context of the fight against corruption. 
                                                          
46  One of the most striking examples is the treatment of so-called witches. Women who are 
accused of witchcraft have to fear being murdered; lynching of alleged witches occurs. 
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Gender and human rights issues were discussed in objective eight, nine and 
ten of the thematic area democracy an political governance and reflected in 
the PoA (cf. APR Secretariat 2005a, 38 ff.). 
Democracy and political governance issues might have been assessed with 
differences in emphasis among the APRM report, interviewed stakeholders 
and academic (external) publications. Nevertheless, most of the issues men-
tioned in interviews and in publications were covered by the APRM. Poten-
tially missing or not adequately addressed issues are explored further below. 
Comparing self-assessment, recommendations and the PoA – a tricky task 
Findings of the self assessment and the CRM, the recommendations of the 
APRM Secretariat and the planned activities of  the PoA did not match in all 
cases, nor were they always coherent. Unfortunately, the PoA changed the 
numeration of the objectives, thereby making a tracking of related issues 
more difficult. In some cases, issues appeared in the PoA that were discussed 
in the main body of the report, e. g. in the case of the objective concerning 
the prevention and reduction of intra- and inter-state conflicts. The PoA ad-
dressed the issues of an early warning system and sub-regional security, 
which were neither subject to the self-assessment nor to the recommendations 
of the APRM Secretariat. And it was not clear whether this was due exclu-
sively to editorial changes to the text (which had to be condensed signifi-
cantly). The contrary was also true: some issues mentioned by the self-
assessment or by the recommendations of the APRM Secretariat were not 
picked up by the PoA. One example is the ratification and adoption of several 
UN protocols and conventions to promote and protect the rights of children.47 
Regarding children’s rights, the PoA brought up other important issues such 
as the elaboration and implementation of a “policy on child prostitution and 
pornography” (APR Secretariat 2005a, 186), but they did not respond to the 
point made in the self-assessment and the recommendations. Another case of 
varying order in topics can be observed within the objectives to (a) promote 
constitutional democracy, political competition and the rule of law and (b) 
                                                          
47  As the Country Review Mission criticises that Ghana had not ratified the two UN protocols 
on sexual exploitation of children and on child involvement in armed forces, nor the Con-
vention on Human Trafficking, the panel consequently recommended to adopt the UN Pro-
tocol against Human Trafficking in Women and Children and to adopt a binding time-
frame to accede or ratify to UN instruments on the rights of the child. The PoA does not 
mention this issue. 
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ensure accountable, efficient and effective public office holders and civil 
servants of the thematic area democracy and political governance in the PoA. 
While the findings of the self assessment and the recommendations of the 
APRM Panel address the Situation of women (see objective two) and Sexual 
harassment/ Gender mainstreaming and equality (see objective five), the 
PoA did not pick up on these issues within the mentioned objectives. Imagin-
able would have been the elaboration of administrative guidelines or an ac-
tion plan or specific measures by the respective ministry.  
4.3 Over-arching issues: Identification and mainstreaming 
Besides the four broad thematic areas named above, the report also indicated 
eight over-arching issues. These were: capacity constraints, gender equity, 
corruption, decentralisation, land issues, chieftaincy, unemployment and 
external dependency. The PoA was structured accordingly. Questions around 
the overarching issues were: (i) How were they identified? And (ii) how were 
they mainstreamed in the programme of action?  
Identifying over-arching issues 
Concerning the identification and selection of over-arching issues, the report 
stated: 
“Without being selective or attempting to define priorities, there are a few 
areas of deficiency in the Ghanaian system that are of a recurring or 
crosscutting nature and have been identified in more than one thematic 
area. These more general problems may require a holistic, immediate and 
critical approach because of the wider impact they have on the quality of 
governance in all areas of activity” (APR Secretariat 2005a, 139). 
While such an approach is favourable, the selection of the eight over-arching 
issues in the APRM can be questioned: were they relevant enough to the 
Ghanaian situation to address them as over-arching? Each of the topics 
(re)appeared throughout the report; yet, they were covered differently.  
Capacity constraints as well as decentralisation were addressed in all four 
areas of the report as well as in the PoA. Both were mentioned as problematic 
by many interviewees. In this context, the generally unsatisfying performance 
of the public sector appeared to be a big concern, going hand in hand with 
complaints about a high level of corruption. International publications (cf. 
SAIIA 2005, The Centre for Public Integrity 2006) did not focus on these 
issues as bottlenecks in themselves but concentrated on institutions such as 
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the parliament or the judiciary and examined their capacities. Capacity con-
straints thus indeed became some sort of a red threat and was one of the most 
mentioned issues.  
Chieftaincy as a source of conflict played an important role in the perception 
of interviewed stakeholders.  
“The chiefs are the local rulers. Without them, you cannot do anything. 
You even cannot visit a village as a foreigner without paying a visit to the 
chief. […] there are serous problems within the system of chieftaincy.” 
(interview, 27 March 2007) 
Nevertheless, the issue of chieftaincy was addressed only punctually in area 
two (democracy and political governance) of the Ghanaian APRM report. It 
became part of the objective Inter- and intra-national conflicts48 and was also 
mentioned under the objective Uphold the separation of powers, including 
the protection of the independence of the judiciary and of an effective Par-
liament (APR Secretariat 2005a, 18–30). In the PoA it only appeared as one 
issue, namely: Responsiveness of Chieftaincy to the rapidly changing social 
needs. In the other three areas of the report – economic governance, corporate 
governance and socio-economic development – chieftaincy was not picked 
up again. Consequently, one must say that chieftaincy was not really treated 
as an over-arching issue.  
The cross-cutting issues of Unemployment and external dependency were 
hardly mentioned explicitly in the PoA and no national economic measures 
were included to reduce specifically unemployment and external dependency. 
Even if positive effects on these areas had been regarded as the overall posi-
tive outcome of the PoA, this rationale was not made explicit. The analysis of 
the interviews reflected this under representation. Interviewees did not men-
tion these issues as a bottleneck. Unemployment and external dependency of 
Ghana did not feature as big issues in publications such as SAIIA (2005) and 
The Centre for Public Integrity (2006). Even though unemployment and ex-
ternal dependency were important topics in the case of Ghana, the APRM 
report does not manage to actually attribute over-arching importance to both 
issues that are admittedly difficult to give specific recommendations on with-
out ideological influence. 
                                                          
48  Evidence points to chieftaincy being a source of conflict rather than always being an option 
for solutions. Serious succession problems undermine stability, especially in Northern 
Ghana (Kirby 2003). 
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Land tenure is crucial for both the livelihood of the majority of the Ghanaian 
population and for long-term investments. In literature it was also widely 
acknowledged as a crucial issue. (The Centre for Public Integrity 2006, 39). 
Institutional incongruence concerning land tenure systems and land owner-
ship led to insecurity of tenure (and thereby created disincentives for invest-
ments and difficulties in credit access) especially for individual users in cus-
tomary land tenure and to conflicts. Land tenure seems to be a well identified 
over-arching issue. 
Stakeholders did not flag the importance of land issues in the interviews 
prominently. The reason might have been the selected urban areas for our 
interviews. When the topic came up, however, it often was associated with 
chieftaincy issues, raising questions of delineation of issues and repetitiveness 
of the report. According to the interviewees, there was a strong link between 
these two issues as chiefs administered most of the land.  
“Due to the constitution, chiefs own the land, the government owns miner-
als and water bodies. But the government gives concessions without asking 
the chiefs. This is unlawfully” (interview, 27 March 2007).  
The issue of land tenure was well represented in the PoA, however, even 
though it was not mentioned in the area of Economic governance and man-
agement. In the area of democracy and political governance, it was addressed 
under the objective Prevent and reduce intra- and inter-state conflicts to-
gether with chieftaincy.  
Gender equality is a classical over-arching issue. The APRM report ad-
dressed gender issues in the objectives of the area of democracy and political 
governance and under Socio-economic development. Especially in the latter, 
gender issues seemed not to be an endogenous and well-linked part; it ap-
peared somewhat loosely attached to fulfil the mainstreaming task. A number 
of interviewees saw gender equality as one of the most important issues in the 
APRM report and the PoA. Women and children rights were not only men-
tioned by specific stakeholders with self-interest in the issue such as women 
and youth organisations. According to international publications, gender 
issues remain a pressing issue in Ghana and are indeed linked to human rights 
violations in a number of cases.  
Both the analysis of interview data and evidence underline the enormous 
scale of corruption in Ghana. The issue was well covered in the country re-
port and the PoA, even if it was not mentioned in the area Socio-economic 
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development. The issue will be taken as an example for the coverage of one 
specific cross-cutting issue in the next sub-section of this study.  
Examples of mainstreaming issues 
To give an impression on how the APRM report and the PoA tackled certain 
over-arching issues in detail, the following focuses on capacity constraints 
and gender equality as examples for different approaches to address over-
arching issues. 
The over-arching issue of lacking capacities and its impact on efficiency was 
concerned particularly with human resource development and good govern-
ance within the public sector. It span over the whole range of thematic APRM 
areas. In the area of democracy and political governance, it featured under 
almost all objectives. It was well represented from objective one through to 
objective five (cf. Box 6). Under these objectives, capacity constraints were 
regarded as an issue of responsiveness to chieftaincy issues, voter education, 
decentralisation of MDAs, access to justice, the media, service delivery in the 
public sector, governance institutions and the capacity of CHRAJ. Capacity 
constraints of the public sector were presented as some of the most pressing 
constraints which were addressed by the government in a more or less suc-
cessful way: 
“The public sector underlies an ongoing Public Sector Reform, but two 
major constraints slow down the process: inefficiency and bureaucracy. 
[for instance] For getting a passport, you did have to bribe your way. 
Now, with the Public sector reform, there is progress due to computisa-
tion. Certain things begin to work” (interview, 21 Feb. 2007) 
Capacity constraints were not the subject of the three last objectives (fighting 
corruption in the public sphere, promotion and protection of the rights of 
women and of children and young persons) of this area.  
One striking gap, however, was that capacity constraints in civil society were 
not specifically mentioned in the APRM. The report states that the presence 
of CSOs in rural areas was limited (APR Secretariat 2005a, 35), but it did not 
address the issue systematically. The PoA did not refer to civil society or-
ganisations in this context, even if this constraint played a crucial role also for 
the APRM process as an interviewee of the APRM institutions states: 
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“The chances of the APRM are causing big challenges. For instance it is a 
chance to involve the Civil Society into the process of policy making, but 
since CSOs do not have enough capacities, there is also a big challenge to 
make them stronger by capacity building. A major problem in this context 
is the dependency of the CSOs on the donor community.” (interview, 20 
Feb. 2007) 
Despite the constitutional norm of equality of gender, women are heavily 
underrepresented in all areas of public life in Ghana. Additionally, violence 
against women and cultural resentments against the education of women was 
prevailing, as the APRM report stated (APR Secretariat 2005a, 38 ff.). Inter-
viewees mentioned that women played an important role not only as back-
bone of society but also for development. A strong need to better integrate 
women into all spheres of society was expressed. As a religious leader stated: 
“One pressing issue is the equality of men and women. The dominance of 
men is too strong” (interview, 18 March 2007). This widely shared opinion 
shows the importance of the issues and gives additional reason to address it 
prominently.  
Observations expressed by interviewees might lead to the impression that 
over-arching issues have fallen short within the specific objectives. One in-
terviewee from civil society stated that in general, gender was a over-arching 
issue and the different areas were mainstreamed, but “women’s questions did 
not stand on their own”. The interviewee added: “mainstreaming makes lose 
fine details” (interview, 21 July 2007). If not specified in the various sec-
tions, the over-arching approach in the APRM report risked to gloss over the 
importance of gender issues rather than actually highlighting them. In this 
regard, the APRM faced the same problems as many donor agencies do when 
they attempt to mainstream policies in their cooperation. 
4.4 Corruption as a key ‘over-arching issue’ – dealt with 
 adequately?  
To further concentrate on one of the named over-arching issues, the following 
examines corruption in a detailed way. 
Corruption as an issue in the APRM 
The problem of corruption in all its facets ranked quite prominently in the 
APRM report and the PoA and consequently was one of eight “salient over-
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arching issues” (APR Secretariat 2005a, 139a). The report highlighted a 
number of deficiencies in the Ghanaian system as the issue of corruption was 
covered in three of the four thematic areas. Corruption in the country report 
was mainly dealt with under the objective seven (Fight corruption in the 
public sphere) in the area of democracy and political governance and under 
objective four (combat corruption in public administration and money laun-
dering) in the area of Economic governance and management. In line with 
the general focus of this study on democracy and political governance, cor-
ruption-related issues in the other areas (e. g. business supply-side or money 
laundering) were not looked at in detail, but reference is made whenever 
relevant.  
Corruption is seen as a major governance problem and was perceived by 
Ghanaians as prevailing at the national and regional level. For these high 
levels of perception, the country self-assessment under the APRM referred to 
a survey by the Ghanaian think tank CDD, which showed that 75 % of the 
households in the survey agreed to the statement that corruption was a na-
tional problem, above all, in the public sector. Causes named in the survey 
were low wages and bad internal management practises (cf. APR Secretariat 
2005a, 36).49 The country report furthermore stated causes such as non-
transparent administrative procedures, weak codes of conduct, a gift-giving 
culture, nepotism, patronage and lack of public perception of corruption as a 
criminal act. (cf. APR Secretariat 2005a, 77). Three main shortcomings in the 
fight against corruption were identified, based on which subsequent recom-
mendations are given.  
First, the absence of a comprehensive legal framework was cited; the matter 
of corruption was addressed in many different statutes. Ghana has both 
signed the UN convention against corruption as well as the AU convention on 
preventing and combating corruption, but still has not ratified and incorpo-
rated them into domestic law. The APR Panel therefore recommended to 
accept a binding time-frame concerning the outstanding ratifications and the 
enactment of the pending Whistleblowers Act, as well as a Freedom of In-
formation Bill. Demand for the latter ranks very high on civil society’s 
agenda, as the APRM’s country review mission revealed (cf. APR Secretariat 
2005a, 16 f., 37 f. and 79).  
                                                          
49  The survey referred to is CDD (2000).  
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Second, of the three integrity institutions, namely the Accountability Office 
within the presidency (established in 2003), the SFO and  the CHRAJ, the 
latter two (established according to the new constitution in 1993) faced ca-
pacity problems regarding human and material resources, logistics and infra-
structure. The absence of a board as well as an executive director within the 
SFO, the institution in charge of more serious offences, was identified as a 
major deficiency.50 The SFO is linked with “serious capacity constraints and 
an inability to prosecute officials directly” (cf. APR Secretariat 2005a, 79).  
Third, the institutional dualism of CHRAJ and SFO, both mandated with 
fighting corruption, was explicitly criticised and the APR Panel recom-
mended the establishment of a “central organ within the government […] 
conferred with exclusive jurisdiction to fight corruption” (APR Secretariat 
2005a, 37). Another recommendation given was to increase public spending 
on awareness raising and educational programmes concerning corruption. 
The panel especially expressed concern about the high level of perceived 
corruption in the judiciary and the problems to produce evidence within its 
system. Therefore, it recommended “investigating the basis of the perception 
and the gravity of the difficulties, using independent bodies if necessary” 
(APR Secretariat 2005a, 79). The work of the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coali-
tion (GACC), which consists of CSOs and governmental agencies, was cited 
as important in the country self-assessment, e. g. as its plan to combat corrup-
tion has been included into the GPRS. In conclusion, the recent efforts of the 
government to fight corruption were honoured in the country report, but re-
garded as not sufficiently successful, which resulted in a call for a more in-
tensive campaign (cf. APR Secretariat 2005a, 141).  
The PoA caught up with the issue of corruption in various measures, e. g. by 
pointing out the importance of a comprehensive anti-corruption legislation as 
central, by aiming at a law on asset declaration and by applying public pro-
curement procedures (cf. APR Secretariat 2005a, 182 ff.). In its answer to the 
country report and PoA, the government did not agree to the statement that 
“serious concerns have been raised […] about the inquisition-like power of 
the SFO to buy incriminating evidence to use against them”. It sharply re-
torted that  
                                                          
50  The board has subsequently been established; yet, its overall use for the institution was 
challenged in interviews. Permanent directors, to the contrary, had not been appointed until 
the time of research in Ghana (April 2007). 
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“the Government is rather taken aback at the language and import of the 
statement in respect of such an important anticorruption agency. Secondly, 
nowhere in the Ghana Country Self-Assessment Report was such a state-
ment made or even suggested. Thirdly, the Country Report did not provide 
any evidence in support of the statement” (APR Secretariat 2005a, 149 f.). 
At the APR Forum on 22 January 2006 in Khartoum (stage four of the APR), 
President Kufuor stressed that government established a ministry of public 
sector reform with the mandate to enhance service delivery, fight corruption 
and look into wage structures, which were cited as causes of corruption.  
The evidence for the problem of corruption in Ghana 
According to Transparency International (TI) and its Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI), Ghana ranked 70th on a list of 163 countries in 2006.51 It 
showed a relatively high level of corruption: Ghana ranked among countries 
like China, India, Mexico or Brazil. Qualitatively, major problems or under-
lying causes of corrupt acts in Ghana were identified (SAIIA 2005, 25 ff.) as: 
(i) there was no central anti-corruption strategy; (ii) tax and customs agencies 
as well as auditor-general did not report to parliament; (iii) money laundering 
was still legal; (iv) poor government procurement practises prevailed; (v) 
there was a prevalence of corruption in the police; (vi) a prevalence of nepo-
tism; and (vii) no protection for so-called ‘whistleblowers’.  
The Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII, the Ghanaian chapter of Transparency 
International) reported that 92.5 % of the respondents agreed with the state-
ment that Ghana is perceived as a corrupt country, 55 % agreed that corrup-
tion is prevalent in the country. Furthermore, nine out of ten respondents 
considered corruption a serious problem. In sum, this illustrates a perception 
of high prevalence of corruption. A high level of tolerance was revealed as  
“most of the respondents interviewed said they looked on unconcerned 
when witnessing acts of bribery and corruption. […] Moreover, when re-
ports are made to the Police and offenders are sometimes arrested, they 
(the offenders) still get off and nothing comes out of the investigations. For 
most people, therefore, reporting corruption is an exercise in futility” (GII 
2005b, 12).  
                                                          
51  Ghana’s CPI score was 3.3; with the value of zero representing highly corrupt and ten 
representing highly clean (free from corruption). 
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As most corrupt institutions, Ghanaians perceived the police service 
(76.8 %), the Ministry of Education (31.5 %) and customs (31.1 %) followed 
by the judicial and civil service (16.4 % each). Households suggested in 
fighting against corruption included ideas on living wages, strengthening 
laws and penalties, public education, poverty reduction and creating youth 
employment. The GII further demanded codes of conduct for civil servants, 
granting more power of prosecution to the SFO and CHRAJ, civic education 
and the enactment of a whistleblowers as well as a freedom of information 
bill (cf. GII 2005b). Regarding accountability bodies in charge of fighting 
corruption, the US State Department’s Human Rights Report 2005 and the 
Centre for Public Integrity agreed to the view that the CHRAJ worked ineffi-
ciently due to short funding and lack of prosecutional rights: 
“Although CHRAJ can access asset declarations in its investigations, it is 
not given the power to prosecute in cases of corruption. In cases of admin-
istrative injustice, yes - it can initiate prosecution proceedings. But in the 
case of corruption, CHRAJ must turn to the attorney general, a member of 
the president's cabinet, to prosecute” (Saffu 2004, 4).  
They furthermore flagged problems in the police force as well as judiciary. 
The latter was accused of   
“accounts of extortion; misuse of remand, bail, and contempt of court 
charges for extortion; and acceptance of gifts or money in exchange for 
expedited or postponed cases, or for losing records” (US Department of 
State 2006).   
Similarly, the expert panel behind UNECA’s governance profile of Ghana 
named the judiciary as the most corrupt branch compared to the executive or 
parliament in 2004. In addition, public bureaucracy and especially the tax 
collecting system were cited as very prone to corruption. The Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS) and customs were named as worst offenders (cf. UNECA 
2004b, 10 and 14 ff.).  
Did APRM findings match the evidence? 
This study checked stakeholders perceptions concerning the coverage of 
corruption issues that found their way into the APR documents and the result-
ing impact on policy in its interview phase. Openly asking “What do you 
think are the most important topics in the country report/PoA?” the most 
frequent answer was, indeed, “corruption”.  
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The analysis of interviews did not give an unanimous opinion on the question 
whether the APRM influenced the public discussion about corruption in 
Ghana., even though it pointed to some positive aspects of the peer review 
report:  
“The APRM unfolds the issue. Even before the APRM facts had been pub-
lished like TI, but government said it was a perception, after the APRM it 
is there yes, the process would have taken longer , before the APRM, CDD 
writes a report, now people listen.” (interview, 21 Feb. 2007) 
Yet, the key issues – including such pertinent details as permanent heads of 
SFO and CHRAJ – were listed in the report. An important issue mentioned in 
the interviews, confirming points made by the APRM report, was the non-
permanent status of the head of CHRAJ and SFO which weakens the position 
and power of the executive directors of these institutions. A permanent head 
would be much less prone to political pressure resulting from his or her in-
vestigative activities. The permanence of the director’s position could en-
hance the personal independence of the position, as it comes along with par-
ticular benefits and guarantees under labour legislation.  Interviewees fur-
thermore highlighted capacity problems of CHRAJ and SFO. Capacity con-
straints in this context were also part of the APRM report. The panel had an 
important influence on the section on corruption and e. g. included a recom-
mendation of asset declaration by office holders.  
4.5 Shortcomings 
As mentioned above, there were several issues which do not appear in the 
APRM report or which are not covered to an extend that they would merit 
according to academic evidence and with regard to their importance to the 
Ghanaian populace. Yet coverage of other issues lack certain aspects.  
Generally, shortcomings occur due to the broad-based or specifically socially 
touchy nature of certain issues, making it difficult to organise pressure groups 
around them and thereby put them on the agenda. In the APRM, we find three 
different types of issues not or not sufficiently mentioned: 
— social taboos or issues of stigmatised groups which could not be voiced 
and addressed in public by these minority groups themselves, 
— interests of heterogeneous groups; groups of interested were too broad to 
gear up for action; here, collective action is the problem and  
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— future challenges which were abstract and of low contemporary rele-
vance, but will most likely impact on future generations. 
As elaborated above, the standard questionnaire and subsequently the Ghana-
ian questionnaire had an impact on the selection of issues. Yet, some issues 
with shortcomings fall within the work area of advocacy institutions like 
CHRAJ, women groups etc., which are mandated to bring them into discus-
sion. Additionally, the Country Review Mission and the Panel of Eminent 
Persons also had the mandate to bring issues on the agenda during the process 
or to attribute them more attention and possibly different weight. Still, some 
social or cultural taboos that impact on the practice of human rights for some 
minority groups, such as gays’ and lesbians’ rights, are not touched upon at 
all, as SAIIA (2005) rightly criticises. 
4.5.1 Quality of coverage of topics  
To the credit of the Ghanaian APRM, some touchy issues were mentioned, 
albeit only in passing. Allegations of witchcraft could serve as one example 
for culturally or socially sensible aspects, touched upon but arguably not 
sufficiently covered. Debates of these issues with many Ghanaians more 
often than not would lead to disagreement of the cultural context and suppos-
edly “Western” values (for the equally sensitive issue of chieftaincy, see 
box 8). However, they impact on human rights of particular groups. 
Human rights issues were addressed in the APRM report in different aspects 
and areas. It related to the objectives Promote and protect the rights of 
women, Promote and protect the rights of children and Promote and protect 
the rights of vulnerable groups. Furthermore, it arguably also was part of 
objective three: Promotion and Protection of civil, political, economic, social 
and cultural rights in the thematic area democracy and political governance. 
The report addressed the access of women and children to justice, cultural 
practices harmful to women, child trafficking and child labour, the under-
representation of women in public life, violation of the rights of the disabled, 
the legislation to protect women’s rights, the ratification of the protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the rights of women, ca-
pacity and resource constraints of gender advocacy and women’s rights 
groups, child prostitution and pornography, compulsory basic education, 
protection of the rights of domestic workers and the autonomy of the Ghana 
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Box 8: The sensitive topic of chieftaincy in the APRM 
Chieftaincy plays an important role in Ghana and consequently featured promi-
nently in collected evidence, including interviews of the authors with a variety of 
stakeholders. One of the potential shortcoming of the APRM report concerning 
chieftaincy was highlighted above: its unsatisfying mainstreaming in the report. 
Additionally, aspects of the institution of chieftaincy in governance of the Ghana-
ian society could be further developed.  
The coverage of chieftaincy issues in the Ghanaian APRM focussed on the conflict 
prevention role of chiefs, while acknowledging at the same time that it can be a 
source of conflict and thus differed from the understanding of conflict in reports of 
other APRM countries: 
“The critical role of traditional chieftaincy institutions in conflict pre-
vention, management and resolution is well established and acknowl-
edged in Ghana. For various reasons, however, the chieftaincy institu-
tions have been weak in the actual performance of these functions. A 
poignant example is the ongoing feud over the succession dispute aris-
ing from the death of the traditional ruler, Ya-Na Abdulai Andani II” 
(APR Secretariat 2005a, 19) 
Although the most critical aspect of occurring chieftaincy issues was mentioned, it 
did arguably not go deep in analysis and stayed vague. The cause for the sudden 
death of the Ya-Na remained contested and was subject of political unrest in the 
North. According to independent non-Ghanaian observers, political interests were 
involved in the occurring conflicts in Northern Ghana. At least, severe government 
failure occurred. During the three-day battle the then-interior minister announced 
on national and international radio that the region was calm. 
“Despite the presence of a police station within 300 meters and a mili-
tary camp within 500 meters of the palace where the An Na and 30 oth-
ers were beheaded and dismembered, the police and military did not in-
tervene to stop the atrocities” (Fayemi et al. 2003, 16).  
The installation of a curfew and a government commission of inquiry did not clar-
ify the circumstances.52 The case of Yendi is not the only one. “Rivalry among 
successors has lead to hundreds of victims” (Kröger / Meyer 2003, 180). The 
succession problem in Wa and in Tamale also led to serious tensions, still notice-
able during visits to this regions in early 2007. 
 
                                                          
52  Cf. www.ghanaweb.com (accessed 21 May 2001). 
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Yet, little precise recommendations on how to tackle the difficult issue of chief-
taincy were made, other than the call for a modernisation of the institution. As the 
issue is a politically contagious issue in Ghana, no quick answer can be expected; 
the duality of ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ rule is a constant feature in the country 
since colonial rule. The APRM, however, has to be commended for addressing 
critical issues within the limits of what is deemed culturally decent. Additionally, 
the issue of chieftaincy was on of the points where the Country Review Mission 
apparently had an impact – and therefore can serve as an illustration for positive 
impact of the continental structure. Even though carefully worded, the APRM 
report therefore provides for opportunity to keep the issue on the political agenda. 
National Commission on Children. This list shows that gender equality was 
rightly regarded closely related to many human rights issues.  
The APRM report also addressed the violation of human rights concerning 
the treatment of so-called witches into account. The self-assessment states 
under the objective “Promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights”:  
“ [CHRAJ] has taken action to address abuse and violation of human 
rights committed by the State and its officials, and also those arising from 
cultural practices, like trokosi (the perpetual enslavement of virgins in 
south-eastern Ghana), female circumcision and penal colonies for alleged 
witches (APR Secretariat 2005a, 26). 
The PoA referred to this passage using the “Decline of abuses against 
witches” as one indicator to measure the proposed activity “Mount aware-
ness campaign on discontinuation of violence and harmful traditional prac-
tices against women” (APR Secretariat 2005a, 180). 
This was a rather prudently addressing an important issue, highlighted by 
external actors: “A strong belief in witchcraft continued in many parts of the 
country” (US Department of State 2006, Section 2). Estimates go to more 
than a thousand women who have been chased and sent in witch camps in 
Ngani, Gambaga, Patinga and Kukuo (Kirby 2003, 181) where they live iso-
lated from their families and their social environment. The so-called witch 
villages might already be an improvement to previous practice of lynching, as 
they were 
“encouraged during the colonial area as an alternative to lynching those 
accused of witchcraft. In recent years witchcraft accusations have in-
creased dramatically and they often lead to the accused being severely 
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beaten or even killed by outraged villagers, neighbours and relatives of the 
accused. The witch villages are traditional sanctuaries for witches“(Kirby 
2003, 181)  
A visit to Ngani created the impression of a lack of government interest in 
these places. The existence of witch camps apparently was more or less ig-
nored. NGOs provided support such as food and medical help, but “CHRAJ 
and human rights NGOs had little success in their efforts to end this tradi-
tional practices” (US Department of State 2006). 
Evidence and interview analysis showed that the issue witchcraft as a viola-
tion of human rights was addressed very carefully – possibly too carefully – 
in the APRM report and the PoA. This, despite its overly prudent form, is a 
success in itself, given the widespread cultural belief in threats by witches. 
Aspects such as the governments attitude towards the problematic on the 
ground are still not covered, and would deserve to be further elaborated upon. 
The issue of witchcraft also highlights the general importance of a strong 
focus on human rights throughout the APRM exercise in order to address the 
concerns of vulnerable groups or individuals who cannot duly organise them-
selves precisely because of their marginal position in society.  
4.5.2 Some missing issues  
Beyond issues of sometimes rather scant attention to socially or culturally 
contagious issues, the report neglected other issues in a more substantial way, 
given evidence and their potential (or prospective) impact on the Ghanaian 
populace.  
Media freedom 
With regard to process, it might be considered a grave neglect not to ask 
about media freedom in the country under review. The official guidelines of 
the APRM do not make any allusion to freedom of speech or press freedom 
or to the specific involvement of the media in the process. Neither is there 
mention of the media in the Memorandum of Understanding; the media are 
mentioned as one part of civil society that will be consulted by the country 
review mission. Boyle has elaborated more on the implications of this omis-
sion for the process and its communication in South Africa (cf. Boyle 2008, 
4). This omission at the continental level, however, was not fully repeated in 
Ghana. Media freedom was dealt with e. g. under the keyword of democratic 
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competition for political power (APR Secretariat 2005a, 21). Yet, one could 
argue that more – or more systematic – attention to media freedom and its 
practice would have been desirable and would clearly have been within the 
core governance focus of the APRM exercise itself.  
Agriculture 
Agriculture was another key topic for Ghanaians that did not receive system-
atic attention in the APRM. It played only a secondary role in thematic areas 
of economic governance and management and corporate governance. The 
sector employs 70 % of the Ghanaian population in rural areas; these are 
usually the poorest regions in the country. But beyond subsistence, agricul-
ture is also the backbone of the Ghanaian economy: it provides 34.3 % to the 
gross national income (GNI). Most of agriculture activities take place in the 
informal sector. Consequently, the US Millennium Challenge Account53 in 
Ghana follows the idea of “reducing poverty through agricultural transfor-
mation”54 and provides 547 million US$ to reach this target. With regard to 
agriculture, one could argue that agricultural concerns were addressed suffi-
ciently in other document and strategies. Yet, given the aspirations of the 
APRM to be a comprehensive assessment of a country’s governance, the 
negligence of key issues for the overwhelming majority of the population is, 
therefore, not fully comprehensible, particularly when shortcomings in agri-
cultural performance are arguably an effect of governance shortcomings. The 
APRM report acknowledged that African economies rely on agriculture 
(APR Secretariat 2005a, 83) but further substance to this statement – or rec-
ommendations around it – are to be searched in the report. The PoA addresses 
“low agriculture productivity and over-reliance on rainfall” as well as “lack 
of proper storage and marketing of agricultural products” (APR Secretariat 
2005a, 268 and 271) as an issue under the objective promote self-reliance in 
development and build capacity for self-sustaining development of the the-
matic area socio-economic development. 
                                                          
53  In March 2002 President George W. Bush called for a new compact for global development 
at the United Nations Financing for Development Conference in Monterrey. It links greater 
contributions from developed nations to greater responsibility from developing nations. The 
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) is a concrete mechanism to implement this com-
pact. (http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/developingnations/millennium.html) 
54  http://www.ghanaianprofessionalgroup.org/ghana_news25.htm 
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Furthermore, a meaningful governance assessment should include prospec-
tive challenges for a country’s governance structures. This might also nega-
tively impact on the usefulness of the APRM to advocacy groups. The topics 
of environmental issues and energy can therefore be taken as examples for 
the difficulty to include prospective challenges in the report.  
Environment 
The APRM report admittedly covers the environment in some findings of the 
self-assessment. Additionally, aspects are mentioned in the area corporate 
governance, objective 2: ensure that corporations act as good corporate 
citizens with regard to human rights, social responsibility and environmental 
sustainability. With regard to the programme of action, one can find envi-
ronmental issues in the area economic governance and management even 
though environment is not mentioned in the corresponding part of the report. 
Under the objective to promote sound macroeconomic policies that support 
sustainable development, one can find the issue environmental sustainability 
in policy and programmes signed. This, however, is scattered and scant cov-
erage of a key issue for Ghanaian society and its governance.  
The fact that Ghana is an economy that relies heavily on naturals resources 
stands in contrast to the low-scale coverage of environment issues in the 
APRM. Most commercial activities such as agriculture, mining, logging, 
fishing and construction do not only rely on but also affect the environment. 
The neglect of environmental issues also stands in contrast to other develop-
ment programmes. The Ghanaian GPRS II addresses environmental sustain-
ability and regeneration as one of six broad development objectives, and 
environmental sustainability is one of the MDGs (cf. UNDP 2003). The 
APRM, however, does not pay much attention to the issue, despite its impor-
tance and demands for and its effects on governance in the country. 
Energy 
Due to economic growth, electricity has become scarce in Ghana. Energy is 
an issue in the thematic area of Socio-economic development, objective four: 
Ensure affordable access to water, sanitation, energy, finance, markets, in-
formation and communications technology, shelter and land for all citizens, 
especially the poor. Herein, access to electricity concerning the distribution 
of electricity is addressed. The PoA mirrors the “difficult access to secure 
and quality energy supply” (APR Secretariat 2005a, 242) and proposes  
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activities comprising the introduction of new power stations, independent 
power supply and the exploration of alternative sources of power.  
More and more newspaper articles report about the problematic energy sup-
ply in all parts of Ghana. The Volta dam in Akosombo, once the biggest dam 
in the world, throughout the year often disposes of too little water to run the 
hydroelectric turbines and to satisfy the needs of the population and economy 
of Ghana (cf. Asare-Kumah 2007). Even in the capital Accra, electricity is 
cut off regularly.55 Future negative effects on economic growth are likely. 
Evidence shows that in Ghana “access to electricity in rural areas is low 
(16,1 %)”(APR Secretariat 2005a, 130). Total demand of energy for 2007 
was 2,030.4 Mw. The production at the Akosombo dam and the Aboadze 
thermal plant left a deficit of 708 Mw (cf. Asare-Kumah 2007). Measures 
against the shortage of energy are the installation of the West African Gas 
Pipeline linking Ghana with Nigeria and of the Bui Hydro Plant which is 
planned to provide 400 mW from 2015 on. These measures – one of 
NEPAD’s showcases in West Africa – will take time to show effects, even 
though shortage of energy is no new issue. Yet, despite some recommenda-
tions, the APRM report did not foresee the (re)-occurrence of the acute en-
ergy shortage in 2007 to its full extent.   
4.6 Conclusion 
The range of issues covered in Ghana – in line with the continental frame-
work – was indeed very ambitious and wide ranging. While the report is thus 
offering a broad range of topics and is useful, a general weakness in the 
APRM and the PoA is the lack of prioritising topics or at least prioritising 
action taken on certain issues.  
Ghanaian stakeholders in their vast majority found their issues in the report; 
hardly any criticism on the scope of the report was heard. In its entirety, the 
report can be regarded as covering the aspects of governance in a predomi-
nantly meaningful way and the Ghanaian adaptation of the questionnaire 
apparently was done in a careful way. Topics could be included and excluded 
by the stakeholders in the process. Consequently, most issues are covered – at 
least those that are brought up by organised groups in Ghana. Yet, some is-
                                                          
55  The average consumption of electricity per capita in 2000 was 288 kWh, far below 810 
kWh, the average for developing countries (cf. Asare-Kumah 2007). 
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sues are more difficult to organise around. This, indeed, is reflected in the 
presentation of issues in the APRM.  
The inclusion of corruption as a over-arching issue into the APRM is to be 
commended. Issues raised by APRM report in the context of corruption were 
indeed critical and included substantial and practical details with potentially 
far-reaching consequences. One such detail was the recommendation to ap-
point permanent heads of SFO and CHRAJ, as the non-permanent position 
could negatively impact on the personal independence of position holders. 
Adequate mainstreaming did not take place in all cases, though, e. g. on un-
employment. Topics like agriculture, the informal sector, or energy, were not 
covered to an extend by the APRM that they would merit – with regard to 
their importance to the Ghanaian populace. 
Unsatisfactory mentioned issues come from both social taboos (topics that 
cannot be voiced) or amorphous interests (the group of interested is too broad 
and faces collective action problems). These topics of specifically marginal-
ized groups can be brought to the agenda by certain advocates, as seen in 
Chapter 3. Several feedback-loops and advocacy institutions such as CHRAJ 
or the Panel of Eminent Persons (in the CRM) were provided and created 
possibilities to set issues or to give them different weight. For the APRM’s 
merits in Ghana, social taboo topics (like witchcraft, but not homosexuality), 
or politically/socially difficult issues (like chieftaincy) can indeed be found in 
the review. They were carefully phrased and restrained from absolutist criti-
cism; yet this style might make it easier for Ghanaian society to accept criti-
cism.  
Consistency of the various components of the report is an additional critical 
point: Country Self-Assessment Report (CSAR), findings of the Country 
Review Mission (CRM) and the PoA do not fully match in all cases. This is 
to be expected, and positive in cases of differing emphasis between CSAR 
and CRM, e. g. in the topic of chieftaincy, and illustrates that the peer review 
works in these areas. However, some issues are to be found in the recom-
mendations and not in the PoA and vice versa. Recommendations not in the 
PoA are for instance conventions to be ratified. There are also new issue in 
the PoA which are not mentioned in the report. 
A key problem appears to be with prospectively important topics. The energy 
crisis apparently was not an urgent issue when the review was conducted, 
even if it will have been looming by then, it (a) was a governance issue and 
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(b) had severe implications for the economy – if not for all citizens. Ghana 
had suffered from energy crises in the past. At the time of the APRM con-
duct, it was for experts to issue a word of warning on prospective develop-
ments – but it was not a topic affecting the general population. This shows a 
general problem with setting priorities through stakeholder consultation only. 
A similar rationale applies to other prospective topics like environmental 
damage or adaptation to climate change etc. These types of topics are diffi-
cult to include if experts are not explicitly consulted.  
5 The report – follow up and implementation? 
After looking at the conceptual framework, the process itself and the report, 
one aspect still needs to be examined. It is equally necessary to make the 
APRM more than a window-dressing exercise in Ghana’s commitment to 
good governance. As highlighted before (cf. Chapter 2 and 4) the APRM is 
very comprehensive in nature and the objectives as well as the recommenda-
tions and activities of the PoA are manifold. Can we find indications of an 
impact on policies? The focus of this section is thus on the critical aspect of 
the follow-up of the first base review in Ghana. If the report is meant to foster 
good governance, it will be essential to go beyond gathering information 
about shortcomings and answer these with action and response. From our 
perspective, there are (at least) four main preconditions for a successful fol-
low-up: 
— Institutions need to exist in order to enable implementation.  
— Implementation has to be supervised and reported on.   
— Stakeholders – mostly from civil society – must have the opportunity to 
use the APRM documents, especially the country report as well as the 
PoA as an advocacy tool for their work. And they need to make use of 
the opportunity.  
— And – predominantly on the government’s side – there needs to be a 
political commitment as well as the (financial) capacity to follow the 
recommendations and to focus on implementation of the PoA. 
This chapter starts with a brief overview of the guidelines for the follow-up 
process. The responsibilities as well as the question of institutionalisation of 
APR structures are key within this analysis (5.1.) The following section out-
lines the first two monitoring reports and provides a discussion on the state of 
implementation as reported by interviewees in Ghana (5.2.). Of particular 
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interest are the (potential) roles of relevant stakeholders in implementation 
and its monitoring, namely the government, public institutions, parliament, 
civil society organisations and the media (5.3). Another crucial question dealt 
with in this chapter is whether development partners regard the APRM as a 
relevant framework for cooperation, align their policies to the APRM and 
thereby act as another important group of stakeholders within the follow-up 
process (5.4).  
5.1 Institutionalisation of APR structures  
The final result of the base review is the publication and dissemination of the 
country report and the PoA. As indicated above (cf. Chapter 2) there are 
guidelines for countries to be followed after the completion of the base re-
view, including monitoring and evaluation of the APRM’s impact. As men-
tioned before, every APR country needs to appoint a focal point with staff. In 
Ghana this  institution is provided by the Governing Council that serves with 
its administrative support – the national APR secretariat – as focal point. The 
role of this institution with regard to the guidelines and the actual implemen-
tation is of great relevance. The Ghana-specific institution of technical teams 
is also analysed with regard to their role in the follow-up of the process.  
5.1.1 The Governing Council 
The responsibility of monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the 
PoA in Ghana is attributed to the national Governing Council. The council 
has to deliver a progress report of the national PoA every six month to the 
APR Panel and the APR Secretariat in South Africa. Every annual report is 
then tabled at the APR Forum. An institutionalised control of the govern-
ment’s efforts to address the PoA is thus provided for. Reports on the pro-
gress made in Ghana have already been written according to the continental 
guidelines. The first report was submitted after six months in June 2006; the 
second report (first annual report) was presented to the APR Panel and intro-
duced to the public in April 2007.  
Important stakeholders in the process of monitoring and evaluating the im-
plementation are the government as well as CSOs (cf. GC 2006; GC 2007; 
Team Consultancy 2005; Opoku 2006).  
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“The Governing Council in keeping with the spirit of participation and 
ownership is working in concert with both government and civil society to 
monitor the progress in implementing the PoA” (GC 2006, 4). 
The Governing Council is obtaining feedback from a great variety of stake-
holders by interacting with the ministries, departments and agencies as well 
as with civil society organisations, citizens and individual experts. That feed-
back can be used to appraise the progress made in improving governance and 
socio-economic development (cf. GC 2007, vii).  
The general tasks of the Governing Council within the follow-up are de-
scribed as: dissemination of the findings of the country report, printing of 
copies of the report, launching the report to the general public and sharing of 
Ghana’s experience with other countries (cf. GC 2006; GC 2007). For the 
latter task, Ghana is planning to establish an APRM centre of excellence, as 
reported by Ghana News Agency in July 2008:  
“Ghana is to host an African Peer Review Mechanism centre of excellence 
to enhance the concept of good governance in the sub-region. Discussions 
on the Centre are far advanced with the World Bank, Canada and Ger-
many ready to offer the necessary financial and infrastructural assistance 
for the building of the centre. Dr. Francis Appiah, Executive Secretary of 
the National APRM Governing Council […] said the centre to be launched 
early next year [2009] would foster regional cooperation and serve as a 
link between the academia and other stakeholders. It will also be a centre 
for generating best practices that would foster the sub-region's political 
development. At the start, the Centre will meet the needs of Benin, Mali, 
Burkina Faso and Ghana.” (GNA, cited on: http://www. modernghana. 
com/news/173321/1/aprm-centre-of-excellence-to-be-established-in-
gha.html)  
As an example for in-country communication, one can note the serial docu-
mentation of the Country Review report in the Daily Graphic, a daily Ghana-
ian newspaper. Another example of activities was a Trainer-of-Trainers’ 
workshop for the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE)’s Re-
gional Directors.  
The examples above only illustrate the role of the Ghanaian GC within the 
follow-up of the process (see box 9). The political will to install it as a per-
manent monitoring body on implementation has been declared by the Presi-
dent – as also written in the minutes of the peer review in Khartoum – and is 
contained in the APR report. 
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“President Kufuor confirmed that the Ghana National APR Governing 
Council would be converted into a permanent body to assist with the im-
plementation of the POA, and with monitoring progress on a continuous 
basis” ( APR Secretariat 2005a, 179). 
The high relevance of the Governing Council was also expressed by members 
of the validation workshop held in Accra at the end of the empirical research 
for this report. Most participants – representatives from civil society as well 
as representatives from government – clearly attributed responsibility for 
monitoring and evaluation to the Governing Council, particularly with regard 
to education and information.  
In July 2008, the Governing Council officially inaugurated 46 District Over-
sight Committees, composed of stakeholders from the public realm and civil 
society actors. These committees were meant to be “serving as monitoring 
and evaluation teams to deepen decentralization of its activities”, as the 
Ghana News Agency reported on 7 July 2008. Notwithstanding the institu-
tionalisation of the council and its work, a number of questions remain and 
will have to be settled at some point, e. g. what is the precise term of office 
for the Governing Council and how are new members appointed to the GC?  
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5.1.2 The technical teams 
The technical teams (TTs) in Ghana provided input for the national secre-
tariat during the process of the country self-assessment. The teams, as men-
tioned, were not included in the overall guidelines, and the work they were 
commissioned officially ended with the presentation of the APRM report. 
This was deplored by both our Ghanaian interviewees and other observers 
(cf. UNDP 2006, 32). The first report on implementation described the tech-
nical teams as “lead institutions that managed the Monitoring and Evaluation 
process” (GC 2006, 10). The central role of TTs is also highlighted in the 
country report were the technical teams were regarded “as strategic partners 
who could facilitate a strong civil society drive in support of [implementation 
of the PoA]“(APR Secretariat 2005a, 165).  
Their role was appreciated by involving the Ghana Center for Democratic 
Development (CDD) as one of the four technical teams in the implementation 
of recommendations given in the PoA. The think tank CDD organized capac-
ity workshops for members of parliament of Public Accounts and Finance 
Box 9: Examples for sensitisation / follow-up efforts 
233 participants took part in four workshops in 2005, focussing on implementation 
of the APRM (cf. Team Consultancy 2005). The aim was spreading information 
nationwide. Thus, the locations were chosen in different parts of Ghana – Tamale, 
Kumasi, Koforidua, and Accra – between 12 and 28 September 2005. 
As a follow-up after the presentation of the report, the Governing Council also held 
workshops in various parts of Ghana, where stakeholders were supposed to express 
their opinion with regard to the implementation of the recommendations. One 
example was a dissemination workshop held in the very Upper West Region in Wa 
in February 2007 were approximately 120 stakeholders took part. The workshop 
was intended to serve three different purposes: (i) the presentation and dissemina-
tion of findings of the country report (ii) the presentation of the PoA and (iii) the 
introduction of the monitoring and evaluation framework to elicit the implementa-
tion of the findings. Expectations of low levels of knowledge could explain this 
choice of emphasis. Thus with regard to implementation, particularly the second 
and third aspects are highly relevant. Note that the first aspect should already have 
been concluded at this stage of the process. It was thus objectively behind sched-
ule. Nevertheless, the workshop focused on presenting the findings of the report 
and explaining the process itself. Additionally, questionnaires focussing on the 
state of implementation were distributed. 
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Committees as well as for the parliamentary draftsman’s office (GC 2007, 
30 f.). As team member explained: 
“It is actually foreseen that we do the monitoring of the implementation, 
but we are still looking for funding support. We also want to do a special 
monitoring from the Civil Society perspective. There will be an extra 
budget for this, but we do not know about the amount, yet. To organise the 
implementation monitoring measures, the APR Secretariat has already 
held a workshop last year. But everything is just about to start. “(inter-
view, 27 March 2007). 
It appears that the role of TTs in monitoring implementation has deliberately 
not been further institutionalised. The first APRM progress reports had 
pointed to the technical teams as the link between the Governing Council 
itself and the civil society organisations. The subsequent first annual report, 
however, replaced the technical teams by the rather general term “Survey 
Analysis” as the link between the Governing Council and the CSOs and 
avoided naming the institutions themselves. Despite the positive image the 
technical teams have in general, actors are cautious not to set their hopes on 
one card and to maintain a certain level of competition. As a member of one 
of the TTs put it: “More flexibility is better […]. You know there is a lot of 
institutionalisation in Ghana and then you see that it is not working” (inter-
view, 27 March 2007). 
5.2 State of implementation  
With regard to the state of implementation two sources are of highly relevant 
for this study. First, the official reports on implementation of the PoA. Sec-
ond, the information provided by the interviewees. Before looking at the 
reports and the perceptions gathered in the interviews, it is essential to state 
that a clear tracking of the impact of the APRM is rather difficult; further-
more, it will be difficult to attribute causality to changes to the APRM as this 
would ignore a plethora of other factors. Nevertheless, the interviews suggest 
that causal links could exist between some topics; these suggestions, how-
ever, would require more in-depth research.  
Implementation reports 
The methodology used in compiling the progress reports mirrors the method-
ology used in the self-assessment of the APRM. It includes pre-field surveys, 
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e. g. desk reviews to gather factual information, field surveys involving inter-
views with a sample of 1,200 citizens from 20 districts in all regions as well 
as post-field validation (cf. GC 2007; GC 2006). The first report concentrates 
on the short-term activities of the PoA, i. e. activities that should run within 
the first two years, whereas the annual report includes the mid to long-term 
activities. Both reports named areas where progress has been made as well as 
areas were implementation lagged behind. As an example, the reports looked 
into parliament’s role as an oversight body and recommended (a) to 
strengthen the committees of parliament and (b) to build capacity, specifi-
cally for members of the public account and finance committees. The pro-
gress described in the first report referred the number of parliamentarians 
appointed as ministers – one critical issue in the APR report – was reduced 
(GC 2006, 26). Relating to the cross-cutting issue of corruption, several ac-
tivities were proposed. The first report stated that some – like the whistle-
blowers bill, aiming at protecting informants – are in the parliamentarian 
process, whereas at the time of the first annual report the Whistleblowers Act 
indeed had been passed (GC 2006, 28; GC 2007, vii). Despite a range of 
achievements like these examples, the impression that there are great – finan-
cial as well as political – challenges and constraints to implementation re-
mains in a wide range of issues (for an overview over areas with high and 
low progress cf. GC 2007, 103 ff.). However, as indicated above, it is diffi-
cult to tell if the progress made in some areas was due to the APRM or not. It 
is likely to have at least contributed to the debate, though. 
The knowledge of interviewed stakeholders about the state of implementation 
and the PoA itself was generally low. Consequently, a wide range of stake-
holders was not able to give any estimation about the progress made. How-
ever, some stakeholders addressed topics that they related back to recom-
mendations by the APRM. 
One level of politics where interviewees assumed a potential influence of the 
APRM was legislation, for instance in the area of domestic violence (address-
ing a largely gender sensitive issue) or the already mentioned whistleblowers’ 
bill: 
“Maybe the report had an influence on government. To speed up certain 
processes like the Domestic Violence Bill. The Bill was pushed. So next 
time when people will review Ghana we can show we have done it. “(inter-
view, 23 March 2007) 
 Sven Grimm et al. 
110 German Development Institute 
“The government was committed to the APRM so it might contribute to 
pass [the domestic violence bill] as well as the Whistleblowers Bill. But, 
what’s next?” (interview 29 March 2007).  
Decentralisation was given as an example by a government official as one 
area where the APRM had helped to make a political cause:  
“The APRM has pushed the topics, for example, with regard to decentrali-
sation. The APRM and the PoA gave a great push. Even if projects were 
already on the run. The APRM is important since it gives the solutions and 
a timeframe”( interview, 15 March 2007)56 
But also institutionally more critical voices indicated changes that they re-
lated to APR recommendations, e. g. the number of ministries that were re-
duced after the review:  
“I think to a large extent the recommendations are implemented. Take the 
number of ministries for example. This was an issue before 2000, with the 
old government. But then the president submitted himself. I think it was the 
APRM that informed the president of the problem of the size of the gov-
ernment. “(interview, 15 March 2007) 
In other words, according to this actor, the APRM was building sufficient 
political momentum to demand (symbolical) changes with regard to the size 
of government. With regard to the realignment of the Ministry of NEPAD 
into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and NEPAD a 
representative assumed in rather vague terms that “it could be that it is linked 
to the recommendations [of APRM]” (interview, 12 March 2007).   
5.3 Role of stakeholders in implementation  
We now take a closer look on relevant state institutions, namely government 
(and more specifically: the Presidency and the Ministry for NEPAD and 
APRM within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and public institutions such as 
the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) and the Commission 
on Human Rights and Justice (CHRAJ) in their role in the follow-up on the 
APRM  Furthermore, conceptually important for the follow-up are parlia-
ment, civil society and the media. They consequently will be studied with 
regard to their actual role in APRM implementation. Even if there are poten-
                                                          
56  This statement has to be seen in the context of the progress reports where decentralisation 
was named as on area where results were mixed. Cf. NAPRM-GC (2007, vii) 
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tially more stakeholders in the follow up of the APRM, the selection of these 
relevant stakeholders follows the line of thought in the report of the Sixth 
Africa Governance Forum on “Implementing the African Peer Review 
Mechanism – Challenges and Opportunities” (UNDP 2006). 
5.3.1 Government and administrative support 
The political commitment of government is crucial for the whole process 
including the follow-up. Government is above all responsible for the imple-
mentation of the PoA, including finding remedies for identified shortcom-
ings. According to the NEPAD documents, the PoA should “explicitly ex-
plain the responsibilities of various stakeholders in government, civil society 
and the private sector in implementing the Programme” (AU / NEPAD 
2003c, 10). During the validation workshop for this study, held at the end of 
the fieldwork phase, the question of who was responsible for activities within 
the follow-up had been addressed. Most participants agreed in ascribing the 
main responsibility to government. Examples given included the clarification 
with regard to more information about the relationship between two different 
planning documents, the PoA and GPRS II. Other responsibilities mentioned 
by workshop participants included education of civil society and the provi-
sion of resources for implementation. 
A question that came up several times in interviews was whether there was a 
need of an official adoption of the PoA as a government programme. This 
question occurred particularly in comparison to the GPRS II, which was in-
deed an official development programme of the government. Especially some 
development partners regarded an official adoption of the PoA as necessary 
for funding.57  
With reference to government’s commitment, a representative of the APR 
structure in Ghana stated that the bottom line of APRM is that African gov-
ernments often “are talking about changes, but nothing is moving in terms of 
implementation” (interview, 21 Feb. 2007). In the first phase of the APRM, 
Ghana’s government created a Ministry of Regional Cooperation and 
                                                          
57  The prerequisite for state-to-state cooperation, development partners maintained, was that 
the supported activity being government’s policy, in order not to violate the principle of 
ownership and to stick to international law. Other stakeholders were of the opinion that 
with the signing of the MoU and the official launch of the PoA the commitment of gov-
ernment was expressed in a sufficient way.  
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NEPAD. The task of this ministry was to spearhead the implementation of 
NEPAD and to help the country in achieving participation in APRM. The 
most important task of the ministry was declared to make sure that the 
NEPAD goals could be reached, including the APRM. “The NEPAD bureau 
is like the national focal point for NEPAD and also deals with the flagship of 
NEPAD – the APRM” (interview, 12 March 2007). 
The ministry was responsible for establishing the national APR Secretariat. In 
2006, the ministry was re-incorporated as a NEPAD bureau into the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. The bureau had no hierarchical or otherwise institutional-
ised links with the APR institutions. An interviewee described the linkages as 
a dotted line between the bureau, the GC and the secretariat for the purpose 
of exchanging information (interview, 12 March 2007).  
Responsibility for oversight of the actual implementation, however, was 
attributed to an advisor within the presidency. There was little information 
about the actual performance as well as the actual workflow of the adminis-
trative structures. However, the ascription of the oversight function to an 
advisor within the presidency seemed a logical choice as the follow-up poten-
tially affects the overall functioning of government as well as nitty-gritty 
issues within district ministries. Furthermore, this responsibility at least sym-
bolically hints at the existence of political commitment of the head of gov-
ernment. 
5.3.2 Public institutions  
Public institutions also (potentially) play an important role in implementing 
recommendations made in the APRM Country Report and the PoA. Two 
main institutions – NCCE and CHRAJ – are particularly important.  
NCCE 
The potential role of the NCCE within the follow-up is in educating, sensitis-
ing and informing the people about the process and progress made. The cru-
cial role of the NCCE in disseminating the APRM Country Report and the 
PoA has already been discussed in Chapter 3. At the time of research, the 
NCCE largely operated as administrative support to the Governing Council 
and the national secretariat, for instance in organising workshops. One exam-
ple the role of the NCCE in implementation monitoring could be the dissemi-
nation and analysis of questionnaires concerning implementation of PoA on 
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behalf of the Governing Council – as was already illustrated in relation to the 
workshop held in Wa in 2007 (see above).  
As a public institution, the NCCE is not directly supervised by a ministry. 
However, in some interviews it was imputed that the NCCE might not be 
independent from government. As a civil society representative stated:   
“The problem with NCCE is that people are sceptical about it. They think 
it is a government institution, even if it is not. (…) But since the govern-
ment funds NCCE people believe it is the arm of government.”(interview, 
14 March 2007) 
With regard to its institutional self-perception, the NCCE staff expressed 
understanding of their independence from government and took pride in ex-
plaining that they were not reporting to a ministry, but to parliament (inter-
view, 27 March 2007). Other authors on the APRM also claim a role for 
public institutions in monitoring and evaluation: “NCCE; NDPC [the Na-
tional Development Planning Commission] and MDAs [ministries, depart-
ments, agencies] should take over the process and in partnership with civil 
society and private sector educate the public and implement the PoA” 
(Opoku 2006, 42). The role of the NCCE reflected in budgeting: the annual 
report on implementation stated that its budget nearly doubled from 2005 to 
2006 (GC 2007, 32); the institution is present in all 138 districts. Develop-
ment partners and Ghanaian institutions indicated the future role of the 
NCCE in monitoring and evaluating of the PoA plans to build district APR 
committees that should tie in with the regional and district structures pro-
vided by the NCCE (interviews, 27 March 2007). In July 2008, some struc-
tures at regional and district level were established, as reported in the section 
on the Governing Council (see above).  
CHRAJ 
Another public institution with a broad mandate was the Commission on 
Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ). CHRAJ has been en-
gaged in the APRM from the beginning and was thus relatively well informed 
about the process. With regard to its mandate and functions, it is the intended 
role of the commission to act as an advocate for social groups and individuals 
that are victims of human rights’ abuses or administrative injustice. In the 
context of the APRM’s follow-up, CHRAJ could therefore – in the pursuit of 
its mission – refer to the APR documents to address certain topics, like do-
mestic violence or cultural practices harmful to women. CHRAJ, thereby, 
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might act as a ‘watchdog’ that could – and institutionally should – have the 
potential to flag government responsibilities in some topics. Indeed, indica-
tions were found that this was its self-perception of CHRAJ.  
“Obviously, the APRM has brought some awareness. People and CSOs 
now have a document to refer back to hold the government account- 
able. For the first time we do not need to rely on international documents, 
when we address human rights issues, we now have an African docu-
ment.”(interview, 21 March 2007)  
Besides this general positive underlying appraisal, little indication of an ac-
tive usage of the APR documents could be found when it came to the actual 
work of CHRAJ. Interviewees often claimed that other reference documents 
– as AU convention, World Bank publications and so on – had been more 
important documents to CHRAJ than the APRM. With regard to two promi-
nent legislative acts – the Whistleblowers Act and the Domestic Violence Act 
– interviewees assumed that the APRM might have contributed to the advo-
cacy work of CHRAJ. Yet, there were no indications of clear reference or a 
causal link to the APRM. Some issues, as indicated in Chapter 4 on the con-
tent of the APRM report, apparently were not covered, e. g. the rights of 
homosexuals.  
5.3.3 Parliament  
Besides its role in the process, parliament is crucial also in the follow-up as 
the paramount democratic institution - at least in theory. Its role in the im-
plementation phase has at least two aspects: First, parliament appeared 
prominently in the APR’s recommendations, which aimed at making this key 
democratic institution stronger. The second aspect deals with the intended 
role of parliament as a watchdog of the very PoA. Parliament indeed proba-
bly should play a crucial role in oversight. It is the eminent task of a parlia-
ment – alongside its legislative role – to provide checks and balances, e. g. 
hold the government to account and to represent the people. With regard to 
the follow-up of the APRM, parliament should thus supervise the implemen-
tation of the PoA (budgeting, implementing recommendations). It could also 
use the APR/PoA to address certain issues to the government.  
At the time of our research, the role of parliament as political institution in 
the follow-up of the APRM was rather low. The weak position of the parlia-
ment in general but also with regard to the APRM in Ghana was pointed out 
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in several interviews. For instance, a member of parliament claimed that 
parliament had initially not been regarded as a stakeholder in the APRM: 
“In the beginning there was a problem, because parliament involvement 
was not foreseen. [I do not] know why. It might just be a severe oversight. 
When this issue was raised by the parliament, it was immediately accepted 
to involve parliament. MPs could attend information workshops to be 
aware of the APRM” (interview, 1 March 2007). 
But there were also hints by the same MP that members of parliament under-
stood the possibilities of the process and started to use the APRM as a tool to 
foster their role in a democratic system. 
“MPs try to make laws along the recommendations of the APRM, for in-
stance to curb down corruption. So the APRM helps to inform the MP 
about relevant problems. […] MPs use the country report to come up with 
questions to ask the Executive (e. g. the separation of the ministry of par-
liamentary affairs). In general there is a majority of opposition MPs to ask 
such questions, by referring back to the report and PoA.” (interview,  
1 March 2007). 
Thus, in some cases, political parties appear to have used the APRM to hold 
the government responsible. Examples were the need for electing Metropoli-
tan Chief Executives (MCE) and District Chief Executives (DCE) – both are 
currently political appointees – and the disentanglement of the position of the 
Attorney General and the Minister of Justice. Both aspects are discussed 
within the country report as well as the PoA.  
“[The opposition party] National Democratic Congress (NDC) says that 
MCEs / DCEs should be elected, i. e. NDC makes references to the APRM 
for this demand. … Positive is also that the opposition refers back to the 
results of the APRM to call the government accountable, e. g. problem 
with the position of the Attorney General, who is not independent from the 
government/president.” (interview, 21 Feb. 2007) 
MPs were presented the second progress report by the APRM’s Governing 
Council in June 2008. At this occasion, the Ghanaian Times reported that 
henceforth, parliament would study and report the country’s progress reports 
on implementation of the APRM’s recommendations. The report would go 
through the committee of foreign affairs (also responsible for NEPAD issues) 
and then be debated in the plenary (cf. APRM Monitor No. 6, October 2008). 
This, indeed, is how the report can be made of good use in order to increase 
accountability and improve governance.   
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5.3.4 Civil society organisations 
The APRM report as well as the PoA can serve as a window of opportunity 
for CSOs to hold government accountable. Their crucial role is summarised 
in the statement that “Civil Society is potentially uniquely placed to act as a 
watchdog over political manipulation of the process” (Verwey 2005, 21). 
Most interviewees pointed to CSOs as crucial stakeholders both in the proc-
ess itself and in the follow-up, much in line with the participation of CSOs 
during the different stages of the APRM, as emphasised in the APR base 
documents (cf. AU / NEPAD 2003c, 14). Interviewees flagged concern about 
slow implementation and in this context emphasised the importance of civil 
society. As an interviewee from the regions said:  
“Implementation has become a problem. Ghana came out with a very nice 
report and good findings, but what we need is a strong civil society to 
force and to push the government.” (interview, 18 March 2007) 
CSOs have in theory several options to use the APRM, which are not mutu-
ally exclusive. They can:  
— actively demand information about the country report/PoA and the im-
plementation progress from government and APR institutions (informa-
tion tool); 
— refer back to the findings of the country report/PoA to address their 
specific topics (advocacy tool); 
— put pressure on government to implement specific recommendations / 
promises made (e. g. start a monitoring of implementation on their own 
account);  
— cooperate with the government in implementation of programmes in 
their specific field of work, i. e. become an implementing body; 
— and/or use the APR findings and the PoA in their specific areas of activ-
ity for fundraising in the development partner community. 
The degree of engagement of CSOs in the follow-up of the process, however, 
appeared to be rather low. The impression gained by interviews was that the 
APRM was regarded as one document among others, yet far from being the 
only one or the key document for civil society organisations. With regard to 
the usage of the APRM according to the above mentioned potential, it can be 
presumed that none of the different possibilities was used to a great extent 
throughout society. Only few interviewees explained that they used the 
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APRM for information and even less indications could be found that organi-
sations actively use the APRM for advocacy. The impression of low engage-
ment in implementation was true for CSOs in Accra, but was even more 
dominant for the situation in Tamale and Kumasi. 
Nevertheless, most interviewed CSOs felt that the APR documents were 
generally useful. Some interviewees perceived themselves as well informed 
about the process and the PoA; it was felt to have contributed to transparency. 
Whoever wanted to get information was able to do so, one interviewee de-
clared (interview, 23 March 2007). Other interviewees, however, were more 
critical about the value of information provided by the APRM. Some inter-
viewees stated that CSOs indeed had used the report and the PoA in their 
work, for instance, in gathering information about their area of work. The 
information provided was then used for discussions and organisational 
alignment – like an annual work plan (interview, 19 Feb. 2007). If this was 
the case, it was actually achieving one of the declared aims by the APRM: 
aligning CSOs to national priorities, rather than having them follow the fund-
ing decisions by development partners. Some of the CSO interviewees stated 
that they actively use the PoA for their work.  
“We look in at the PoA and ask questions, the government has to give ac-
count. This makes policy more transparent. We try to work on the imple-
mentation of the PoA issues” (interview, 27 March 2007).  
Others confirmed that the APRM provided for the possibility to raise one’s 
voice and to relate to an official document. Interestingly, these voices mostly 
came from the regions, i. e. from actors relatively remote from political proc-
esses in the capital. Nevertheless, in most cases it was stated as a possibility 
that could be used, rather than that it actually had been used. 
5.3.5 The media  
The media are important when it comes to the central prerequisite for en-
gagement: information. As was already described with regard to their role in 
the process (cf. Chapter 3) media coverage of political processes – as op-
posed to events – is difficult, anywhere in the world (e. g. for South Africa’s 
APRM see Boyle 2008). Media tend to focus on news and conflicts. Within 
the limitations of this general systematic obstacle, the media in Ghana acted 
as a valuable source of information also with regard to the APRM as a great 
number of interviewees acknowledged. In some cases, media representatives 
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explained that they use the APR document as a reference. One example pro-
vided was the case of reporting on corruption (interview, 16 March 2007).  
The role of the media in implementation was also discussed during the vali-
dation workshop held in Accra. Different proposals to engage the media more 
closely in the follow-up included the suggestion to engage skilled personal in 
the national secretariat to brief the media systematically. Another idea that 
arose within the discussion was to identify a small number of media represen-
tatives – specialised journalists in their respective area of work – that should 
be invited and informed by the Governing Council on a regular basis. 
5.3.6 Development partners’ alignment towards the APRM  
Some observers understood the APRM as an attempt to operate like a credit-
rating scheme. Proving that government was serious about governance re-
forms (and thus implicitly about development of the country) would increase 
willingness of development partners to engage in the respective country, it 
was hoped (cf. Grimm / Gyimah-Boadi 2008). Indeed, the APRM base docu-
ments state that:  
“if the Government of the country in question shows a demonstrable will 
to rectify the identified shortcomings, then it will be incumbent upon par-
ticipating Governments to provide what assistance they can, as well as to 
urge donor governments and agencies also to come to the assistance of the 
country reviewed.” (AU / NEPAD 2003e, paragraph 24).  
The potential important role of development partners in supporting the na-
tional PoA is also emphasised in the guidelines for countries to prepare for 
participating in the APRM (AU / NEPAD 2003c, 16). Some observers – and, 
in fact, actors – recommend that funding from external partners should be 
utilised to assist in scaling up and to accelerate implementation (Asante 2006, 
13). A range of sources – including Ghana’s President Kufuor – put emphasis 
on the need for commitments by and support from development partners. 
”External assistance from development partners would, nevertheless, be 
useful towards implementing the Programme of Action” (APR Forum 2006). 
Ghanaian stakeholders who participated in this study’s validation workshop 
in April 2007 also attributed responsibility to development partners for fund-
ing the implementation phase.  
Development partners, indeed, are expressing their willingness in official 
declarations and documents to take an active role on the APRM. The interest 
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of development partners expressed in the implementation of the PoA is gen-
erally high. The G8 qualified the APRM as key in political reforms and ex-
plicitly stated on several occasions that implementation was the linchpin for 
reform. Namely the European Union, the French, the German as well as the 
British government explicitly state their motivation to support the implemen-
tation of APRM recommendation (cf., G8 2005; German Federal Govern-
ment 2005, UK Government 2006). 
“Germany has pledged to assist the APRM countries in implementing the 
reforms which the peer review process identifies as being necessary, and is 
providing funding for this purpose – up to 3 million in 2005 alone. Our key 
criteria, in this context, are that implementation must be embedded in na-
tional strategies and that the African partners must be responsible for 
managing the process” (German Federal Government 2005, 25). 
The British Government addresses similarly as mentioned above the need to 
incorporate the APR programmes into the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(GPRS II) as well as in the budgeting process (cf. UK Government 2006, 2). 
In interviews in Ghana, most development partners also lauded the PoA as 
useful and as a document that covered the right issues and merited implemen-
tation. As one diplomat expressed: 
“I fully agree with the recommendations [of the PoA]. They avoided to 
point out certain individuals and mentioned the right issues. So they 
wanted to improve the situation and not only to blame people” (interview, 
29 March 2007). 
Support of development partners in Ghana to the follow-up of the process 
thus far has happened through financial support to the national APR secretary 
or by supporting single measures within implementation and dissemination.58 
Among the providers of funds for activities of the Governing Council are the 
French and Italian government, Germany’s GTZ and the Department for 
International Development (DFID) of the British government,. The funds 
were bilaterally discussed (cf. Opoku 2006, 31). One example for such an 
engagement was the publication and dissemination of a short version of the 
APR report in cooperation with DANIDA and UNDP with the Governing 
                                                          
58  Support to the APRM can also be organised at continental level, as is the case with German 
development cooperation via a GTZ support programme attached to the NEPAD secretariat 
in South Africa / Midrand, Cf.: http://www.gtz.de/de/unternehmen/19291.htm. This study, 
however, assessed the activities at Ghanaian level only.   
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Council. The dissemination of that short version and an additional brochure 
APRM at a glance to explain the APR process was in preparation at the time 
of research in Ghana and has been published since. Development partners 
inter alia provided funds for these reports, including translation into five local 
languages, printing and dissemination via the NCCE (interview, 29 March 
2007). 
The interest of the international community – and namely of the development 
partners – is thus generally high. But at the same time, implementation is 
regarded as the weakest point. Concerns were expressed by development 
partners that the commitment of government towards the PoA was weak or 
even missing (interview, 26 March 2007):   
“Government officials are absolutely not aware of the PoA. They do not 
take it into consideration and they are not aware of the commitment. I 
have never seen any paper, which says that government will implement the 
PoA. The PoA is more an outsider reference than for the government […]. 
What the APRM needs is a more public step than this six page response 
from the government [included in the APRM report]. Why should we have 
this PoA?”  
Additionally, questions of development partners are related to the relevance 
of the PoA compared to other development programmes, namely the poverty 
reduction strategy (GPRS II in Ghana) and the closely related question of 
double-costing. Development partners provide funding to Ghana within the 
framework of the GPRS II. Both the APRM and the GPRS II were frame-
work documents for development cooperation59, with reference made to these 
two papers/reports in the Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy (G-JAS). The latter 
was a relatively new paper and aimed at improving “alignment of develop-
ment assistance with the core business of government and crucially the Gov-
ernment’s political and partnership cycle” (G-JAS 2007, 1). The Joint Assis-
tance Strategy was the development partners’ programming response to 
                                                          
59  There are a number of additional reference documents and development matrices besides 
these core documents for development cooperation. In Ghana a great extent of financial 
support is provided through budget support (around 40 % of the national government’s 
budget) and thus development partners indirectly support the GPRS II as well as the APRM 
and its PoA. In budget support consultations there is no in-depth discussion with the Gov-
ernment of Ghana on specific policy issues, as was explained by a representative of the sec-
tor group on governance issues (interview, 26 March 2007).  
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GPRS II, given by 12 bi- and multilateral agencies engaged in Ghana for 
cooperation from 2007 to 2010.60  
In G-JAS, the APRM was highlighted in the field of monitoring, not in the 
thematic fields of political and economic development nor in human and 
social development. The GPRS in its first generation appeared as the most 
important reference when defining development partners’ policy. The impor-
tance of GPRS was also taken into account in the APR process – as required 
by the core documents of APRM (cf. AU / NEPAD 2003c, 2). Thus the 
APRM report named and discussed the GPRS. It was also explicitly stated in 
the relevant section of the APRM report that the GPRS “provides the over-
arching policy context for the country’s socio-economic development” (APR 
Secretariat 2005a, 116). This situation remained the same with the change to 
GPRS II.  
The demand to integrate the APRM in existing development programmes – in 
2007 namely the GPRS II – was an important topic for development partners 
in Ghana: 
“It was [us who] pushed the representatives forward to merge the PoA 
with the GPRS. The APR Secretariat did merge them. So I still question, is 
the PoA a relevant government’s document, or something that the Govern-
ing Council and civil society should do? There is also the question, who 
wrote the PoA? Who is committed to it?“ (interview, 26 March 2007) 
Even after the merging of both documents was carried out with regard to the 
costing, some interviewees saw the question of budgeting of development 
programmes as critical. There were concerns that operating the PoA at the 
parallel to the GPRS II could mean duplication of efforts – or, in other words: 
to be asked for funding for the same development programmes twice. The 
merging of both documents – or rather: sorting out the costing in order to 
avoid double-costing – has been done relatively shortly after the APRM 
process (i. e. in 2006/2007). The first monitoring and evaluation report on the 
implementation of the PoA emphasised that: 
“To ensure smooth implementation of the Programme of Action and to 
avoid duplicating development efforts, the PoA has been mapped onto 
                                                          
60  The development partners committed in G-JAS were: Canada, Denmark, EU, Germany, 
France, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland UK, UN, USA and the World Bank.  
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Government’s development programme (the Growth and Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategy – GPRS II)” (GC 2006, 4).  
Yet it was not very clear to development partners how both documents were 
combined. Some claimed that merging both was not carried out in a system-
atic way so that important questions remain (interview, 30 March 2007). 
Have all topics been covered? Has the costing merged as well? Which docu-
ment is the relevant framework for development? These uncertainties poten-
tially have a great impact on the role of the APRM within the agenda of de-
velopment partners, as one interviewee illustrated: 
“The recommendations of the PoA were also part of GPRS II. But there 
are also some issues that are not part of the GPRS II and the [Government 
of Ghana] will never put them into it. We take part in the Joint Assistance 
Strategy.... The APRM is not on top of our agenda” (interview, 29 March 
2007). 
Ghanaian government staff who were closely engaged with writing the GPRS 
II, however, stated that such a problem simply does not exist because the 
APRM findings fed into GPRS II (interview, 27 March 2007). However, 
there still seems to be some confusion about the relationship between the 
poverty reduction strategy and the PoA of the APRM among numerous de-
velopment partners as well as among CSOs and government representatives 
themselves, as Ghanaian observers mentioned in interviews (e. g. interview, 
27 March 2007). Even without qualification of this perception of develop-
ment partners, the perception itself is a problem. At the minimum, there is a 
lack of information, notwithstanding the possible substance of the discern-
ment. 
5.4 Conclusion  
Regarding the institutionalisation of APRM structures in the follow-up, the 
state of implementation as well as the role of different stakeholders within 
implementation, the authors of this study share Opoku’s assessment that 
“implementation seems to be the weakest point of Ghana, and indeed of the 
entire African continent, although this is the stage that makes the desired 
transformation into reality” (Opoku 2006, 42). This assumption was sup-
ported by numerous interviews, in which interviewees identified implementa-
tion as one of the key challenges and critical factors in the Ghanaian APRM. 
Looking at the state of implementation it must be re-emphasised that clearly 
tracking causal links between recommendations of the APRM and implemen-
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tation of them would require in-depth research on issues that were brought 
about first in the APRM. The research outline of this study focuses rather on 
process and substance of the peer review than on follow-up, as research was 
conducted too recently after the APRM process. What could be found, how-
ever, was anecdotal evidence on where the APRM triggered (re)actions. 
Overall, the fundamental guidelines for monitoring and evaluating the im-
plementation by the Midrand Secretariat were respected in Ghana: the Gov-
erning Council has prepared a semi annual and an annual report on imple-
mentation. Press coverage of Ghana still eventually picks up on the APRM’s 
latest report or other activities. Furthermore, the President expressed his will 
to install the Governing Council as a permanent monitoring body on imple-
mentation and steps for monitoring at district and regional level have fol-
lowed in summer 2008.  
None of the Ghanaian stakeholders thus far have made use of the APRM’s 
potential to its fullest. Government illustrated its commitment to implement-
ing the APRM’s recommendation by establishing APR structures. For in-
stance, the attribution of oversight to a person in the presidency is laudable as 
it stated political will; yet there was little information about the actual per-
formance of the task by this administrative structure. Beyond the presidency, 
the APRM’s follow-up in Ghana can build on existing state (but non-
governmental) institutions like NCCE and CHRAJ. NCCE is already acting 
as a regional administrative support to the Governing Council. Yet, the ca-
pacity constraints are vast and going down to the district level – as planned – 
would be a very ambitious step that would require a significant increase in 
funds and human resources. Implementing the APRM recommendations 
concerning parliament was the weakest point when the authors conducted 
their research in Ghana in early 2007. Parliament’s potential in oversight was 
far from being unfolded. This de-link of parliament and public scrutiny, ar-
guably, was the very reason for the APRM’s creation. Since early 2007, some 
measure have been taken, such as the (slight) reduction in numbers of minis-
ters and the announcement of regular debates on the APRM’s implementation 
in Ghana’s parliament. The effects of a change in government in January 
2009 remain to be seen. Governing Council members were quick to empha-
sised the non-partisan character of their institution (cf. Ghana government 
 Sven Grimm et al. 
124 German Development Institute 
website61), and the new President John Attah Mills was expected to duly 
present the progress report to the APR Heads of State and Government at the 
AU summit at the end of January 2009.62   
Shortcomings in performance were also found for organisations of civil soci-
ety. Opoku describes the potential of civil society in implementation as fol-
lows:  
„Above all, civil society need to be proactive, show interest in the process 
and demand for progress report on status of implementation from both the 
Governing Council and Government and also fulfil their obligations to 
make the implementation successful.“ (Opoku 2006, 42) 
However, it appeared that the APRM was one document among others for 
civil society, which they scarcely used to as an advocacy tool. There were no 
indications about the sustainability of this (little) reference made. While most 
civil society organisations said that they regard the APRM as a valuable 
process, little active use seemed to have been made of it. The media, for its 
part, seemed to confirm this general conclusion. It needs to be acknowledged 
that media coverage of political processes is difficult in general, as media 
tend to focus on events and conflicts. Coverage of the APRM in Ghana con-
sequently was highest around events such as the launch of the review, the 
visit of the Country Review Mission and the presentations of results. One 
might want to criticise this, but is a fundamental feature in free journalism.  
Development partners engaged with Ghana in various ways that directly or 
indirectly linked to dissemination, implementation and/or follow-up of the 
APRM. Their political praise of the APRM was unanimous and it appeared to 
be mostly used in the political dialogue. Various ways of interacting were 
possible and practiced, inter alia, general budget support, specific funding for 
workshops or publications by the APR Secretariat. Yet, the key reference 
document for development partners appeared to remain the GPRS. There 
seemed to be a concern among development partners about the potential for 
window-dressing in the APRM by the Ghanaian government. Credibility of 
the continental structure is therefore crucial for the creation of trust with 
                                                          
61  http://www.ghana.gov.gh/ghana/aprm_members_reminded_be_neutral.jsp (downloaded, 
2009-01-16). 
62 http://www.ghana.gov.gh/ghana/new_government_will_not_affect_ghanas_aprm_process_ 
executive_secretary.jsp (downloaded, 2009-01-16).  
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development partners. Respect of the – few – rules will therefore be the key 
for the future of the APRM.  
Implementation as the weakest point – information and capacity as crucial 
factors 
One possible reason for the slow progress in implementation could lie – 
among other things – in a lack of political commitment. However, beyond 
this black-box term of “political will”, a more tangible explanation might be 
found in serious constraints for the involvement of relevant stakeholder 
groups. Looking at the possible roles of stakeholders in the process, serious 
obstacles for engagement were found in Ghana.  
With regard to the prerequisites to actively engage in implementation, all 
actors would need to meet two requirements for any meaningful engagement 
in the process itself. Actors need (a) a general level of information and (b) a 
basic level of capacity to engage in a process. In the interviews it was regu-
larly stated that more often than not, actors in Ghana suffer from a lack of 
information and a lack of capacity:  
“Concerning the follow-up of the process, people are not sure of their 
role. They do not know how to challenge the government. So people know 
about the APR process but not what they should do with it.” (interview, 29 
March 2007) 
Lack of information 
It must be concluded that the great majority of stakeholders in Ghana – espe-
cially outside Accra – have not been reached by the APRM so far. Observers 
were concerned that “the APR report might suffer the same fate as its prede-
cessors, that is previous development programmes” and might suffer from 
dying interest in the process (Opoku 2006, 42). This included civil society 
organisations, even in cases when they appeared well informed about the 
APR process itself and had even been involved in the self-assessment or the 
CRM. A wide range of stakeholders did not know about the existence, let 
alone the content of the PoA. This was particularly the case in our research 
beyond Accra, i. e. in Kumasi and Tamale. As an interviewee from civil soci-
ety reported: 
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“This place is not like Accra, documents do not get down here, unless one 
has a chance to get a copy by knowing someone. We do no have access to 
documents.” (interview, 15 March 2007) 
It is worth mentioning that Kumasi and Tamale are not the remotest or least 
connected locations in Ghana; they are rather the next biggest and important 
cities in Ghana after Accra.  
Lack of capacity 
Reasons given for this low engagement were often a lack of capacity – more 
so in Kumasi and in Tamale than in Accra. “How should I refer [to the re-
port] if I do not have the resources?” (interview, 16 March 2007), as a civil 
society actor complained. These capacity constraints could lead to the situa-
tion that even if civil society organisations had been involved and informed, 
they did not dissimilate their knowledge to the people they represent. One 
interviewee summarize this as follows: 
“The problem is, we do not have the resources to implement the APRM in 
our area or to educate [our people] about it. […] In Kumasi there are 350 
groups registered as NGOs […] They do not know about the APRM.” (in-
terview, 16 March 2007). 
Similar capacity problems are an issue for parliament. In the APRM’s first 
annual progress report issues of parliament’s capacity were filed in the sec-
tion “Areas with least progress.” Parliamentarians were not provided with 
office space, research resources or support staff. The need to enable parlia-
ment to perform its functions effectively was accepted by the Ministry of 
Parliamentary Affairs (GC 2007, 30). The role of parliament within the fol-
low-up – to act as a watchdog of the implementation was far from being un-
folded. This could partly also be because of a demand for independence of 
the institution, as a MP said: “The APRM is regarded as an ordinary docu-
ment by parliament. We do not look at it as a guide” (interview 30 March 
2007). This situation, however, has changed and parliament seems to have 
grasped the opportunity APRM progress reports offer for general debates.  
The capacity situation for public institutions is comparable. The idea to go 
down to the district level and to use the structures of the NCCE need to take 
these weaknesses into consideration. Going down to the district level is a 
very ambitious step that would require a significant increase in funds and 
human resources. 
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6 Conclusions and recommendations  
Discussions at this still relatively early stage of the APRM, about its effec-
tiveness with regard to strengthening governance, resemble debates about 
whether the glass is half full or half empty. We have not yet seen a second 
review, i. e. the systematic assessment of what has been achieved after the 
base survey. The APRM has some built-in sanctioning mechanisms, but it 
builds predominantly on soft law, i. e. deliberations between peers and peer 
pressure. One of the implicit questions evolving from this study could be “Is 
Africa ready for soft law?” The APRM could be regarded as a tool to bridge 
the gap between civil society and the state. In Africa, this relationship more 
often than not is loaded with (mutual) mistrust and disengagement. People 
have often not been treated as citizens, i. e. individuals or groups with rights 
to be respected and protected by the state. Consequently, they have also not 
behaved like citizens of a state with duties; the state was regarded as some-
thing remote, if not alien. The APRM in this context can help in the exercise 
of an honest stocktaking. It can, however, not replace parliamentarian democ-
racy, as it cannot replace the legitimacy of popular vote – no matter how 
transparent, honest, consensual and efficient it was conducted. Consequently, 
parliamentarians need to be included in the process right from the start. 
First commendable steps have been made in the case of Ghana. Positive re-
sults thus far were: A first ever peer review of an African country, respecting 
continental standards and rules, and openly discussing and coming up with 
critical findings on one of the “good performers” in Africa. This is no small 
achievement. However, much remains to be done in implementing the 
APRM’s recommendations in Ghana. As an explanation for weak implemen-
tation Ghanaian actors point to costs attached to implementation of the pro-
gramme of action (which has a price tag of 5 billion US$). Yet, some of the 
recommendations would not require funding, but political will – like the 
nomination of a permanent head of the anti-corruption authorities. Other 
issues would require more time. These include changes of the constitution, 
which arguably have to be done by referenda (and thus also come with costs 
attached). One such issue is the strengthening of parliament.  
The APRM’s Programme of Action can be a point of political discussion and 
direction. Even though it would benefit from more prioritisation (beyond the 
rough division into short, medium, and long-term measures), it should not be 
regarded as a technocratic blueprint. First, the APRM’s PoA is one develop-
ment plan amongst others. The relationship to other strategies needs to be 
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further explored and developed. This high number of strategies existing at the 
parallel and to some extent cross-referencing to each other – from PoA over 
GPRS and the national development plan to several donor matrices – makes it 
difficult for actors to find their way through this  range of strategy papers. 
Secondly, this is even more so the case as most structures in Ghana suffer 
from capacity shortcomings. Handling and scrutinising several strategies is 
difficult – even more so for institutions with limited means. At the same time 
this creates the added value and is the strength of the APRM’s aspirations: In 
the thicket of national plans, it can serve as the one authoritative reference for 
all actors. If well-done, it could be the first document to consult when enter-
ing a discussion about the state of governance in any one given country and 
thereby contribute to improving governance, indeed.  
Based on these conclusions, some recommendations to different types of 
stakeholders can be formulated, namely the continental structures, the Ghana-
ian APRM structures, civil society and development partners.  
6.1 What the continental APRM structures (Midrand) 
 should do 
Insist on the commitment of participating states: In an exercise built on the 
all encompassing soft law rationale, there is some tension around how to deal 
with free-riders. One cure of this could be to provide for a minimum time 
after which a country will have to conduct a review once it has acceded the 
ARPM. Currently, free-riders can declare their intention to join the APRM, 
sit in its institutions and use the label as an APRM-participating country 
without necessarily respecting the basic principles (e. g. the case of Sudan). 
This risks to devalue the reputation of the APRM. One possible solution to 
this problem might be to introduce different levels of participation. It is a 
serious question whether today’s Sudan should actually have a voice in dis-
cussing good governance at heads of state level – or rather sit in on these 
discussions.  
Include national APR Commission in the basic guidelines: Ghana has intro-
duced a national APR Governing Council, replicating continental structures 
at the national level. This creation was beyond what was prescribed by the 
base documents. This institution has been included by Midrand in some 
charts and presentations. They should be included in the base document for 
the APRM.  
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Think about basic principles for the setup of the APR Commission at the 
country level: The size of the governing council appears to be crucial for the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the process. It might be useful to define an 
absolute maximum number and probably some fundamental guidelines for 
the composition of that body, i. e. a minimum representation of civil society.  
Civil society organisation should lead the self-assessment:  The institution of 
technical teams has worked well in Ghana and further evaluations should 
build on this experience wherever feasible. In places where the capacity is not 
sufficient, support missions could have different forms – and might be needed 
for longer engagement than brief country visits. We also recommend to stick 
to African expertise so as not to undermine the ownership and build up ca-
pacity in Africa. Furthermore, with regard to the methodology, the double-
checking of information provided by the technical teams was successful in 
Ghana and should be retained as standard in other assessments.  
Country Review Missions need to be strengthened: There is a specific respon-
sibility of the Panel of Eminent Persons (and the Country Review Mission) in 
safeguarding the standards. These standards are going to be tested in each 
individual case and relentlessly these standards need to be guaranteed. The 
CRM was a crucial external check for legitimacy even in the good practice 
case of Ghana; it is of high importance to marginalized groups in society, as 
it can act as an external advocate. The CRM therefore needs to be strength-
ened, which could, for instance, be done via extending the period of time 
envisaged for this stage of the external investigation. Currently, this stage 
appears to have been attributed too little time. Additionally, national human 
rights commission or similar institutions need to be involved in the process, 
as happened in Ghana. These institutions are particularly crucial during the 
CRM. 
The timeline for the peer review needs to be revised: Several observers have 
pointed out that the time for the country self-assessment was too short; we 
would argue that the CRM was also too short. Time can and should be saved, 
however, at the end of the peer discussion: the APR Forum meets every six 
months. As reports are handed in at one summit and are discussed at the next, 
at least half a year passes without much being heard about the national APR 
report. This fans rumours about the content; at worst, it stifles a dynamic 
process. 
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The continental questionnaire should be improved: Topics such as agriculture 
and the informal sector need to be further elaborated upon; they are very 
important to vast parts of the population in both Ghana – and more broadly, 
Africa – and their coverage in the APRM to date is too weak. Furthermore, 
the APRM is currently a stocktaking exercise, which could be further devel-
oped. For instance, environmental topics could be further emphasised in the 
questionnaire so as to include prospective challenges, such as adaptation to 
climatic change, meeting future energy demands, etc. Environmental govern-
ance will gain importance; it might consequently even merit discussion as a 
fifth sector to ensure substantial coverage. This could possibly happen in the 
context of other future challenges. A review of the review (provided for by 
the APRM documents) will constantly have to check whether future chal-
lenges are sufficiently included. 
6.2 What the Ghanaian APRM institution should do 
The next challenge for Ghana in the APRM becomes increasingly clear: after 
four years of having gone through the base survey, the next peer review 
would be due according to the declared intentions of the APRM. The new 
administration under John Attah Mills (since January 2009) will oversee the 
second peer review. This review will measure the improvements against the 
first report – and will conclude with new recommendations. Having a new 
government in Ghana is actually a great chance: It should have an interest in 
going through the exercise again and conduct it in a transparent and non-
partisan way also under a government led by the NDC. This would bring 
merits to democratic Ghana and would manifest its pioneer role once again. 
The APRM was and is not meant as a party-political tool; Ghana has the 
chance to prove this and learn lessons in the process. Yet, some lessons could 
already be learnt from the first round of Ghana’s APRM.  
Very broadly speaking, staffing and funding of the APRM needs to be 
stocked up if the exercise is meant seriously. We are aware that this is more 
easily recommended than done in a environment of particularly scare fund-
ing.  
With regard to dissemination, a number of recommendations to the national 
APR structures in Ghana emerge from this study:  
Don’t stretch yourself too far, i. e. don’t do everything yourself: A wise use 
of resources is crucial to maintain effectiveness with few staff at the APRM 
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Secretariat. Is it really sensible to have the Executive Secretary and the GC 
members each time at every dissemination workshop in Ghana? It might be 
more crucial for the national APRM secretariat to actually monitor (and 
lobby) government and to train / sensitise staff in the regions than to conduct 
regional workshops itself. Mounting demands for sharing experiences with 
other African countries further stretch limited human resources, even though 
they are important.  
Build on existing structures for dissemination, and do not stretch them too 
far. Linked to the plans to engage NCCE more in dissemination, it seems to 
be advisable to concentrate on a number of districts for decentralisation of the 
NCCE, and to start with pilot districts. This could be either regional capitals 
or showcase districts, in order to learn from experiences made there rather 
than spreading resources across the country thinly.  
Focus on the value-added of the APRM to key groups. It is hard to image that 
a majority of the (literate) population would read the comprehensive and 
technical APR report from A to Z. This is not necessarily a disadvantage, but 
has consequences for dissemination: It might be wise to target specific groups 
in dissemination. NGOs will engage with the APRM only if they see added-
value to their work. The comprehensiveness of the APRM makes it hard to 
see how an abridged version of the full report could be created without loss of 
substance. It might therefore be providing more “digestible” information by 
elaborating short versions with a sector-focus – e. g. on “corruption in the 
APRM”, “the youth in the APRM” or (why not?) “rural concerns in the 
APRM”, etc. – rather than an a 20-page report on overall governance in 
Ghana. This could also enhance monitoring of implementation, as CSOs 
would be better equipped to fulfil their watchdog role. 
Print more copies of the report in English: The strategy sketched above 
would also make translations of the overall report into local languages a sec-
ondary task. It is understandable why this might be helpful – with regard to 
ownership, for instance – but in a context of limited resources, it should not 
be overall priority. More copies in English would help more, as the target 
audience of the entire report is the country’s literate elite that speaks English.  
For the next recruitment, treat a media officer as priority: The media was 
named as a special group of stakeholders – and needs specific attention in 
dissemination. The recruitment of a permanent media officer could improve 
communication of the APR structures and might foster awareness for the 
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need to create media events in the GC, for instance in the presentation of 
implementation reports or in preparing of the above suggested specific off-
spring publications of the APRM on specific topics.  
The term of office of GC members remained unclear as well as procedures 
for their replacement, should one of them step down; this should be clarified 
in advance so as to avoid less transparent ad hoc-decisions. With any changes 
in the GC, the representation of women and a diversity of religious faiths 
should be standard criteria. This should not compromise the quality of per-
sonnel; yet, it would improve the basis of representation. 
6.3 What civil society should do 
Civil society groups should use the APRM documents for advocacy wherever 
possible, as this will strengthen the nature of the APRM. Government has 
committed itself to the implementation of recommendations. The comprehen-
sive report can help in looking up information and recommendations; much 
can be found in the report. This could be a major tool for advocacy in the 
respective work areas; it is worth the attempt to obtain copies of the report 
from NCCE or the APRM Secretariat.  
Additionally, shadow implementation reports could be established – as was 
done with the shadow country self-assessments. This would meet the watch-
dog function an NGO also has in its respective area of work; chances for 
engagement need to be dealt with. This requires funding of activities, of 
course. If development partners are serious about their interest in the APRM, 
they should be one potential source of funding for NGO monitoring exer-
cises.   
6.4 What development partners should do 
Development partners in a context of high donor-dependency like in many 
African countries have a particular interest in and responsibility for govern-
ance in African states. Even though it can – and should – be argued that the 
main responsibility for governance of any country remains with its govern-
ment, development partners also have to live up to their responsibility. One 
aspect that development partners might need to consider is greater flexibility 
of their respective structures in engaging with parastatal actors like the GC. 
This issue might be less relevant in countries where basic conditions for 
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sound management are met, as budget support could work around this weak-
ness, and leave responsibility for the establishment of functioning structures 
with government and provide funding through the national budget. Direct 
funding of the APR structures could be an option – possibly via pooled fund-
ing – yet it could also potentially undermine the process. The APRM could 
appear as a ‘donor-driven’ project. 
Reference to the PoA by development partners in their political work in the 
partner country would strengthen the soft-law process in the country. Cross-
reference in development partner documents and joint papers to activities of 
the PoA (e. g. using these as indicators for their performance assessments) 
could increase the political weight of the exercise. This is partly already 
done; it should be maintained and strengthened. A strategy of supporting the 
APRM as a reference document can, of course, also be applied in cases where 
special technical engagement is necessary. With regard to the relationship 
between various development plans, development partners themselves might 
want to look more systematically into the linkages between GPRS and 
APRM. This could clarify the current status of both documents – which paper 
had an impact on the other to what extend – and it might also help to develop 
a dialogue with African governments about possibly better sequencing exer-
cises like the elaboration of PRSPs and APRM. The latter, ultimately, re-
mains a task for African governments, as both exercises might build on each 
other, but involve much energy, capacity and funds from a range of local 
actors.   
Leadership is an important factor in any reform process. Yet, in a context of 
weak structures, leadership is not enough. Capacity constraints appear to be 
dominant in Ghana, and expectedly equally or even more so in other African 
countries. It is via processes that actors can develop certain capacities – if the 
process is regarded as potentially meaningful enough to merit the time and 
engagement. In this regard, the APRM – though not the panacea to Africa’s 
development – can contribute to improve governance in Africa. 
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Annex 1:  Research design  
1.  Research phases  
The research approach of DIE country working groups is generally subdi-
vided into three main phases: the preparatory desk phase (12 weeks), the field 
research (11 weeks) and the final desk phase of writing up the report (4 
weeks). All three phases are marked by a presentation of their respective 
results. 
I. Preparatory desk study (November 2006–February 2007) 
During this preparatory phase the team analysed relevant documents and 
secondary literature. The overall structure of the study was defined; aim and 
main hypothesis were elaborated. This phase included several feedback 
loops, based on face-to-face interviews and discussions. The discussion part-
ners were a group of experts from the German Development Institute (DIE). 
This expert group was chosen on the basis of their knowledge in subject areas 
such as research methodology and governance issues as well as for their re-
gional expertise on Africa. One expert acted a particular point of contact and 
reference throughout the preparatory phase. Also consulted was an expert 
from the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ). The research counterpart from the Centre for Democratic Develop-
ment (CDD), Ghana, provided input and in-depth discussions during a one 
week stay in Bonn, Germany. CDD is an independent think-tank in Ghana 
and constitutes a relevant academic consultant for the country-working group. 
CDD is one of the technical teams that were engaged in the country self-
assessment of the APRM. Due to its involvement in the process it was a cen-
tral information source about the methodology of the APRM. As a result of 
this phase a draft report was prepared and presented to a group of DIE re-
searchers in a plenary session.  
II. Empirical phase (February 2007–April 2007) 
The main phase of research took place in Ghana, i. e. in three big cities: Ac-
cra, Kumasi and Tamale. A mixture of qualitative empirical research methods 
was chosen to answer the questions of this study, to get a comprehensive 
picture, and to validate the findings. An important partner in the second phase 
was the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) from South Africa. The institute 
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explores the field of human security – including good governance – in Sub-
Saharan Africa. In this realm it researches about the APRM. Thus, ISS was a 
valuable partner for sharing experiences out of a research perspective. Within 
their work, they also report on the APRM in other African countries (espe-
cially in South Africa) and were involved in a shadow report on the APRM. 
Since ISS has great experience in analysing the APRM in different settings it 
was finally intended to assure the research outline of this study. The findings 
of this phase were finally supplemented with documents that were only ac-
cessible in Ghana, e. g. the APRM annual implementation report that was 
released to the public in February 2007. At the end of the empirical phase a 
draft report was presented at a validation workshop held in Accra to a group 
of interviewed stakeholders. This presentation marked the end of the re-
search. 
III. Writing up of the final report (May 2007) 
The results as well as documents from the first and second phase are used to 
prepare the final report, which is then presented to research staff and guests at 
DIE. This presentation and the following discussion give the final feedback. 
2.  Qualitative research instruments 
It was not the aim of this study to quantitatively measure the level of good 
governance, let alone the degree of influence the APRM is having on the 
quality of governance. Instead, it aimed at understanding the rational and 
potential of the APRM to impact on governance structures in Ghana. Evi-
dence on this was generated with several qualitative research methods. 
The most important tool was the interview. The study reverted to a sample of 
67 semi-structured interviews with stakeholders from civil society, public 
sector, the media and development partners. The tool of semi-structured in-
terview was chosen because it gave the interviewer the flexibility to ask sub-
sequent questions in the broad pre-structured interview aspects. At the same 
time, it allowed the respondents to freely express their opinions and experi-
ences (cf. Hopf 1991, 177). Semi-structured interview risk confirming what is 
already know, but constitute opportunities for learning, as often interviewees 
“will provide not just answers, but the reasons for the answers”(FAO 1990). 
Since different groups of stakeholders (members from the public sector, civil 
society organisations, media and development partners) were interviewed, it 
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was essential to have different sets of questions within a general guideline for 
interviews. A sample of the semi-structured questionnaire is given in Box 10 
below.  
Box 10:  Sample of semi-structured questionnaire 
Questions for all Stakeholders 
– What is your field of expertise? 
– What do you think of the APRM? Where are opportunities and chal-
lenges? 
– Who are important groups in the Ghanaian APRM? (Whom do we need to 
talk to?) 
– What was your role in the APRM?  
– How do you use the country report and/or the PoA since it has been pub-
lished?  
– What – in your opinion - are the most important problems within the sec-
tor of public procurement? [Topic area: corruption & procurement]   
Questions for the Media 
– Which role did the media have during the APR process? 
– Which role do the media have to foster good governance? 
Questions for Development Partners  
– How do you see Ghana in the African context? Where would you see pit-
falls in Ghana’s development?  
– Which topics are you working on? 
– What do you think is the most important policy framework for develop-
ment in Ghana?  
– Did or do you support the APRM?  
– When and why did you decide to engage in the process? [Alternatively] 
Why NOT?  
– You mentioned the area X. This topic is also covered in the PoA. Is this 
relevant for you? Do you align your engagement with the PoA?  
– What do you think about the involvement /reaction of different stake-
holders? Where they effectively involved and what is the meaning of their 
involvement?  
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In addition to these interviews, a focus-group discussion was held at the end 
of the empirical phase to validate findings and to gather information on 
stakeholders’ perceptions on responsibilities in the follow-up of the APRM. 
A focus group discussion in general aims at gathering new and maybe unex-
pected information and topics that could emerge within an interactive group 
discussion (cf. Flick 2002, 168 ff.). The central component of this discussion 
was a scoring exercise, used as a tool to trigger discussion in small groups. 
The purpose of using a scoring exercise was “to make a relative comparison 
between options of a specific issue or solutions to a problem […]” (IFAD 
2002, 44).  
The focus of the exercise was on the follow-up of the Ghanaian APR process. 
The task was to develop a matrix as shown in the example of Diagram 3 
below. So participants needed to first discuss and decide upon what they 
regarded as important measures in the follow-up (first column) and second 
whom they saw as responsible for that measures (first row).  
Diagram 3: Example of the scoring exercise 
 GC President / 
Govern-
ment 
Parlia-
ment 
Devel-
opment 
Partners 
CSOs NCCE Me-
dia 
Political 
commitment 
to PoA 
… … … … … … … 
Clarification 
of relation 
between 
PoA & 
GPRS II 
… … … … … … … 
Funding  3  2    
Education 
of the public  3 … … … … … 2 
Monitoring 
and Evaluat-
ing 
… … … … 2 … … 
Source: own illustration 
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In the subsequent attribution of scores, participants were able to express 
where they saw the responsibilities and to indicate their importance (score 1-
3) to the single measures. Thereby, it was possible to determine which meas-
ures are regarded as more important than others and to initiate further detailed 
(focus group) discussion on each of these.  
In addition, the print media in Ghana was a valuable source of information 
for this study by answering questions about the degree of information avail-
able to actors. This information was relevant to both issues covered by the 
APRM and the process itself. Media reports of the APRM were made avail-
able by the national APR Secretariat . 
3.  Selection of case study – Ghana and its regions 
The research focused on Ghana as a case study to examine the potential im-
pact of the APRM on the quality of governance. Since the central question is 
if the peer review was an instrument to improve good governance it had been 
crucial to choose a country that had already gone through the process. Addi-
tionally, certain basic political standards needed to be in place. Ghana was 
among the first countries that acceded to the APRM and the first country that 
has completed the first full cycle review within the APRM. Carring out the 
peer review in Ghana was therefore exemplary for the other states that fol-
lowed. Furthermore, Ghana was classified as a democratic system with basic 
democratic requirements such as free and fair elections, freedom of press and 
an energetic and free civil society. It is also attributed the label of being a 
good performer because of its relative economic and political stability.   
To get a comprehensive view about the impact of the APRM in Ghana it was 
essential to include various regions in the study. Three regions were chosen 
for geographical reasons as well as for their diverse development status and 
their cultural background: 
— The first region chosen was Greater Accra in the South. Accra has more 
than 2 million people. It is not only the capital of Ghana and the region 
of Greater Accra, but also Ghana’s largest city and its administrative, 
communications and economic centre. All key governance institutions 
are found there. 
— The second region reviewed was in the northern part of Ghana, the capi-
tal of the Northern Region, Tamale, with a population of 350,000. It is 
centrally located and is the political and economic centre of this region. 
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The North is thinly populated and culturally distinct from the majority 
of Akan-speaking Ghanaians. With regard to its socio-economics, the 
region is less developed than the south or the centre of Ghana.   
— The third research area was located in the Central Region of Ghana. 
Kumasi has a population of more than 1.5 million and is in the Ashanti 
Region. It is the second-largest city in Ghana and is regarded as the cul-
tural centre of the country.  
4. Selection of interviewees  
Interviewees selected for this study were all stakeholders in the APR process. 
Their background was largely in civil society, which includes the private 
sector. In addition, the public sector and the media were targeted. In stake-
holder analysis, relevant dialogue partners are selected according to two key 
criteria: Power and interest. In this selection, it is important to involve a wide 
range of informed stakeholders.  
 
Diagram 4: Stakeholder analysis 
 
 
Source: Start / Hovland (2004, 25) 
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The study focused on stakeholders with potentially high power and high 
interest and thus included those groups that were organised and had been 
involved in the APRM. This sample was not static and was open to changes 
in the course of the research, as some of the envisaged interviewees were not 
available while others emerged that researchers had not included at the outset. 
This possibility was explicitly asked for in the interviews (snowball ap-
proach: “Who would you name as other relevant actors?”). An additional 
group of interviewees consisted of development partners engaged in Ghana. 
This was due to the importance of development partners to Ghana as an aid-
dependent country in general. A number of representatives of different devel-
opment partners were asked questions about their engagement in governance 
areas and with regard to the APRM. The composition of the interviews is 
shown in Diagram 5.  
Diagram 5: Sample of interviewees 
 
 
Source: own illustration. 
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Annex 4: Timetable of the Ghanaian APR process 
Date  Events/activities  Stage of APRM 
October 2002 Ghana accedes to the APRM at 
35th Conference of African Min-
isters of Finance in Johannesburg 
 
9 March 2003 Ghana signs MoU at 6th Summit 
of HSGIC in Abuja 
1 
March 2003 Ministry of Regional Cooperation 
and NEPAD is established 
 
November 2003 The Ghanaian government an-
nounces at a conference that the 
self-assessment is progressing 
well; the participating CSOs 
protest  
 
18 March 2004 President Kufuor appoints Gov-
erning Council (GC), national 
APR Secretariat takes up its work  
 
May 2004 Country Support Mission led by 
Chris Stals (member of APR 
Panel of Eminent Persons) 
 
December 2004 Ghanaian elections  
February 2005 Self-assessment reports are pre-
sented internally by the four TTs 
to the GC and President Kufuor. 
Subsequently the government 
consults internally about the 
findings (comments by govern-
ment are later published in the 
annex of the country report) 
 
March 2005 Country self-assessment report 
and draft PoA are sent to APR 
Secretariat in Midrand (docu-
ments are updated several times 
till June 2005) 
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4-16 April 2005 Country Review Mission (CRM): 
APR Team led by Chris Stals 
visits Ghana 
2 
 After CRM, APR Team writes 
report 
3  
May 2005 APR Secretariat compiles final 
country report and PoA  
3 
10 June 2005 Publication of comments of 
government to draft reports and 
PoA 
3 
19 June 2005  APR Panel presents final country 
report and PoA with its recom-
mendations at the APR Forum in 
Abuja  
4  
22 January 2006  President Kufuor presents coun-
try report and PoA to peers at the 
APR Forum in Khartoum. APR 
Forum discusses findings  
4 
February 2006 Official publication of country 
report and PoA 
5  
June 2006 GC publishes first monitoring 
and evaluation report on the 
implementation of PoA for the 
period January 2006 - June 2006 
(6)  
January 2007 GC publishes first annual moni-
toring and evaluation report on 
the implementation of PoA for 
the period January 2006 - January 
2007 
(6) 
Source: own illustration  
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Annex 5:  The APRM and OECD’s aid review 
Peer reviews are an innovation in Africa, but have also been practised else-
where. An international organisation in which the practise of peer reviews is 
deeply rooted is the OECD. Since the creation of this organisation in 1961, 
peer reviews are used as tools for co-operation and change (cf. OECD 2003). 
One example where member countries examine each other in one specific 
policy area is the DAC’s aid review of individual member countries’ policies. 
The DAC is the main OECD body on development cooperation. Currently, 
there are 23 members of the committee, including the European Commission. 
Members are periodically reviewed, on average every three to four years, i. e. 
within the DAC community, there are around five to seven reviews each year.  
The peer reviews are meant to assess the effectiveness of policies and pro-
grammes. Furthermore, the review aims at assisting in improving individual 
and collective performance, providing comparative reports and identifying 
best practises to foster cooperation (cf. Pagani 2002b, 25; Ashoff 2000, 71ff). 
As a basis for proceedings, the DAC review measures performance of the 
member countries against agreed principles and guidelines, e. g. policy co-
herence. In the field of development cooperation, guidelines on related policy 
issues are manifold, e. g. covering the area of environment, gender or peace 
and conflicts. Examples for standards of performance are the DAC Guide-
lines for Poverty Reduction or the MDGs.63  
When a member country is scheduled for the review, the OECD Secretariat 
as well as two fellow countries nominated as examiners are involved. These 
actors form the review team. The actual process includes seven stages: (i) 
preparation, (ii) field visits to partner countries, (iii) mission to the capital, 
(iv) peer review meeting, (v) editorial session, (vi) publication of results and 
(vii) follow-up. The timeframe for the whole process is six months.  
As part of the preparation (i), the examined country hands in a memorandum 
or annual report describing its practise. It is upon this document that the re-
view team (secretariat and the two examiners) choose key issues of particular 
interest for the actual assessment. The next phase includes (ii) field visits to 
selected partner countries of the member under review. Thereafter, a visit to 
                                                          
63  Cf. www.oecd.org/dac (accessed 10 May 2007). 
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the capital (iii) constitutes the main fact-finding mission, as different stake-
holders, including civil society representatives, are interviewed to get a first-
hand impression. After this on-site visit, the secretariat prepares a draft re-
view and a main issues paper. These are forwarded for comments to the coun-
try under review before the findings form the basis for discussions at the one-
day peer review meeting (iv). Here, all DAC members’ delegates form the 
actual peer forum, as they discuss main findings and recommendations with 
the examiners, the secretariat and the country concerned. The editorial ses-
sion (v), usually held the next day, is used to arrive at final documented con-
clusions on the main findings. Finally, results are published in a review report 
(vi). The follow-up (vii) foresees that the reviewed country is visited six 
months after the publication of the review report to track progress (cf. Pagani 
2002, 25 ff.; Ashoff 2000, 72; Ashoff 2002).  
When comparing this procedure with the APRM, a couple of points are strik-
ing, despite a number of similarities. Despite – or because – of the lower 
levels of socio-economic development in Africa, the APRM envisages peri-
odic reviews in a much shorter period of time, i. e. every two to three years. 
Concerning the scope of review, the APRM is a very comprehensive exer-
cise. First, it is neither restricted to only one policy area, nor is there a selec-
tion or preset focus on key issues. The mission to the capital within the 
DAC’s procedure comes quite close to the mandate of the CRM in the 
APRM, as both have the mandate to elevate or cross-check findings with 
different stakeholders on-site. Concerning the peer character of the review 
process, it has to be noted, that the APRM - by involving Heads of State and 
Government - takes this peer review higher than the DAC. This leaves it 
ultimately to the examiners decision at what level they are represented in the 
review process. As Ashoff notes, there is a common understanding that DAC 
countries should send “senior representative[s] of the aid administration 
with a solid professional background including field and evaluation experi-
ence and with an awareness of policy coherence issues” (Ashoff 2002: 20). 
This however, together with the mixed audience at the one-day peer review 
meeting is a mayor difference to the APRM. In both reviews, the correspond-
ing secretariats face a high workload in preparing various background docu-
ments. In comparison, as already noted, the APRM is the more ambitious 
exercise. The necessity to sufficiently fund and staff the APRM Secretariat in 
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Midrand (currently with 20 staff)64 becomes thus obvious, as it is within their 
mandate to manage the whole process and provide background information.  
 
                                                          
64  Cf. http://www.nepad.org/aprm (accessed, 10 May 2007). 
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